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ABSTRACT 
THE CONTEXTUALIZATION OF MYTH: IDENTIFICATION OF MYTH IN THE 
PROPAGATION OF NARRATIVE ACROSS GENERATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
 
Joseph G. Ponthieux 
Old Dominion University, 2021 
Director: Dr. Thomas J. Socha 
 
 This thesis demonstrates the unique correlation between myth and the propagation of 
narrative across generational boundaries. It argues that myth occurs in the intersection of belief, 
semiotics, and context, and further enables a way of re-encoding a narrative with a dual 
contextuality. This dual context preserves a narrative’s literal context while endowing it with a 
new or modified myth context and affords the audience a selection of choices for how to receive 
a narrative experienced as myth. To demonstrate this correlation a Myth Context Reception 
Model is designed for the purpose of identifying ascendent, obscure or emergent myths evident 
in an audience’s reception of narrative, as a result the paradoxical human beliefs and behaviors 
the audience imposes upon narratives appropriated as myth. Three over-arching narratives, 
classical myth, Santa Claus, and Batman are then evaluated as exemplars, using the procedures 
defined by the model, to demonstrate that myth can influence the propagation of a narrative 
across many generations and in ways we might not expect. And to show that myth is a powerful 
a rhetoric that is stealthily obscure, remarkably ubiquitous, and resilient. Even in the modern day. 
 Keywords: myth, context, mimesis, semiotics, generation, lifespan, belief, paradox, 
appropriation, imitation, obscure myth, emergent myth, ascendent myth, paradoxical belief, 
appropriative imitation, reverse-mimesis 
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 Whether a cave-dwelling society from a hundred-thousand years ago, the societies of 
ancient Egypt or Greece, or a society of the modern day, humans have sometimes sought to 
communicate in ways that transcend the limits of their time on Earth. Art on a cave wall, 
hieroglyphs in an Egyptian tomb, and electronic books written with the aid of a computer all tell 
similar stories. We lived, we experienced life, and these writings communicate to those who 
come after us what we want the world to know about us. But the human need for narrative, for 
story, is much broader than a simple need to record and archive histories. We use narrative to 
communicate, to entertain, to convey to others what we have learned from our experiences. But 
more importantly, we use narrative for the critical function of preserving and perpetuating, 
beyond our limited lifespans, the general essence of our characters, our consciousness, or our 
emotional responses to experiences. Yet, from the cave wall to the computer screen, a significant 
question to raise is: What is the probability that any of the narratives that we create will live on 
in the minds of generations that follow us? Is it a foregone conclusion that all that is necessary 
for a narrative to survive, is for it to be archived? Will any of it function as more than just a 
record? More than just a historical footnote? Is any of it “guaranteed” to become part of the 
consciousness of future generations? Will it be part of their living essence the same way it was 
for us? Or will it be nothing more than a simple record, without any of the life, excitement, or 
character that we experienced conveyed by it? For that matter, is it reasonable to even have an 
expectation that any of it will be experienced similarly to how we experienced it? While there 
may be support for the argument that the narratives we create today can never be fully 
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experienced in the distant future, especially exactly the same way we experience them today, it 
has always been, it is today, and will always be, a product of human nature to try. Which 
narratives become timeless and which will be lost to time?  From a lifespan communication 
perspective, the processes of the transmission of narratives from one generation to the next and 
processes of narrative perpetuation within subsequent generations are highly relevant and 
significant questions that this MA thesis seeks to begin to address. 
1.1 SOCIETY’S NEED FOR NARRATIVE 
For as long as we have engaged in communication with each other, we have always told 
stories. Over the course of human history, the humble story, or narrative, has been used to 
capture the character of each generation from which it was woven. Time and again, narratives 
have been used to convey records of history, to entertain, to teach, and to persuade. And for 
purposes of this thesis, narratives have also been used to convey the very fabric of a generation 
or culture’s essence to future generations. But why do some narratives, and the ideas they 
promote, live on for millennia, evolving and growing, while other narratives die a quiet but 
sudden death in the shadow of their own conception? Is there a mechanism or communicative 
process that is significantly influential upon any narrative’s potential longevity and experiential 
quality? And within the time that literacy and orality have existed, is it reasonable to assume that 
the simple act of recording a narrative for posterity, duplication, or dissemination, is enough to 
ensure that a narrative will live on? 
1.2 CONSTRAINTS UPON NARRATIVE PERPETUATION 
Any narrative or text can be recorded for posterity and presumably exist in its recorded 
state for all eternity or, more realistically, can exist for at least as long as humans care to 
maintain the record of that narrative. After recording a narrative, as an artifact it can exist 
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silently, as in a secluded and dark tomb, or live vibrantly and in constant evolution within some 
(or many) humans minds. Or it can become a part of the code of human DNA for future 
communi-biological use (Hulse, 2017, p. 14). To the extent that any recorded narrative will live 
vibrantly in the collective or sub-collective human consciousness, passed exuberantly from one 
generation to the next, the narrative itself must, at the very least, somehow be interesting-enough 
and compelling-enough to persuade enough people to focus their attention upon the narrative. 
These successive generations of audience must then also desire to experience, repeatedly re-
experience, and then repeatedly re-integrate the narrative into their collective consciousness, 
over and over and over. Further, each audience must then find ways to convince successive 
generations of audiences to do the same, and they must also hold out hope that this process can 
continue infinitely across many generations and great spans of time. 
Indeed, we know this happens. Strauss and Howe (1991) argued clearly that “through our 
cross-generational relationships, we communicate across eras of mind-bending length” (p. 425). 
But what incentives are there for future generations to reach into our “tombs” and resurrect our 
narratives for themselves and future audiences to receive? Especially when this endeavor, the 
perpetuation of narrative, as a record of a prior generation’s history, experiences, and 
imaginations, is often impeded by significant cultural or societal constraints typically caused by 
differential generational conditions. Differences in life experiences, opinions, beliefs, 
perceptions, cultural sensitivities, and affect, traits well known to significantly differentiate 
generational audiences separated by even the shortest distances of time, can impose significant 
barriers to acceptance, or understanding, of generational narratives. Another constraint that can 
occur is one of persuasion. Perpetuation of narrative must cope with the difficulty that only a 
handful of successive generations will have the benefits of the living presence of the prior 
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generation that conceived the narrative in question. These successive generations may be denied 
the opportunity to converse with the generations that forged the original narratives, and therefore 
may be denied the opportunity to be persuaded of the narrative’s value as it was originally 
conceived, or intended, by the generation that authored the narrative. Further, preservation of 
that narrative may be adversely affected by that originating generation’s own mortality and their 
resulting inability to continue as caretaker of their own narratives. The imperative, finally, is this. 
The problem is that a generation which conceives any narrative, if it desires the narrative to 
perpetuate or live on, must somehow endeavor to imbue the narrative with the very seeds of that 
narrative’s potential for longevity and self-perpetuation. I will argue in this thesis that myth is a 
critical seed. 
1.3 THE PROBLEM OF MYTH 
Every generation will create a significant sum of narratives that have the potential to 
outlive that generation’s time. However, the preservation of a narrative’s literal form is a limited 
part of the narrative’s persistence and stamina. Narrative can be preserved as a written record for 
many millennia. Its literal scope potentially unwavering and resilient. But will it remain fresh in 
the consciousness of each successive generation? Will any part of its original signification 
survive the generation that created it? And how might that signification change or evolve as it 
leaps from one generation to the next? More than what is written, or even what is told, it is our 
perception of the world around us, at the time the story is told, that molds our perception and 
conscious experience of these narratives (Strauss & Howe, 1991, pp. 9, 34). The historical time 
we live in functions as a lens through which we perceive any narrative, and there is no greater 
perception or experience that a narrative can produce than for the narrative to be received as 
myth. Since the time of Plato and Socrates, myth was believed to possess great power that could 
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be manipulated to shape societies (Murray, 2011, p. 183). Narratives that become myth speak 
profoundly for the generations that created them and the generations current and future that will 
enthusiastically appropriate them. But myth is so much more than a perception of narrative. 
Myth possesses the power to endow its form with great persistence and longevity across many 
generations (Brisson, 2004, p. 15), and myth possesses a sentient quality quite frequently 
recognized as nothing less than life embodied (Birenbaum, 1988, p. 235), or a “life form” (Von 
Hendy, 2002, p. 156). But what is myth? And how does one identify a narrative to be myth? 
Becoming mythic involves a complex alteration of an existing narrative. Because it has a 
unique multi-contextual and contradictory nature, it often has a way of shrewdly redirecting or 
obfuscating our sense of what it really is. I suggest that we are typically conditioned to think of 
myth as being something exclusively of a classical or primitive origin that possesses a deep and 
historically complex cultural pedigree. For example, Joseph Campbell said that “When we think 
about mythology, we usually think either of the Greek mythology or of the biblical mythology.” 
(Campbell & Moyers, 1991, p. 88), and that “One of our problems today is that we are not well 
acquainted with the literature of the spirit. We’re interested in the news of the day and the 
problems of the hour.” (Campbell & Moyers, 1991, p. 1). Further, I suggest we are prone to think 
of myth as being irrelevant. Doty (2000) implicated our modern dependence upon science as the 
cause of our tendency “to assume that we are above the ‘primitive’ need for myth, that science 
does away with the necessity for mythic expression or belief” (p. 92). This “tendency” is further 
reinforced by the observation that, for society today, myth is considered synonymous with the 
“cultural”, while science synonymous with the “natural” (Doty, 2000, p. 89). I suggest, therefore, 
that we commonly perceive myth to be exclusively something for the conveyance of an ethereal 
sense of a distant age, antiquity, and culture that can only be experienced through myth. For 
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example, the unnatural half human-half animal creatures of distant Greek mythology, such as 
centaurs, sirens, or minotaurs, are argued to be easily recognizable and immediately apparent as 
myth (Woodford, 2011, p. 159). Or as Andrew Von Hendy (2002) put it, “myth and mythos 
redescribe a preexistent reality” (p. 312). In other words, we allow myth to function as a portal 
through space and time that permits us the unusual ability to experience antiquity through its 
instantly apparent mythical nature. So powerful is this ability that we often perceive the Greek 
legacy as the exclusive experience of myth. It should be no surprise then, with such temporally 
charged views of myth being so common, that myth should in some way be implicated in the 
process of cross-generational communication. 
But there are other complications when it comes to myth. Such as, how do we define 
myth? Harvey Birenbaum (1988) argued that it is not possible to provide an “absolute definition 
of myth,” asserting instead that myth can be defined from a subset of descriptive components 
dependent upon the discipline from which myth is being examined (p. xiv). The difficulty 
regarding the framing of myth is largely a result of whether it is framed relative to literature, 
theology, philosophy, rhetoric, science, psychology, anthropology, sociology, or history 
(Birenbaum, 1988, p. xi). Indeed, myth can appear to be as elusive a science as it is an elusive 
idea. Robert Alan Segal (2004) asserted that “There are no theories of myth itself, for there is no 
discipline of myth in itself…There is no study of myth as myth” (p. 2). Further, any attempts to 
explain myth by way of rule, form, or function, as opposed to lived and believed experience, was 
argued to occur at the cost of turning myth into an observational reduction (Liszka, 1989, p. 10), 
a consequence that often results in the loss of myth’s meaning. As Birenbaum (1988) eloquently 
argued, myth exists primarily in the realm of human consciousness and experience (p. xii). This 
thesis is thus aware that any attempt to define a thoroughly complex theoretical framework that 
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comprehensively incorporates the larger bodies of the form, function, structure, reference, style, 
genre, and use of myth would require so significant an undertaking that this thesis has neither the 
time nor space to afford. But it does not accept the postulate that myth is, or can be, reducible to 
that simply of a literary genre, an oral mode of memory storage, or a teaching tool. Claude Lévi-
Strauss (1981) asserted that “myths tell us nothing instructive about the order of the world, the 
nature of reality, or the origin and destiny of mankind”, arguing instead that myth exposes the 
structural fabric of the culture that harbors the myth (pp. 66 – 67). In other words, it exposes the 
consciousness of the generation that created the narrative now perceived as myth. 
And then there is the problem of how do we know when myth is present in the 
narrative? I suggest we are prone to think, albeit mistakenly, that myth should be always 
immediately obvious to us. The earlier citation on Woodford’s (2011) views of what makes myth 
recognizable or apparent (p. 159), allude to this potential problem. But is myth only apparent in 
the obvious expression of the Greek legacy? Is it only a matter of antiquity? If that were the case, 
then it could have little or no function in the modern day. It would have no relevance as a means 
of perpetuating narrative for anyone but ancient Greek culture, and it is inconceivable that myth 
is only the province of a handful of Greek Gods. 
Based on my review of the varied and extensive literature about myth, as well as my 
related studies in lifespan communication I postulate four necessary conceptual conditions for a 
narrative to function as a means of cross-generational communication: (1) it must in some way 
be relevant to at least two generations, that is, be relevant to their generational concerns and 
experiences; (2) it must somehow be present throughout both generations whether it is relevant 
to the simplest of narratives and/or the most sophisticated of narrative tragedies or epics; (3) it 
should be active within at least two generations’ vernaculars during the historical time of that 
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generation; and (4) it should have the ability to produce effects upon the stories told of at least 
one subsequent generation’s experiences. That is, it must somehow support a connection 
between “modern” urban myth and myth of “antiquity,” or else why would myth of antiquity 
have managed to become the hallmark of hundreds of generations of cross-generational 
communication efforts?  
1.4 RESEARCH STATEMENT 
 I argue in this thesis that myth is a powerful rhetorical communication process with a 
unique ability to overcome generational resistance and thus influence the perpetuation of its host 
narrative across generational boundaries. Specifically, I argue that myth, as a result of its unique 
2nd order structure, permits a dual contextuality to occur within the reception of narratives 
appropriated from prior generations. And as myth, a narrative can be embodied with a powerful 
resilience with the ability to ignore paradoxical conditions within the reception of a narrative and 
thereby contribute to a narrative’s ability to overcome its own potential mortality, as well as 
overcome any resistance a future generation may possess regarding the narrative. 
To accomplish this, in Chapter 2, I provide a literature review establishing a core 
theoretical framework distilling the aforementioned postulates to frame a conceptual model that 
can be used to evaluate narrative for its potential reception as myth. It will define the constraints 
upon cross-generational perpetuation of narrative, define narrative relative its mimetic context, 
then it will contrast that to the semiotic context of myth using the work performed in Barthesian 
Semiotics to lay a groundwork for why myth is relevant. Finally, the thesis will establish the 
common relationship between belief and myth to show how myth in the modern day is 
compatible with the myth of antiquity, and to cross-generational communication. In Chapter 3, I 
construct a Myth Context Reception Model using the core theoretical framework built upon the 
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paradoxicality of myth. The model will attempt to discern the core attributes of myth, define a 
potential lifespan for myth, and will define the contextual, appropriative, paradoxical, and 
imitative qualities of myth reception that indicate myth’s presence and highlight the conditions 
for a generation’s willingness to acquire narratives outside the scope of content a generation 
might view as favorable. The purpose of this model is to address the core problem of how one 
determines when myth is present and active in relation to a given narrative. In Chapter 4, I offer 
a sample of existing narratives and analyze them using the model. I provide three examples of a 
cross-generational myth reception that is positively occurring, relative to the narrative, across 
multiple generations. In the first I will use an exemplar with a rich historical pedigree to 
demonstrate how a narrative both succeeds and fails at cross-generational propagation, and in the 
two that follow I will use exemplars that are more modern but also demonstrate successful cross-
generational myth reception in variable ways. I conclude in Chapter 5 that myth permits a 
generation the unique ability to appropriate a legacy narrative for use as myth despite any 
literalness the generation might have normally resisted from the prior generation’s source 
narrative.  




Myth is ensnared in a dialectic that commonly promotes ‘classical myth’, a phenomenon 
where primitive cultures, including the traditional Greek legacy, leveraged the mythic for art or 
religion (Campbell, 1997, pp. 1-9), on one side, and ‘modern myth’, such as that promoted by 
Roland Barthes (2012), on the other. As illustrated by the contemporary essays in his seminal 
work Mythologies, Barthes (2012) demonstrated myth to be present in many modern “urban” 
narratives. Further, and quite ironically, myth in this broader modern context is understood to be 
less obvious, if not completely transparent (Barthes, 2012, pp. 240-242; Lévi-Strauss, 1995, p. 
3). Such is the condition that myth finds itself a part of. At once the obvious expression and 
experience of the Greek legacy that is paradoxically a limited part of the greater, but less 
obvious, myth whole that Barthes is recognized to have significantly contributed to (Dowden & 
Livingstone, 2011, pp. 17-18). Barthes (2012) did argue that everything had the potential to be 
myth (pp. 217–218). While it might be difficult to fathom how all speech is, or could be, myth, it 
is further inconceivable to assume that myth only ever existed in antiquity or as the result of 
classical literature. This thesis takes the position that myth is alive, well, and thriving in the 
modern world, and can be found if we know where and what to look for and is a fundamental 
element of inter-generational communication. I will therefore attempt to create a theoretical 
framework for myth from as narrow a perspective possible while maintaining a core alignment 
with semiotics, maintaining relevancy to the thesis topic, and maintaining a connection with 
what is arguably myth’s most important qualities, the phenomenon of its appropriative, 
persuasive, and paradoxical natures. To that end, I will seek to build upon the work of Barthes to 
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demonstrate that myth can be fundamentally indiscriminate, spontaneous, and stealthy. In other 
words, within an audience or culture, sometimes myth just happens, and I argue that this 
spontaneity can occur as an unintended phenomenon, where a narrative never intended or 
expected to be myth, simply transforms, or as Barthes argued, distorts, into myth. Alternatively, 
a narrative fully intended to be myth may fail in that endeavor, but when the narrative is 
appropriated, and myth does emerge, regardless the narrative’s intention, this distortion can be so 
stealthily silent that it can occur without the conscious awareness of the creator of the work, a 
large and significant segment of its audience and their culture or generation at large. Finally, 
once it is myth, obvious or not, it will exhibit the potential to grow, using any and all belief in the 
myth, by its audience, to overcome its paradoxical nature until it is ultimately imitated by its 
audience and ascends from speech into a ‘living essence’ capable of promoting its source 
narrative across significant generational boundaries. 
2.1 THE GENERATIONAL CONSTRAINT  
2.1.1 Common Limits to Narrative Perpetuation 
 There is an abundance of evidence in common history that will effectively attest to the 
potential difficulty of a narrative to overcoming cross generational boundaries. This can be seen 
most clearly in narratives that are susceptible to culture change or generational social change. 
Narratives regarding the British Crown in America were far different in the Revolutionary War 
era of the late 1770s than they were in the 50 to 100 years prior that time, or today. Narratives 
regarding NAZI Germany were far different following the end of the war, and with the 
subsequent discoveries of sites like Auschwitz and Buchenwald, than prior to Neville 
Chamberlain’s signing of the Munich Agreement in 1938. We see this even today. The former 
dominant and positive narratives of “sacrifice,” “family,” “honor,” and “remembrance,” 
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regarding the numerous Confederate war memorials found in southern American states, is today 
dominated by narratives depicting these memorials to be negative representations of racism, hate, 
and angst. Per the adage, times change. But is resistance to former narratives, previously 
perceived without controversy by most, strictly a matter of post-wartime reconciliation? Or is it 
just that these events are obvious to all? Is the need of the current generation to redefine these 
narratives, formerly perceived positively by some, into new narratives perceived negative by all, 
unique to just this generation? Or is there something much larger at work here regarding the 
willingness of one generation to accept or deny the narratives of a prior generation? 
2.1.2 Generational Limits to Narrative Perpetuation 
 Strauss and Howe (1991) in defining their theory of generations, demonstrated the clear 
cyclical and repetitious nature of their model that is evident over more than 400 years of 
American history (pp. 80-97). Strauss and Howe (1991) proposed that any generation can be 
isolated or identified as a generational “cohort-group” with a temporal span of about 22 years (p. 
34), and that any four consecutive 22-year generations comprise a generational constellation (p. 
31). As a member of a “cohort-group,” each person, that is a member of a generation, is 
generally born into their generational designation (Strauss & Howe, 1991, p. 44). Strauss and 
Howe (1991) argue that each generation possess a unique “peer personality” defined as “a set of 
collective behavioral traits and attitudes that later expresses itself throughout a generation’s 
lifecycle trajectory” (p. 32), asserting that the “peer personality” of a single generation will 
always be unique from the peer personalities of other generations in the relative constellation 
(pp. 63, 73). Further, Strauss and Howe (1991) argue that these generational peer personalities 
recur in a persistent cyclical repetition of four personality types identified as “Idealist, Reactive, 
Civic, and Adaptive” (pp. 33-35), and that for each generation, their personality type is relational 
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and responsive to a recurring and alternating cycle of social moments, a crisis or an awakening, 
that typically occur in alternating repetition approximately 44 years apart (pp. 71-74). Most 
notable, Strauss and Howe (1991) assert that a generational response to a crisis social moment 
results in society’s attempt at “reordering the outer world of institutions and public behavior,” 
while a generational response to an awakening social moment results in society’s attempt at 
“changing the inner world of values and private behavior” (p. 71). Lastly, in recognizing that 
each generation will seek to offer something unique of itself to the next generation, Strauss and 
Howe (1991) identify this act as a generational endowment (pp. 39, 369), and define the 
endowment effort of each generation to be intrinsically associative of that generation’s peer 
personality for the purpose of promoting its own self-image and legacy (p. 369 – 370). Some 
examples of a transgenerational endowments provided by Strauss and Howe (1991) include 
poetry (p. 369), art (p. 369), spiritual capital (p. 369), and “the writing of great literature” (p. 39).  
To summarize, every individual is a member of a generation defined by a specific 
temporal period into which the individual was born. Their generation will possess a unique 
collective character and collective identity called a peer personality. This peer personality may at 
times find itself to be driven to reorder or change the world created by itself or previous 
generations, their response will be dependent upon the larger nature of the social moments each 
generation will directly experience within their respective cycle, while also attempting to take 
ownership of any endowment for the sake of promoting their own generation’s peer personality. 
In other words, every generation will, to some degree, seek to write their own narratives about 
themselves and the history of the generations that preceded them, and/or outright reject and 
dismantle the narratives of preceding generations if those narratives are not suitable to the 
sensitivities of the current generation’s view of the world. With such conditions lying in wait for 
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the narratives a generation creates, what chance does a narrative have to resist and survive? Since 
this thesis relies heavily on the assertion that narrative is a dominant source of myth, it will now 
define narrative and its mimetic role in the myth making process. 
2.2 MIMETIC NARRATIVE 
2.2.1 Narrative 
Cobley (2001) describes narrative as the “showing or the telling of these events [story 
and plot] and the mode selected for that to take place” (p. 5 – 6), adding further that it occurs as a 
“sequence which starts and moves inexorably to its end” (p. 9). Narrative occurs as a telling of a 
story that is situated in a time displaced from the time of the telling (Dowling, 2011, p. 10-11). 
This division of time within narrative can further be examined through the study of sequential 
(syntagmatic) relations in semiotics (Chandler, 2007, p. 114). Narrative, for the purpose of this 
thesis, has a direct and special relation to the concept of myth (Doty, 2000, p. 6; Hatab, 1990, p. 
17; Segal, 2004, p. 4), and is assumed to be created by some generation, containing material that 
can be written about practically anything, but is assumed to commonly include a mimetic 
reproduction of something that interests that generation and is intended for reception by its own 
generation and/or generations that preceded it or follows it. 
2.2.2 Mimesis 
Narrative is commonly considered to be a “mimesis,” or is in some way, mimetic in 
nature. In its simplest form, mimesis is understood as imitation (Lyons & Nichols, 1982, p. 1). 
From a literary perspective, mimesis is taken to be an imitation of life accomplished with a 
degree of verisimilitude (Hume, 1984, p. 20; Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, p. 72). As argued by 
Lyons and Nichols (1982), “Literature, like the other arts, is therefore an imitation of some 
reality outside itself” (p. 1). And further, it was the view of Plato that a mimetic reproduction 
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was a relation “between appearances and reality” (Boyd, 1968, pp. 8-9). A mimetic narrative is 
therefore an artistic imitation of some reality. In other words, a narrative is an artistic device with 
an “appearance” that can be similar to some “real thing” a narrative is written about, and what is 
being written about can be an event, an idea, or even a social concept.  
In the form of literature, written narrative, or art, the imitation is considered to take the 
form of a representational mimesis (Schaeffer & Vultur, 2005), while imitation involving human 
re-enactment of the narrative is considered an imitative mimesis (Cobley, 2001, p. 62). However, 
mimesis is not considered to be exclusively a matter of representation or imitation. It is also 
recognized in the context of a social practice, evident in Aristotle’s view that the practice of 
author or artist as imitator is synonymous with making (Boyd, 1968, p. 21). In other words, 
whether representational or imitative, mimesis is defined as an act of creating something. It is as 
much a social process as an object or product of imitative description. Further, Aristotle applies 
this view to the audience as well. For example, Boyd (1968) tells us that: 
Aristotle’s view of literature as mimesis, or an imitation of human life, best stated the 
fundamental nature of the Classical literary achievement, and his view of its function for 
the audience as pleasurable contemplation most faithfully reflected the minimal demands 
of such literature. (p. 1) 
In the larger context, mimesis involves not just the author but the reader or spectator of 
the artwork as well, because the mimesis is created for consumption by an audience. In other 
words, the distinction of narrative is highly relevant in regard to the audience that consumes it 
(Rabinowitz, 1987, pp. 20, 21, 95, 98). Further, mimesis is seen in the contemporary view of “art 
imitating life” (Dowling, 2011, p. 1), and is established with a clear and direct connection 
between narrative and audience. The directionality of the mimesis is generally expected to 
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proceed from life, as the example, to art, as the reproduction. With the author or artist acting as 
the agent that moves the mimesis, which can be significantly or minimally imitative, in the 
direction from life to art. The act of mimesis production therefor implicates a generation’s social 
role in the process of producing narratives such that some of those narratives are fully anticipated 
to imitate or resemble in appearance, the life or consciousness of that generation, in some 
appreciable way. 
Michael Riffaterre posited that a mimetic reading of a text is to understand the text in its 
literal sense, while a semiotic reading of the same text is to understand the text in its figurative 
sense (Scholes, 1982, p. 42). Barthes (2012) articulates much the same idea when he tells us that 
myth can be defined by its literal sense as well as its intention (p. 234), and in contrasting myth’s 
literal form to its nebulous concept (p. 231). What the assertion by Riffaterre tells us is that first 
and foremost, many texts can be read either literally or figuratively, that second, a text can 
potentially be simultaneously mimetic and semiotic, and that third, because the figurative is often 
dependent upon the existence of the literal (Moran, 2017, p. 375), the semiotic and the mimetic 
possess a potentially codependent relationship. Mimetic context of narrative is therefore 
understood as the imitative nature of a literal narrative, fictional or otherwise, within an artistic 
social practice, where a narrative is fabricated for a spectator’s consumption, and where this 
consumption is potentially open to figurative interpretation by the spectator. Or more simply put, 
susceptible to being received as myth. 
2.3 SEMIOTIC MYTH 
2.3.1 Semiotics 
While myth is studied across many disciplines (Birenbaum, 1988, p. xi), it was Roland 
Barthes (2012) who declared the position that myth “in fact belongs to the province of a general 
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science, coextensive with linguistics, which is semiology” (p. 219). Semiotics is the discipline by 
which semiosis is studied (Danesi, 2010, p. 135). Semiosis is the structural process of sign 
production that enables a social process of communication intended to produce comprehension 
within an audience (Danesi, 2010, p. 135). This paper recognizes semiotics to be inclusive of the 
historical differences found in the ‘Semiology’ of Ferdinand de Saussure (Chandler, 2007, p. 3) 
and the ‘Semeiotics’ of Charles Sanders Peirce (Chandler, 2007, p. 3). It embraces the modern 
view that Semeiotics and Semiology have distinct similarities (Berger, 1984, p. 13), that 
Semiology is now considered a subset of Semiotics relative to extra-linguistics and that it is 
common practice to use the term Semiotics in place of Semiology (Hénault, 2010, pp. 103-104), 
and that Saussure’s semiology was relational to a focus specific to the science of linguistics 
(Bouissac, 2010, p. 74). As asserted by Arthur Asa Berger (1984), contemporary semiotics can 
be applied to the study of “formulaic genres, advertising, sports, photography, fashion, television 
programs, cartoons, theatre, artifacts, videogames, fairy tales, films, and corporate symbols” (pp. 
ix–x). All topics that would be of great interest to any defined generation. Further, semiotic 
analysis of cinema, such as that done by Christian Metz (1982, 1991), is well established, and 
literature is recognized as a fundamental example of semiosis (Culler, 1981, p. 35). Therefor it 
can be extrapolated that semiotics, and by extension semiosis, is applicable to many forms of 
mimetic narrative including literature, illustration, fiction, fantasy, narrative, and performance. 
2.3.2 Saussure 
In the semiotics of Saussure, the sign is considered the primary constructive unit of 
communication (Bouissac, 2010, p. 90). Saussure (1959) cast the sign into a dyadic model where 
the sound-image component would be the signifier and the concept component would be the 
signified (p. 67). The sign is the composite of both signifier and signified, and the signifier is 
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incontrovertibly inseparable from the signified (Barthes, 1968, p. 47). While Saussure (1959) 
regarded the signifier to be a “psychological imprint” of a sound (p. 66), it is also referred to as 
the sign-vehicle (Eco, 1976, p. 14). In modern semiotics, signifier is generally regarded to be the 
sign’s “physical form” (Chandler, 2007, p. 15). In contrast, the signified is typically defined as 
the mental or psychological concept we have about the sign (Chandler, 2007, p. 16). Barthes 
(1968) argued that a signified “is not ‘a thing’ but a mental representation of the ‘thing’” (p. 42). 
In its simplest definition, the signified represents the sign’s meaning (Eco, 1976, p. 14; Kress, 
2001, p. 72).  
2.3.3 Peirce 
In contrast to Saussure’s dyadic signifier/signified approach to sign division, Charles 
Sanders Peirce developed a complex triadic system of semiotics that permeated his view of the 
sign on multiple levels (Cobley, 2010, p. 7; Peirce, 1974b, §§ 2.233-2.234). At the core level, 
Peirce (1974b) divided the sign into three components - representamen, interpretant, and object 
(§§ 2.228). Peirce (1974b) argued that “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity.” (§§ 2.228), that the object is that which 
the sign stands for, or “represents” (Peirce, 1974b, §§ 2.230), and that the interpretant is a 
cognitive mental perception of that sign (Peirce, 1974b, §§ 2.242). Peirce frequently used the 
terms sign and representamen interchangeably (Chandler, 2007, p. 30), but Peirce (1974a) 
appears to distinguish between sign and representamen by arguing that a sign can always be 
interpreted by the human mind, while the representamen is a way of distinguishing something 
that has the potential to be a sign, but may not yet be understandable to the interpreter (§§ 1.540). 
This is supported by the general notion that the representamen is meant to describe the literal 
sign-vehicle (Chandler, 2007, pp. 29-30), and that the sign must be capable of producing an 
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interpretant in order to be a sign (Liszka, 1996, p. 24). Peirce’s representamen and interpretant is 
considered to be similar in nature to Saussure’s signifier and signified respectively (Chandler, 
2007, pp. 30-31). This thesis will defer to the use of signifier and signified to describe these 
subcomponents of the sign. 
2.3.4 Barthes 
Roland Barthes (1968) expanded upon Saussure’s idea of the sign to argue that a 
signifier’s substance could be sounds, images, or objects as evident by his assertion that the 
“verbal sign, the graphic sign, the iconic sign, the gestural sign are all typical signs.” (p. 47). 
Barthes thus redefined the signifier to be that part of the sign which takes any “literal” form 
(Moriarty, 1991, p. 23), an achievement that would eventually play a significant role in Barthes 
(2012) theories on deciphering myth (p. 238). With this bold step, one counter the Saussurean 
tradition, Barthes would promote the cause of Saussurean semiotics beyond that of just verbal or 
linguistic study (Cobley, 2010, pp. 8-9). It also bore some similarity to Peirce’s approach to the 
sign, which permitted practically anything to be a sign (Houser, 2010, p. 91; Liszka, 1996, p. 20), 
included some level of objectivity (Merrell, 1997, pp. 25-26; Peirce, 1974b, §§ 2.228), permitted 
the sign to represent abstractions and fictions (Liszka, 1996, p. 22), and permitted the sign to 
originate and exist outside a constraint of human social interaction (Eco, 1976, p. 15). 
2.3.5 Social Semiosis 
Saussure’s approach to sign was predominantly a social one that focused on, and 
required, human interaction (Hénault, 2010, pp. 104-105). For example, Saussure’s semiological 
tradition is applicable to that of cinematic narratives (Metz, 1991, pp. 91-107), where human 
interaction is abundant. Eco (1976) argued that Saussure “did clearly stress the fact that the 
signified is something which has to do with the mental activity of anybody receiving a signifier” 
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(p. 14-15). Further, Peirce (1974c) also approached the sign as a matter of shared social relations 
(§§ 3.621). Though not exclusively a social mechanism, the sign is implied to be an intentional 
means of “social” communication between two people, one originating the sign and the other 
receiving it (Eco, 1976, p. 15). It is in this “reception,” the signified half of the Saussurean 
dyadic sign that occurs as comprehension or meaning within the human mind, where myth is 
argued to ultimately reside (Birenbaum, 1988, pp. 4-5; Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 12). 
2.3.6 Myth 
Myth is a phenomena considered unique to the cultural forces that create it (Lévi-Strauss, 
1981, pp. 66-67), and is argued to reside almost exclusively in the province of human experience 
(Birenbaum, 1988, p. xii). Barthes (2012) argued that myth is constructed from a second-order 
system where the sum of the signifier and signified of the first system, or linguistic sign, plays 
the role as myth’s second-order signifier to myth’s second-order signified (p.224). At the first-
order level, Barthes (2012) referred to the linguistic sign as meaning (p. 226). At the second-
order level, Barthes (2012) referred to myth’s signifier as form (p. 226), and to myth’s signified 
as concept (p. 226). Barthes (2012) argued that the binding of form and concept, or second-order 
signifier and signified, resulted not in sign, but in signification (p. 231), producing a condition 
where signification and myth are one and the same (p. 231). In defining the binding relationships 
of this signification, Barthes (2012) asserted that myth’s form has an ambiguous and paradoxical 
relation with its literal meaning (pp. 226-227), and that myth’s concept is overtly expansive in 
relation to its form, unambiguously nebulous, and ultimately susceptible to being appropriated by 
its audience (pp. 228-230). 
                                    21 
2.3.7 Form  
Barthes (2012) asserted that the first order sign, or meaning, and the second-order 
signifier, or form, are the same (p. 226). They are two sides of the same coin that are 
distinguished, and defined, by a specific viewpoint which is associative either the first-order 
linguistic system, or the second-order mythical system (Barthes, 2012, p. 226). Barthes (2012) 
tells us that meaning is defined from the viewpoint of the linguistic system (p.226), can be 
literate or visual (p. 224), and that it is a full entity, saying that it “postulates a kind of 
knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts, ideas, decisions” (pp. 226-227). In 
contrast, Barthes (2012) tells us that form is defined from the viewpoint of the mythical system, 
and that there is a paradoxical relationship between meaning and form (pp. 226-227). In Barthes 
(2012) view, form develops into an empty, ambiguous, impoverished, recessive, and parasitical 
entity by putting meaning at a great distance from itself, leaving the form’s starved but literal 
remnants free to influence a new and expansive mythical signified, or concept (pp. 226-228). 
2.3.8 Concept 
Barthes (2012) tells us that concept is the unambiguous signified of the second-order 
mythical system (p. 226), a place where meaning and form compete for dominance in a persistent 
and oscillatory dance such that the sum of this oscillation is the root of myth’s ambiguity (p. 
233). Or as Barthes (2012) put it, this oscillation is “a purely signifying and purely imagining 
consciousness…at once intellective and imaginary, arbitrary and natural” (p. 233). Barthes 
(2012) argued that concept [myth’s signified] possesses a disproportionate volume in relation to 
its form [myth’s signifier] such that concept is capable of spreading this signified “over a very 
large expanse of signifier” (p. 230), and that a new history, synonymous to a situational 
awareness derived from the form’s distanced and depleted history, fills this expansiveness (p. 
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228-229). Barthes (2012) regarded this resulting expansive differential, between meaning and 
concept, as a deformation because “what the concept distorts is...the meaning” (p. 232). Barthes 
(2012) further tells us that the concept has an “open character…open to the whole of History” (p. 
229), where the resulting situational awareness within the concept, or as Barthes (2012) put it, 
the “formless, unstable, nebulous condensation, whose unity and coherence are above all due to 
its function” (p. 229), is subject to appropriation (a key part of generational communication) by 
a discriminating reader for whom the myth appeals to (p. 229).  
2.3.9 Signification 
Barthes (2012) defined this distorted relation between form and concept to be 
signification and that this signification is explicitly synonymous with myth (p. 231). In 
Saussurean semiotics signification is defined as the “relationship between the signifier and the 
signified” (Chandler, 2007, p. 15). In repurposing the term signification to imply “second-order 
sign”, Barthes (2012) tells us that the signification of myth is an interplay between the alternating 
viewpoints of an alienated but full first-order literal meaning and an empty second-order form 
that oscillate within a deformed and nebulous concept (pp. 232-233), and that the “relation which 
unites the concept of the myth to its meaning is essentially a relation of deformation” (p. 232). In 
other words, for a narrative to become a signification of myth, the narrative must distort or 
deform. But what phenomenon of human consciousness and behavior might have the raw 
catalytic power to enable a spectator or audience to deform a first-order literal narrative into a 
second-order signification of myth? 
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2.4 THE CATALYST OF BELIEF 
2.4.1 The Case for Belief 
As I developed this thesis, several critical questions would frequently resurface regarding 
the signification of myth. How does one differentiate, or place a value, on the many competing 
views or theories regarding myth? Which view of myth is the mainstream view? How does one 
narrow the subject of myth? How does one reconcile a myth, simultaneously argued to be 
anything from a form of memory-inducing mnemonics, a strict literary style, or a tool for societal 
control, to be one, or all, of these things? In the pursuit of answers to these questions, and 
keeping the focus on intergenerational communication, I determined that it was critical to find a 
common denominator among the variant qualities of myth. In examining the span of disciplines 
that study myth, as previously cited to Birenbaum (1988, p. xi), I sought to address the following 
questions. What are the qualities of myth that are noticeably common across most disciplines 
that study myth? Is that common quality of myth, if one exists, observable in both antiquity and 
the modern day? And can it be attributable to any level of audience? Individual or group? 
Regardless the discipline, or the approach, the one quality that appeared to dominate my 
evaluation, sometimes in ways so obvious, and so often presumed to be common knowledge by 
all, as to be frequently ignored or invisible within plain sight, was the phenomenon of belief 
associated with myth. The common phenomenon of deep personal convictions, or beliefs, held 
by the audience or spectator, about a narrative perceived as myth, could demonstrate a clear 
multi-disciplinary presence while also demonstrating a significant relationship to myth across the 
span of historical time.  
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2.4.2 Ubiquity of Belief Regarding Myth 
Since the time of Greek Antiquity, philosophers and poets such as Plato and Socrates 
used fabricated narratives to persuade their societies to believe in myths, in the hope that these 
“noble lies” might promote desired societal behavior (Murray, 2011, p. 183). For Plato and 
Socrates, the purpose of myth is for the explicit inducement of desired societal beliefs (Murray, 
2011, p. 183). The philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1956) argued that “In mythical imagination there 
is always implied an act of belief. Without the belief in the reality of its object, myth would lose 
its ground” (p. 75). Martin Heidegger (2010) spent considerable energy, within the context of the 
Greek understanding of myth (pp. 91-93), analyzing the contradiction of “true belief” in relation 
to Plato’s deference for “false belief” (pp. 188-193). In the discipline of Classical History, Niall 
Livingstone (2011) has argued that myth “helps to crystallize belief and to fashion thought 
patterns” (p. 125). In Literature, it has been argued by Tudor Balinisteanu (2018) that “an 
enriched definition of myth would state that it is a literary style that engenders faith and belief 
experienced somatically” (p. 176). In contrast, Joseph Campbell (1997) argued that the human 
behavior of accepting something for what we experience it to be, and not for what it is logically, 
is “a primary datum, consequently, of the science of myth, which is concerned precisely with the 
phenomenon of self-induced belief” (pp. 20-21). In Sociology, Émile Durkheim attempted to 
draw a distinction between myth as belief and ritual as action (Pickering, 2014, pp. 363, 366-
372). Durkheim’s views were complex as he attempted to make further distinction between 
belief and religious dogma as they might pertain to myth, but the connection between myth and 
belief in Durkheim’s work was evident and relevant, however ambiguous (Pickering, 2014, p. 
367). In the discipline of Science it was the opinion of Tito Vignoli (1978) that myth and science 
are contradictory to one another while at the same time the two are also a symbiotic amalgam 
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(pp. 9-10), that they are “developed by the same methods” (p. 154), and that mythical theory is 
synonymous and integral with beliefs (pp. 39, 285). In Psychology, Richard H. Armstrong 
(2011) argues that myth functions as a belief system with the ability to encode deeply recessive 
childhood experiences into mythic narratives (pp. 475-476). In Psychiatry Celia Jaes Falicov 
(1988) asserts that family myth is the product of a family’s systemic shared beliefs about each 
member’s role and relationship within the family (p. 213). In Anthropology, Bronislaw 
Malinowski (1971) argued that myth “expresses, enhances, and codifies belief” (p. 19), and that 
it has the potential to be “believed to be true” (p. 25). Lévi-Strauss (1981) argued that myths 
clarify the “raison d'être of beliefs” within a society (p.66). In the discipline of Rhetoric, 
Michael Calvin McGee (1980) attempted to demonstrate a clear mutual inclusivity between 
ideology and myth (p. 3) by coining the term “ideograph” to describe common conceptual terms 
in the societal vernacular that can be leveraged for political persuasion and ultimately be used as 
“guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” (p. 6). And finally, within 
Semiotics, Barthes (2012) did clearly draw a connection between myth and ideology, or system 
of beliefs, though in Barthes’ scholarship, this connection to belief to myth is acutely associated 
in relation to political ideology (pp. 249-274). However, the relationship of belief to both 
semiotics and myth is far more complex than it might seem at its obvious face value.  
2.4.3 Belief and Semiotics 
In arguing for the idea of signification of myth, Barthes situated myth not as a signified, 
but as a 2nd level deformation that can occur in the relationship between form (signifier) and 
concept (signified). The use of signification to identify this deformation inevitably goes a long 
way toward delineating the role society plays in the formation of myths and can further 
illuminate how belief also plays a role in the sustainability of myth. Eco (1976) asserted that 
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Semiology, as defined by Saussure, could otherwise be described as a “rigorous semiotics of 
signification” (p. 14), and that signification is implicated in the existence of codes, or sets of 
rules that govern the signification process (Eco, 1976, p. 8). Eco (1976) argued that a code “is a 
system of signification” (p. 8), and that all human acts of communication “presupposes a 
signification system as its necessary condition” (p. 9). The existence of code within a 
communication system presumes a condition where the code rules within the system are shared 
between two or more social agents (Chandler, 2007, p. 148). In other words, signification 
presumes that communication code, or subcodes, pre-exist as a result of commonly shared 
societal structures or peer groups. Further, Chandler (2007) expands on this by arguing that 
semioticians:  
treat as signs any objects or actions which have meaning to members of the cultural 
group, seeking to identify the rules or conventions of the codes which underlie the 
production of meanings within that culture. Understanding such codes, their relationships 
and the contexts in which they are appropriate, is part of what it means to be a member of 
a particular culture. (p. 148) 
In short, sign production is dependent upon the cultural contexts in which those signs were 
generated. In the semiotics of Peirce (1974c), communication was predicated upon mutually 
shared knowledge gained through experiential relations (§§ 3.621). Liszka (1996) points out that 
this shared understanding in Peirce’s model served as both the product of understanding by way 
of communication and as the common ground, or “commens of the sign agency” by which 
communication was interpreted (p. 81). Further, meaning could occur directly within the 
individual, be exchanged between different agents, or be imparted by non-agents through nature 
(Liszka, 1996, p. 81). In other words, what Peirce was arguing is that for understanding or 
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meaning to occur, some level of mutually understood prerequisite code, or common ground, 
must pre-exist and be shared amongst those agents communicating with each other and that 
physical things that pre-exist, without any involvement of agency or human interaction, still have 
the ability to function as sign vehicles, or alternatively as communication code. For example, a 
tree by any other species is still a tree. What this ultimately implies is that the code, or subcodes, 
that may influence signification reveal a cultural influence upon the process of signification. 
Code, while not necessarily exclusive to the group, thus lends itself toward a group activity, or 
communication between two or more people connected by way of associations and 
commonalities. In other words, peer groups with age commonalities such as a generation. One 
such code with relevance to this thesis is that of connotation. 
In semiotics, connotation is recognized as a code that defines the way in which we 
personalize our interpretation of a sign through ideology or affect (Chandler, 2007, p. 138). 
Barthes (1968) argued that the signifiers of a connotation system, or connotators, were groups of 
denoted signs synonymous with that of rhetoric (pp. 91-92), and that the signifieds of the 
connotation system were synonymous with that of ideology (p. 92). Connotation’s signifieds 
were, as Barthes (1968) put it, “at once general, global and diffuse” and that they “have a very 
close communication with culture, knowledge, history, and it is through them, so to speak, that 
the environmental world invades the system” (p. 91-92). The binding between rhetoric (signifier) 
and ideology (signified) is still signification (Barthes, 1968, p. 91), but connotation has a 
complex set of qualities as it is seen as an amalgam of many denotations, is synonymous in some 
ways with that of text, has an inexhaustive capacity, and can naturalize the denotations it is made 
from (Barthes, 1968, p. 91). In Barthes’ description of it, connotation has a character that is 
virtually indistinguishable from his own descriptions of myth. Further, Barthes (1977) argued 
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that perception, cognition, and even ethics could impose themselves upon the connotative 
interpretation of a sign (p. 29). Connotation, therefore, reflects the process and product of 
persuasion within semiotics. It is a recognition that communication, by way of semiosis, involves 
more than just the communication of an idea, the defining of and conveyance of a term, but also: 
What is it that I believe about this communication in relationship to my contextual position in 
space and time? In relation to the culture I grew up in, the generation that raised me, the 
knowledge I have, and the culture, environment, and generation I now belong to, what are my 
convictions and beliefs regarding this communication that its connotative qualities seek to 
persuade of me? And what am I willing to accept? We could ask similarly: What is the ideology, 
regarding a myth’s rhetoric, that I choose to permit? 
2.4.4 Belief and Group 
But is that permission to grant a narrative the status of myth, should I choose to grant it, 
isolated to just the individual? It is common knowledge that belief exists and occurs within the 
individual. But belief also occurs as a shared activity within groups of individuals that hold 
similar shared beliefs often producing the result of a shared cultural identity. Coupland and 
Jaworski (2001) argue that the acceptance of ideology “by the audience, especially mass media 
audiences, ensures the establishment of group rapport. As Fowler (1985, p. 66) puts it, through 
the emergence of a ‘community of ideology, a shared system of beliefs about reality’ creates 
group identity” (p.144). Coupland and Jaworski (2001) further argue the need to understand:  
the term ideology as a set of social (general and abstract) representations shared by 
members of a group and used by them to accomplish everyday social practices: acting 
and communicating (e.g. van Dijk 1998; Billig et al. 1988; Fowler 1985). These 
representations are organized into systems which are deployed by social classes and other 
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groups ‘in order to make sense, figure out and render intelligible the way society works’ 
(Hall 1996, p. 26). (p. 144) 
In other words, the cumulative of beliefs held by a group of individuals play a role in forming the 
beliefs of the group. These shared beliefs of the group then play an extended role in forming the 
beliefs of any one individual. Richard J.Watts (2012), in suggesting that we use narrative, as 
myth, to make our world intelligible, argued that: 
Beliefs about a phenomenon or a set of phenomena do not come from nowhere; they are 
socially constructed as frames, scripts, and schemata of knowledge in every individual’s 
cognition through the discursive repetition of those beliefs in institutionalized settings of 
social interaction (or social practice) such as the family, the school, the media, friendship 
networks, the work-group, and other communities of practice (Wenger 1998; Eckert 
2000; Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003). (p. 587) 
The beliefs of the individual thus are influenced by those of the group. What someone believes 
about a narrative may differ from that of the group, but it might also be shared with another 
group. Belief can be a conviction of the individual, or it can be part of a shared ideology. And it 
should be no surprise that belief might also be recognized to play a significant role within the 
shared ideology of a generational cohort. 
2.4.5 Belief and Generation 
Strauss and Howe (1991) argue that the inner beliefs of the larger generational cohort 
tend to remain consistent over the span of a lifecycle, but that the beliefs of everyone in the 
cohort will not be uniformly demonstrated across the cohort (p. 66). In other words, the essence 
of the beliefs of a generational peer personality is the sum of the beliefs of everyone within that 
generation. However, individuals with nonconformant beliefs within their generation are 
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typically conscious of how their beliefs differ from the dominant beliefs within their generational 
cohort (Strauss & Howe, 1991, p. 66). If an individual can be acutely aware of how their beliefs 
differ from their generational peers, then they most certainly can be aware of how their beliefs, 
or even their generation’s cumulative belief system, differs from the beliefs of a different 
generation. Strauss and Howe (1991) argued that “we can apply no reductive rules for comparing 
the beliefs and behavior of one cohort-group with those of its neighbors” (p. 67), and that any 
comparison “must be interpreted in the proper historical context” (p. 67).  
In other words, even within a cohort belief system possessing rigid or dominant beliefs, it 
is not uncommon or unexpected that an individual, or subgroup of individuals, might desire to 
believe something different, counter, inconsistent, or even unconventional from their 
generational norm. Further, any interpretation of these beliefs must consider the culture and 
times in which the beliefs occurred. This oscillation between the belief identities of individual 
and group leaves open the potential for anyone in one generation to engage in or entertain beliefs 
inconsistently or illogically dispositioned (paradoxically) to the rest of the generation they 
currently belong to. Since narrative can be used to conveniently inherit, or appropriate, beliefs 
from a prior generation, even if those beliefs are illogical or inconsistent with the current 
generation, the dynamic creates a fertile environment where there is always an opportunity for 
myth to enable the appropriation of those narratives across generational boundaries, in spite of 
any generational constraints or differences that might exist to impose unpalatable opinion about 
those narratives. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
 Belief thus takes center stage in the perpetuation of narrative across generational 
boundaries and time. Belief is implicated in the longevity of messages that people perceive as 
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memorable (Knapp et al., 1981, pp. 34, 40). Dallos and Vetere (1997) argue that family beliefs 
are often shared across time by way of narrative (p. 3), while further, Falicov (1988) tells us that 
“family myth” functions to “promote the continuity of family identity from one generation to 
another” (p. 218). Belief is relevant the audience of myth as individual, as group or generation, 
across countless avenues of research pertaining to narrative and myth and is further relevant 
myth across significant spans of time. But belief is only a catalytical character of myth’s 
resilience. It accelerates and sustains the deformation of narrative into myth by permitting or 
encouraging appropriation. I argue that it is the strong conviction in the myth, by the audience, 
that acts as a catalyst to encourage those appropriations. Appropriation often perceived to occur 
against an illogical frame or set of conditions, and that frequently occur within contextual 
degrees of freedom that enable certain narratives to overcome social resistance to their content. 
In other words, myth provides the generational cohort with the necessary communication codes 
to use belief and imitation, under conditions that might otherwise be perceived as illogical or 
encounter a great degree of resistance, to endow certain narratives with resilience. But it’s not 
just any belief, or just any imitation, that are found relational to myth. Signification of myth 
involves both a special kind of belief, and a special kind of imitation, paradoxical belief and 
reverse-mimesis, that provide a special kind of social code that ultimately permits audiences to 
distort narrative into myth. 
What this implies is, there is a governing set of rules, or code, by which myth can be 
readily identified. That there are also subsets of rules governing interpretation of myth that can 
be highly relevant to cultural or group contexts. As Barthes (2012) argued, in the act of being a 
mythologist, myth can be identified (pp. 234, 238–239). In the case of this thesis, I will argue 
that myth can be shown to occur solely at the level of the individual operating within a single 
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mind, be highly relevant within the generational group, thus it can be hidden, stealthy, or 
obvious, occur as a result of the influence of a natural occurrence, and can scale to become a 
power within its own right. While both Barthes (2012, pp. 230, 234) and Lévi-Strauss (1981, p. 
87) did argue for myth’s ability to expand limitlessly, I will argue the distinction that it is in the 
moment that the signification of myth transitions from a private phenomenon to a shared process 
of group or culture that signification of myth is finally permitted the ability to expand to its true 
potential. Poised within that cultural context, narratives shared between multiple people, then 
between multiple cultures or groups, possess a significantly greater chance to survive beyond the 
mortal limits of the individual, or even the mortal limits of the generation, that conceive the 
myth. To that end, this thesis will now use the semiotic framework previously cited to propose a 
Myth Context Reception Model. A model whose purpose is to establish a clear relation between 
myth of antiquity and modern urban myth, that defines how myth can be stealthily hidden from 
view in plain sight, that defines how paradoxical belief and mimetic behavior can be used to 
identify myth reception within an audience, and that defines a lifespan for myth for the purpose 
of evaluating the state of a myth’s scale, potential, strength, and resilience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MYTH CONTEXT RECEPTION MODEL 
 
3.1 PURPOSE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
3.1.1 Purpose 
It is a fundamental argument of this thesis that myth occurs in both the individual and the 
group, and that myth is a force that enables a narrative to outlive the generation that spawned it 
by encouraging future generations to assimilate it as their own. Watts (2012) argued that myths 
“are also culturally constructed through a history of transference that has made them the ‘cultural 
property’ of a group” (p. 589). This thesis will demonstrate such transference by presenting 
narrative exemplars of myth in Chapter 4 that illustrate cross-generational longevity, and 
therefore resilience to their own potential mortality. But to put forward an exemplar requires the 
ability to identify the existence of myth in relation to a narrative. I argue that a model can be 
constructed, leveraged largely from semiotic scholarship and Barthesian theory of myth, to 
accomplish such identification adequately and reliably. This model is constructed for the purpose 
of identifying the existence of a myth reception in relation to a narrative. And while not all 
narratives produce myth, and others are not immediately obvious for their propagation of myth, 
this model is limited to the goal of providing guidance for identifying myth, for identifying 
where myth has the potential to exist, and for how to test for that potential.  
3.1.2 Limitations 
This model does not consider any application of the use of myth where it is applied as a 
derogatory term. The invocation of “that is a myth” is often used as a means of judgment by one 
party to suggest that another party, that holds a signification of myth for some narrative, is 
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somehow demonstrative of a position of ignorance regarding that signification by the other party. 
This constitutes the potential correlation of identification of myth with that of a derogation. This 
is a reduction based upon a personal value judgment of the first party against the second. This 
model is concerned only with the act of identifying the existence of a myth reception and does 
not place any judgement upon the value of such reception.  
This model does not account for attempts to address style of narrative, theme of narrative, 
types of myth, genres, or other defining literary criteria related with myth. Its focus is on the 
receiver of myth, the reader or audience, and how that receiver responds to a narrative for the 
determination of whether the narrative is signified as myth by the receiver, and does that 
narrative propagate or perpetuate itself as a result of myth becoming involved in the narrative’s 
reception. Conversely, it does not argue that styles, genres, themes, or types of myth are 
irrelevant or inconsequential to the existence of signification of myth. Further, it does accept the 
postulate that these characteristics of literary design may in fact enhance or promote the potential 
reception of myth, within an audience, with greater success or efficiency. While this thesis may 
not necessarily consider their effects, benefits, or relevance on the signification of myth, it also 
does not rule out any potential impact they may have on the larger discussion of myth.  
This thesis observes that because myth requires a host narrative, such narrative is 
fundamentally “not myth” until it “becomes myth.” In other words, there is no direct method of 
testing a narrative for “not myth” because the narrative is inherently always “not myth” until 
myth is observed. What this thesis will promote is a test for the potential existence of myth that 
has developed in an existing narrative as the alternative to a narrative having remained in a myth-
less literal state since its origination. Further, because this literal state existed at origination, and 
always exists even after myth becomes present, a test for “not myth” is inefficient, impractical, 
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and potentially unresolvable. This model will therefore not test for the existence of “not myth”, 
but rather assumes that what is left, after all tests “for myth” are exhausted and have failed, is a 
narrative remaining in its original, literal, or “not myth” state. A narrative which has never 
developed a myth reception associable to it. 
3.2 ANTECEDENTS TO MYTH CONTEXT 
Since it is generally presumed that a default set of activities, conditions, and narrative 
inventory must exist before myth can occur as an experience, the antecedents of myth should be 
defined up front. This involves defining the prospective potential for myth, the source or 
inventory that myth can draw upon, the existence (or not) of any author intent for a myth’s 
eventuality and is that eventuality even guaranteed.  
3.2.1 Prospective Myth 
 Barthes (2012) argued that everything could be appropriated to become myth (pp. 217 –
218). However, Barthes was not telling us that all things are myth. He was telling us that all 
things can be taken as myth. That all things have the prospective potential to be taken as myth 
(Flood, 2002, p. 161), at some point in the future, if we have cause for any of them to be 
appropriated, and then signified as myth, by us. Barthes (2012) further recognized that this 
potential was spontaneously indeterminate and at times volatile or potentially perishable (p. 218). 
Bruner (1959) points out that the viability of an “attempted myth”, or a narrative serving as a 
mold for myth, is always uncertain (p. 356). In other words, everything can potentially be a 
target, a victim of, or a host to the exploitative predator of myth. Everything is Prospective Myth. 
Not yet myth, but with the inherent potential to become myth, regardless that its origin is natural 
such as the moon, or man-made such as a fictional narrative.  
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3.2.2 The Myth Host 
To become myth the object appropriated must become something it was not. Something 
different but also something more expansive. Barthes (2012) described myth to be an “expansive 
ambiguity” (p. 234). Indeed, even those things perceived to be natural, or naturally resistant to 
myth, are not excluded. For example, the moon precedes all of humankind, but is a natural 
source for countless myths in the course of history (Brunner, 2010, pp. 6, 25-36). But Barthes 
(2012) would effectively demonstrate that myth can remake any sign, and that all signs are 
Prospective Myth and ultimately powerless to resist being appropriated (p. 243). To demonstrate 
this, Barthes (2012) argued that myth could turn Einstein’s venerable mass-energy equivalence 
formula, E=mc2, into the “pure signifier of mathematicity” (p. 243). Any object natural or man-
made, any invention, image, photo, animal, insect, human, event, or action is Prospective Myth. 
But Barthes (2012) also recognized that myth “is a type of speech” (p. 217), and that due to this 
qualification, “everything can be a myth, provided it is conveyed by a discourse” (p. 217). 
Therefore, while the object might merely be a literal thing, it is the discourse about that object or 
event, real or fabricated, that itself is Prospective Myth. It is the discourse—and the beliefs we 
hold, convey, or experience through that discourse—which have the power to turn a thing into a 
myth, and there is one discourse above all others that demonstrates the greatest prospective 
potential to become myth.  
Barthes (2012) was clear in his position that myth was potentially relevant to any visual 
discourse (p. 219), but the most common host of myth is recognized to be that of story or 
narrative (Doty, 2000, p. 6; Hatab, 1990, p. 17; Segal, 2004, p. 4). An imaginative literary 
narrative, or fiction, is regarded as a mimesis, or literary product imitative of life (Hume, 1984, 
p. 20; Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, p. 72; Lyons & Nichols, 1982, p. 1). Both fiction and myth are 
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noted for their possession of imaginative quality (Barthes, 2012, p. 233; Lamarque & Olsen, 
1994, p. 41). Fictional narrative is well known to be associated with myth. Lamarque and Olsen 
(1994) argued that the purposes of fiction included “mythic purpose” (p. 445). Hume (1984) 
asserted that “fantasy exists in the basic myths” (p. 33) and that fantasy provides a “mythological 
or metaphoric dimension to the mimetic level of the plot” (p. 86). While an association between 
fiction and myth can be clearly established, this thesis asserts that both are unique and distinct. 
Myth sets itself apart from fiction in a very special way. Schaeffer (2010) argued strenuously that 
there is a significant distinction between fiction and myth, where fiction as shared ludic feint, 
and myth defined as “beliefs held to be true”, can simultaneously share the same space, and each 
is distinguished not by what a narrative literally is, but by how it is signified by a particular 
individual, society, or culture (p. 124-128). In other words, the variability of myth is contextually 
dependent upon a reception unique to a specific spectator or audience. Further, while these 
differences between fiction and myth seem to suggest a very short distance between the two, as 
well as a low resistance in one becoming the other, this thesis will show that the distance 
between the signified of each has the potential to be quite massive, regardless any motivated 
intent by an author for their fiction to become—or not become—myth.  
3.2.3 Author Intent 
Since narrative and storytelling is a uniquely human activity (Cobley, 2001, pp. 1-2), 
myth being a narrative, visual or otherwise, implies that narrative is something we can create 
with the intent for it to become myth. But myth can occur both where it is intended and where it 
is not intended. Any inanimate, sterile, or naturally occurring object can become myth. But since 
narrative is observed here to be uniquely endowed as Prospective Myth, what about those 
narratives never intended by an author to become myth? Barthes (2012) said that “myth can 
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reach everything, corrupt everything, and even the very act of refusing oneself to it” (p. 244), 
exposing even the most logical and immutable Einsteinian math to be vulnerable to myth. An 
author’s intent, for something to become myth, might improve its chances of succeeding at that 
endeavor, but intent is not necessary for this to result. And where such intent is employed and 
myth accomplished, an author may soon lose complete control over the ‘life’ he has created 
(Gould, 1981, p. 182). Barthes (2012) suggested that myth could occur as “incidental myth” (p. 
260-261), if its use was “not part of a strategy” (p. 261). And as noted by Scheub (2012), “In 
certain performances, narrative becomes myth; in other performances, the narrative remains 
narrative but not myth” (p. 18). Hagood (2008) wrote that, “although all myth is narrative, all 
narrative is not myth” (p. 204), and Brockway (1993) had argued that myth often occurs where it 
was not intended (pp. 71, 137), and that some narratives often far exceed the intentions of their 
creators (p. 120). These assertions are consistent with the argument by Eco (1979) that the 
interpretation of a narrative frequently uses codes not intended by the narrative’s creator (§ 
0.2.2). In other words, there is no guarantee that something unintended to be myth will remain 
narrative and no guarantee that something intended to be myth will become so.  
Barthes (2012) clearly recognized that narrative could be created for the intended purpose 
of being received as myth, identifying the myth producer as a “journalist who starts with a 
concept and seeks a form for it” (p. 238). This excerpt provides two remarkable observations. 
The first is that myth can be produced with the direct intent by the author to become myth. The 
second is that myth resembles a circular reasoning argument. As argued by Walton (1991), 
circular reasoning can be recognized as a kind of argument observed to avoid a “burden of 
proof” requirement when used as an intentional tactical operation where the premise is 
dependent upon the conclusion and the goal is to coerce and deceive a respondent into accepting 
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“something as a legitimate premise that is really not, and to slur over the omission, to disguise 
the failure of any genuine proof” (p. 285). Myth, drawn in this light, can be viewed as a direct 
attempt to persuade by first defining the sum of a rhetorical logic equation and then second 
configuring the logical premise or premises in such a way that they might factor into a rhetorical 
message personalized to fit the special interests of the intended audience. In other words, the 
myth author not only creates an unprovable narrative with the intent to become myth, but with 
the express and clear intent for it to be believed regardless its lack of proof, and it is an act that 
has been known and practiced since the time of the ancient Greeks. In examining Aristotle’s 
purposes for the invention known as myth, Richard Bodéüs (2000) wrote that “The myths are 
invented not by the many, but for the many, by individuals who wanted to persuade them”, and 
argues further that myth’s ultimate goal, in the time of Aristotle, was to guide conduct (p. 95). 
Both Socrates and Plato fabricated narratives for the desired purpose that these narratives might 
be believed by the audiences that they were intended for (Murray, 2011, p. 183). Still, the 
narrative must pre-exist in advance of the signification associated with it that might become 
myth, and it must eventually become the possession of someone else. Even if the thing being 
abducted is a planned eventuality, resembling a sacrificial offering by its creator for the express 
purpose of becoming myth, it must persuade someone to appropriate it despite its lack of 
guarantee for a myth outcome. Regardless the intent for a narrative to be received as myth, or the 
lack intent, nothing is safe from myth should the audience that desires it see fit to contextualize it 
into myth.  
3.3 MYTH CONTEXT  
It was the position of Bronislaw Malinowski (1971) that evaluation of the myth of 
antiquity, by text alone, and without the ability to survey or contextually frame the audiences of 
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those myths, was fatally flawed (p. 18). Murray (2011) asserted that the myths of Plato are “the 
product of his own artistic imagination” that were “designed for a specific context” (p.184), 
adding further that the meanings of Plato’s myths were “dependent on context” (p. 189). I argue 
that the notion of context, derived from narrative or applied to narrative, and further constructed 
for and by the audience, is critical to a proper evaluation of myth’s presence in relation to any 
narrative. Lévi-Strauss (1955) had asserted that “myth itself provides its own context.” (p. 434). 
However, I would add that myth is not possessive of only a singular context, but fundamentally 
occurs within an overarching dual contextuality. Barthes (2012) referred to myth directly as a 
“double system” (p. 232), and I suggest that these two systems should be thought of as 
contextual systems where one context is static and relational to a narrative’s 1st order literal 
system, while the other context is dynamic and relational to a narrative’s 2nd order myth system. 
While it is common for any simple expression or utterance to potentially involve many multiple 
contexts, I argue that narrative transformed into myth is uniquely dual-contextual where it is 
always a composite of two governing contexts, a Literal Context and a Myth Context. This 
composite always a result of two messages existing simultaneously where (1) the Literal Context 
is mimetic, rigid, static, and independent and (2) the Myth Context is semiotic, scalable, 
dynamic, and co-dependent upon both the Literal Context and the audience for its existence. 
Even though at times the Myth Context might obscure itself from the very audience that will 
conceive or propagate it. Further, the audience can selectively choose, at will and at any time, 
which governing context it wants to directly engage with, or impose. And finally, the composited 
co-existence of these two contexts, in relation to a narrative, is fully supported by semiotics.  
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3.3.1 Peirce, Saussure, and Barthes 
Context is generally viewed through the prism of linguistic pragmatics (Meibauer, 2012, 
p. 9). But context can also be shown to be an important element of semiotic theory. In Peircean 
semiotics, context can be demonstrated to be associative to Peirce’s concept of object.  Peirce’s 
object is the fundamental component that permits the sign to possess external referents 
(Chandler, 2007, p. 63). Peirce (1974b) argued that a sign always “represents” something and 
defined that “something” as the object (§§ 2.230). A sign can refer back to a single object, to 
many objects, or to a single complex object comprised of an object set (Peirce, 1974b, §§ 2.230). 
Peirce (1974b) identified the referential condition, between object and sign, as ground (§§ 
2.228). Ground being a concept typically described as an abstract quality, or character, of the 
sign’s object (Liszka, 1996, p. 20; Peirce, 1974a, §§ 1.551). Thus, in Peirce’s concept, the object 
can be real, an abstraction, or fictive (Chandler, 2007, p. 33). Further, since Peirce’s object is not 
exclusively nor explicitly rooted in that of the physical “object”, it is thus more a concept than a 
physical thing, whether it happens to be a physically real thing or not. For example, Floyd 
Merrell (2001) describes Peirce’s object as a “semiotic object” as a way of distinguishing 
Peirce’s object from that of the more common physical object (p. 28). Liszka (1996) used the 
words “resistance” and “constraint” to describe the purpose of Peirce’s object (p. 21). Further, 
the object’s role, as determinant of the sign, is argued by Liszka (1996) to play a direct role in 
determination of the interpretant (p. 23). In other words, the object serves as a condition that 
directly affects interpretation. It is a position supported by Merrell (1997) who argued that 
conditions that affect interpretation are synonymous with context (p. 38). Peirce (1974b) himself 
had suggested that context could be a factor in how the sign serves to represent its object (§§ 
2.230). Peirce (1974b), in accounting for the different referential conditions that can occur 
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between sign and object, described some conditions as having the potential to be arbitrary (§§ 
2.230). The result is to imply that the object, the object’s character, and any parameters that 
govern the object’s ground, play at least some role in establishing the context within which any 
signifier [representamen] is ultimately signified [interpreted]. Context was further supported by 
Jakobson, who asserted that Peirce’s interpretant could be driven by both context and code 
(Chandler, 2007, p. 35), and that context is often used as the determinant for which codes are 
used at any given time (Bradford, 1994, p. 84). What’s more, this allusion towards the idea of 
context, and to the arbitrary, is remarkably similar to the arbitrariness that Saussure (1959) 
described in the relationship between signifier and signified (p. 67). 
Saussure (1959) had elaborated that the connection between signifier and signified should 
be understood to be arbitrary (p. 67). This “random” or “variable” behavior of the sign, as 
defined by Saussure, was evident by means of the multiple signifiers that a singular signified 
could possess within the context of different cultural base languages (Saussure, 1959, p. 68). For 
example, the English word bat is considered synonymous to the French word chauve-souris. 
Both are signified as the same thing, a small, winged, nocturnal mammal that can fly. In contrast, 
the French word bat is signified to be a type of cigarette. Bouissac (2010) directly identifies this 
contextual quality when he points out how this word bat, in English, can have multiple meanings 
in English as a result of separate simultaneous contexts derived from both zoology and sports (p. 
98). What is evident here, in Saussure’s notion of the arbitrary, is the contextual nature of the 
sign due to the signified’s, and signifier’s, potential to exist simultaneously within different 
linguistic conditions and histories. In other words, a sign’s meaning is highly dependent upon 
context. Since the contextual parameters of language can change according to its relationship to a 
place or time, this kind of contextual constraint is possible within different environmental or 
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even generational settings. For Saussure, what could be described as the ultimate contextual 
binder between signifier and signified was largely predicated by his focus on different cultural 
base languages. But Saussure (1959) had also posited the idea that multiple signs could be placed 
into two particular relational configurations in order to produce meaning, or as he put it, a “class 
of values” (p. 123). Ultimately, context is implicated as a significant attribute of semiotics in 
Saussure’s syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations (Chandler, 2007, p. 84).  
 Barthes (1968) would take Saussure’s logic a step further, defining the process of 
signification as a binding of signifier and signified such that it produces sign (p. 48), with the 
sign deriving “its value also from its surroundings” (p. 48). The description is similar to the 
ground’s ability to connect object and sign in the Peircean model and is a condition that could be 
interpreted as contextual. In regard to context and myth directly, Barthes (2012) did briefly 
connect context to “mythical schema” (p.238). In doing so, Barthes implied context in relation to 
myth by way of the imagination. To elaborate, schema is recognized as a procedural 
manifestation of the imagination by both Kant and Cassirer (Verene, 2016, pp. 101,103). 
Cassirer had implicated schema to the emotive qualities, or affect, that we impose upon symbol 
(Verene, 2016, p. 102), and symbol has been recognized as nothing less than myth but in iconic 
form (Pafford, 1962, p. 132). Further, Cassirer (1956) had asserted mythical imagination to be 
directly grounded through belief (p. 75). Barthes (2012) had depicted signification of myth as 
nothing less than “a purely signifying and a purely imagining consciousness” (p. 233). Barthes 
(2012) also suggested a more direct linkage between myth and context when arguing that myth’s 
concept was “filled with a situation” (p. 228). Meibauer (2012, p. 11) implied that situation can 
be linked directly to extratextual context, defining this “situational context” as “the relation of a 
text to aspects of the situation in which the text has been produced or interpreted” (p. 11). In 
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other words, what is asserted here is that situation and schema are interchangeable examples of 
context and code. Further, where Barthes (2012) did not appear to directly address the 
examination of context relational to myth, he provided an overabundance of context’s relation to 
myth, by way of example, in his anthology of myth dialogs titled Mythologies. Pete Bennett 
(2013), in critiquing the historical value of Mythologies, directly identifies this contextual nature 
of Barthes’ dialogues on myth within Mythologies (pp. 148, 151, 154, 155, 164). But this 
recognition of context in relation to myth and Barthes is incomplete. Myth Context, as I propose 
it here, reveals that there is far more to signification of myth than an observation of 
environmental, temporal, or historical “situation” in relation to any narrative. Myth Context is 
context directly and intentionally manufactured by the audience which is both new and dynamic., 
and it is context that has the potential to be paradoxical, mimetic, resilient, and shared. 
3.3.2 The Contextuality of Myth 
Many of the poetic tragedies created in Plato’s time are recognized to have been recycled 
myths, re-engineered and retold so that their contexts would be relevant to a new generation, and 
the efficacy of these tragedies was determined by an audience’s ability, or willingness, to 
perceive the tragedy as myth (Brisson, 1998, pp. 54-55). The relationship of context to myth, the 
audience’s role in receiving myth, and the intentional construction of context through perception, 
was as relevant to myth then as it is now. Context is commonly thought of in the terms of a 
constraint that frames communication content in direct relation to the environment in which the 
communication occurs (Fetzer, 2012, p. 107; O'Donnell, 1999, p. 63). However, context is far 
more complicated than it might seem. Context is much more than an environmental setting or 
constraint. More importantly, context is the act of interpreting something as a result of that 
constraint. Carmel Cloran (1999) argues that Material Situational Setting, or MSS, may “be 
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thought of as an actual physical space containing actual physical elements…considered to be a 
potential interactional frame” (p. 178). Cloran (1999) adds that context should be more 
appropriately viewed as “a theoretical construct abstracted for metalinguistic purposes from the 
MSS” where the elements within an MSS “may have a semiotic value which arises from 
conventional usage and which must be recognized when negotiating a context for interaction” (p. 
178). Elements within the MSS may be human, spatial, non-human, circumstantial, or even 
temporal (Bowcher, 1999, p. 154; Cloran, 1999, p. 178). Since time can influence context 
production, it is thus relevant generationally, and context can be a dynamic product imposed by 
human behavior. For example, context can be construed as part of a negotiation process, by 
parties within a discourse, such that the parties accept or reject context that is potentially referred 
to, imported, or contributed in common through a discourse (Fetzer, 2012, p. 110; O'Donnell, 
1999, pp. 92-93). O'Donnell (1999) argued that context is both constructible and negotiable 
through discourse, saying that “our behavior projects a situation” (pp. 92-93). And Fetzer (2012) 
argued that construed context can be differentiated between subjective context derived from the 
beliefs of the individual or community; and individual context derived from an individual’s 
perception of the world (p.112). Fetzer (2012) asserts that subjective context is shared and 
negotiated through group participation and is a “social construct of context” (p. 112). In other 
words, subjective context relative a group can be inclusive of or the same as an individual 
context, while individual context has the potential to be exclusive of the group. Since context is 
something that can be uniquely group constructed, it can be relevant to a generational peer 
personality. From the individual perspective, Fetzer (2012) identifies another more localized 
form of context called cognitive context which includes “mental representations, propositions, 
contextual assumptions which may vary in strength, and factual assumptions” that are variably 
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dynamic and involve assumptions about the shared environment, or shared context, that the 
individual resides within, and likened it to a meta-representation (p. 119). In other words, 
cognitive context is a dynamic, constructible, and behavioral context that resembles belief, and is 
held by the individual but can be shared by a group. An individual could assume, accurately or 
erroneously, that the cognitive context they hold is also held mutually by others within the group. 
Further, as a meta-representation, cognitive context bears remarkable similarity to the way 
Barthes (1968, 2012) described myth when referring to second-order myth and second-order 
connotation systems as meta-languages (p. 90; p. 233), and it provides a foundational connection 
between context and myth, by way of belief and behavior, within the scope of significations 
produced by individual, group, or generation. 
Myth Context is therefore more than a physical or environmental constraint upon the 
interpretation of a narrative. Myth Context is also relational to the context an audience, 
especially a peer group, brings with itself and attempts to impose upon the narrative privately or 
publicly. For example, what does the reader engaged in a Myth Context believe about the 
narrative and how do they attempt to personalize and promote that belief, and potentially the 
narrative itself, to align with the world view they and their peers hold. John M. Gómez (2017) 
argued that Barthes research emphasized “the ideological* context in myths, showing how 
meaning always reflects the interests of a particular social grouping” (p. 41). As an example, I 
can use an excerpt from Barthes’ own Mythologies to illustrate. Each dialogue in Mythologies 
was an eloquent and artful exercise in defining the unique contextuality of the myth discussed in 
that dialogue. In an excerpt from one such dialogue, the “Jet-Man”, Barthes (2012) writes: 
mythically the jet-man is defined less by his courage than by his weight, his diet, and his 
habits (temperance, frugality, continence). His racial identity can be read in his 
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morphology: the anti-G inflatable nylon suit and the polished helmet encase the jet-man 
in a new skin in which “not even his mother would recognize him”. This suggests a 
veritable racial conversion all the more plausible in that science fiction has already 
accredited this transferal of species: everything occurs as if there had been a sudden 
transmutation between the old creatures of propeller-humanity and the new ones of jet-
humanity. (p. 104) 
This particular dialogue provides some depth to Barthes’ usage of the terms, situation and 
schema, or context and code, as noted previously. What Barthes provides here, in only the way 
Barthes could, is a description of Barthes’ own self-constructed context for the narrative. “Jet-
Man” exists within a situational setting, or environmental context, and derived from this context 
is a communicative code, or schema, that Barthes imposes upon the narrative as an alternative 
context to be shared with society that is built upon his own social understanding of the world, 
and what he believes it to really mean, at the time he lived. His own individual context situated 
within a subjective context. In other words, Barthes’ is leveraging the environmental context or 
situation of the period (Bennett, 2013, p 156), that he and his generation experienced first-hand, 
or subjectively, to create a new Myth Context that is uniquely cognitive to Barthes. The 
emergence of the “Jet-Man”, the construction of a signification of myth unique to his’ and his 
generation’s frame of mind, and his belief that the narrative is ideological, are intrinsically 
connected. While the constructed context is unique to Barthes’ own eloquence, it has the 
potential to work within a group because it might also be shared or interpretable by others from 
his generation. The common thread is that his generation, because it shared a life experience and 
possessed a shared communicative code, was uniquely susceptible to the startling first 
impression that a pilot in a never-before-seen jet flight-suit might make.  
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Barthes’ experience, predicated upon temporally influenced context, is a socially shared 
experience that has now been imposed upon the narrative, as a new context. The narrative of 
“jet-pilot” is in clear Literal Context, but the vision and belief of the “Jet-Man” as something 
more than human, if not completely and egregiously alien, is captured in a dynamic and 
expansive Myth Context filled in by Barthes. Situation, schema, and all. It is this clear and 
unequivocal construction of new context that is most significant. In describing the “Jet-Man” 
through a racial lens—“propeller-humanity” vs. “jet-humanity”—old vs. new—human vs. 
alien—Barthes’ injects into a myth already steeped in paradoxical perceptions of super-
humanity, a new and personal political dimension of anti-humanity. An expanded Myth Context 
unique to Barthes’s own personal political view of the world. Where in the aftermath of World 
War II, the Holocaust, and the racial strife of that era, the narrative is now contextualized within 
his affective interpretation of his world and time. It is a self-constructed, and uniquely 
generational context in which the “Jet-Man” is appropriated for yet another myth and now 
viewed by Barthes through a prism of ideology or belief, and it is forged as a kind of persuasion 
and is thus rhetorical. A personal ideological interpretation acting as a metaphor for criticism of 
the racial politics common during his era, that is imposed upon the narrative by Barthes. But it is 
a context which is undeniably difficult to signify through the static Literal Context of “jet-pilot”. 
For Barthes’, his view of “Jet-Man” as racial difference, or even potentially racial disparity, 
demonstrates a quite significant paradoxical expansion of the narrative. It is a view, of which 
there is no doubt, that was important to him and that he held in high reverence because it 
promoted his own ideologies. It was important enough that he would intentionally appropriate 
this image to impose upon it a new Myth Context. An image which, on its appearance alone, 
could have little connection to French cultural criticism. 
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Myth Context therefore identifies much more than the observation or evaluation of a 
“myth reception”. Myth and Myth Context occur as one and the same, where myth is the event 
and Myth Context is the structural and behavioral facilities, the context, that occurs internally 
and externally during the event. It is a cumulative interaction of input and output being received, 
occurring within, or being expressed by the reader of myth, that we impose upon the event. 
Barthes (2012) oscillatory turnstile analogy of myth is poignantly appropriate here (p. 233). 
Myth Context describes the dynamic attributes, indicators, and lifespan qualities that occur 
during human interaction with object or narrative to produce myth, and it is these attributes that 
can be used to identify the presence of myth in the reception of a narrative. 
3.3.3 The Attributes of Myth Context 
  Myth Context is fundamentally a dependent context. That is, myth is always dependent 
upon a core communicative source for its eventual existence. Barthes (2012) described this 
dependence as myth’s parasitical nature (pp. 226, 243), and asserted that “nothing can be safe 
from myth, myth can develop its second-order schema from any meaning and, as we saw, start 
from the very lack of meaning” (p. 242). In other words, myth is always dependent upon a 
symbiotic relationship with something that existed prior to itself. Myth can invade and repurpose 
any pre-existing, prospective, and unsuspecting host to support its ability to come into being and 
sustain itself. Regardless for why the thing did pre-exist or any intent, by the author, for the host. 
Another way to interpret this is to view myth’s “parasitic dependence” as a metaphor for the very 
human behavior of appropriation. Barthes (2012) had argued clearly that the “fundamental 
character of the mythical concept is to be appropriated” (p. 229). Barthes (2012) further asserted 
that the literal narrative is always still present and does stop being narrative or stop being literal 
(p. 243). In any capacity that myth might function as an infectious parasite it does so at the 
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behest of the human mind. Myth possesses its character because we are intimately and 
behaviorally involved in the process of appropriating, repurposing, and re-signifying the 
narratives we consume. Barthes (2012) identified the general character of myth to be dynamic 
(pp. 234, 239), and that it’s dynamic character was a result of how we paradoxically participate 
in myth’s eventuality, arguing that we consume “myth according to the very ends built into its 
structure: the reader lives the myth as a story at once true and unreal” (p. 239). Myth’s character 
is therefore a behavioral imposition resulting from tactical human interference in the strategic 
purpose of a narrative’s stated first-order signification, or Literal Context. Attempts to define the 
attributes of myth are almost always metaphoric because what they frequently identify is not the 
character of myth itself, but rather, the behavior of myth’s audience. For example, Barthes had 
eloquently described the dynamic character of myth, time and again, through the metaphor of 
myth as a living sentient being. The attributes of Myth Context must therefore be defined from 
the behavioral aspects of myth’s reception and are thus metaphors for the behavioral dynamics of 
human interpretation of a narrative.  
3.3.3.1 Obscurity 
Myth Context can exist in obscurity. Myth can, and does, actively hide within both 
individual and culture. Positions arguing for myth’s obscure nature are clear. Cassirer (1956) 
referred to myth as an unconscious fiction (p. 74). Joseph Campbell cited both Jung and Freud in 
arguing that “myth is grounded in the unconscious” (Campbell & Moyers, 1991, p. 71). Lévi-
Strauss (1969) made the bold claim that it could be shown how “myths operate in men’s minds 
without their being aware of the fact” (p. 12). Lévi-Strauss (1995) would further describe myth’s 
nature, as a potentially unwitting human behavior, arguing that “myths get thought in man 
unbeknownst to him” (p. 3). Brisson (1998) asserted that “a myth is never a ‘myth’ for the 
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person who adheres to it. It only becomes a ‘myth’ for those who consider it from the outside 
and who question its validity” (p. 9). And finally, Barthes (2012) exposes society’s culpability, in 
myth’s inclination for obscurity, when he writes that, “‘normalized’ forms attract little attention” 
(p. 252). But Barthes (2012) also argued that everything had the potential to become myth (p. 
217). We are thus told that myth, while it resides within us, can evade our conscious awareness 
of its existence and is potentially elusive to the cultural body at large. Yet it can occur anywhere. 
A condition that highlights its variable and scalable potential.  
3.3.3.2 Variability, Potentiality, and Scalability 
I assert that Myth Context is (1) a “variable” and (2) possesses the potential for great 
variability. This assertion is made with a uniquely contemporary interpretation in mind. I argue 
that Myth Context is itself a communicative variable in a sense quite similar to that of the logical 
variable of the modern digital computer programming paradigm. That is, Myth Context is a 
condition where we appropriate the Literal Context as a referent to a chosen value and that this 
value can be altered, replaced, or made as large and voluminous as we choose. A computer 
programming variable is a logical and commonly understood concept, is critical to the 
programming paradigm, and is conceivably present in every software language ever devised. 
While there are fundamental differences between a microprocessor’s handling of code and the 
human navigation of social communicative code, the attempt here is to provide a contemporary 
analogy, or metaphor, for myth’s dynamic character that is also a concept we generally assume 
uncontroversial, undeniably logical, and something taken for complete granted in modern digital 
communications. In this analogy, Myth Context’s expansive value can be irrelevant to, 
inconsistent with, or contradictory to the naming of the Literal Context while at the same time 
being one and the same. From a software programming perspective, one might declare myth as: 
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string $myReality = “my myth context”;. As with myth, the variable is what my programming 
defines it to be, its value changes according to the rules my programming and algorithms dictate, 
and it doesn’t matter what the variable’s name says it is, my programming is going to fill it with 
whatever I want it to be, need it to be, or my algorithms say [believe] that it is. And further, I 
assert that this analogy, or metaphor, is grounded in semiotic theory. 
Saussure (1959) observed the fundamental random, or variable, relationships that 
signifieds had with signifiers, within different languages and cultures, and referred to this as a 
sign’s arbitrary nature (pp. 67-68) and that arbitrariness was dependent upon conventional rules, 
such as social context, to determine meaning (p. 68). Barthes (2012) declared that “Myth is a 
value” (p. 233), that when myth’s form materializes “it empties itself…its newly acquired penury 
[poverty] calls for a signification to fill it” (p. 227), and that myth’s concept is “filled with a 
situation” (p. 228). Gómez (2017) argued that what Barthes was advocating was that myth 
vacates a sign’s original history and context to repackage itself with “different sets of meanings” 
than what the sign originally possessed (pp. 41-42), such that the sign, as myth, is endowed with 
“an entire history, perspective, and prejudice of its own” (p. 43). In other words, myth has the 
power to erase a sign’s original context and fill the sign with a new and more potent context. So 
powerful is myth’s ability to fill a sign with voluminous and seemingly arbitrary value, that 
Barthes (2012) declared myth’s concept “open to the whole of History” (p. 229). But can 
something as simple as a single word be capable of filling itself with the equivalence of all 
history in the real world?  There is evidence of exactly this kind of myth dynamic in the concept 
of the ideograph as posited in the work of Michael Calvin McGee. McGee (1980) argued that 
ideology and myth are connected (pp. 2-4), and that the truth or falsity of an ideology was 
rhetorical, a “product of persuasion” (p. 4). Interestingly, Barthes (2012) did casually refer to 
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myth as “a pure ideographic system” (p. 238). McGee (1980) argued that the symbiotic 
relationship between myth and ideology could be demonstrated quite effectively in ideographs, 
or terse words or terms that can be “easily mistaken for the technical terminology of political 
philosophy” (p. 5). McGee (1980) provides as examples terms such as “liberty,” “rule of law,” 
“equality” or “world peace” (pp. 7-8), arguing that while these terms are historically and 
politically charged they mean different things to different people in different cultures dependent 
upon their use in their localized social context, and are further temporally mediated and 
magnified (p. 8, 10-11). An ideograph is therefore a simple lexical sign, or variable, that can 
leverage the whole of human history for the express purpose of being filled with mythical 
meaning so that it may then serve as a vocabulary for a rhetorical political grammar (McGee, 
1980, p. 14). A grammar that can be used as a guide for acceptable human behavior or 
alternatively to discourage unacceptable behavior (McGee, 1980, p. 15). McGee (1980) argued 
that ideographs were important because of the persuasive “truth” values these myths were 
perceived to possess, by the individuals who believed in them, and how these perceived truths 
managed to situate those individuals in relation to social groups (pp. 15-16). In other words, we 
use Myth Context, in the alternative form of simple rhetorical variables that we fill with 
expansive historical value, in order to situate ourselves socially and politically where we are 
most persuaded to belong, and we use the variable’s vast potential to persuade others to situate 
with us or against us.  
Myth Context possesses significant potential. Much like the potential energy that millions 
of years of pressure have infused into a piece of coal, Myth Context possesses a similar reserve 
of potential “energy” that I shall refer to as its potentiality. Barthes (2012) indicated that myth’s 
growth potential was generally limitless, saying that in myth “there is no regular ratio between 
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the volume of the signified and that of the signifier” (p. 230). Potentiality recognizes a 
fundamental quality about myth that with myth there is always more to come. If it is not filled 
with potential at the time of its receipt, it at least can be filled with potential. This potential is 
quite like the growth potential for symbol as posited by C. S. Peirce. His view was that symbol is 
created in the human mind by means of thought and concept, and once experienced by the 
culture, its repeated use resulted in its evolution and subsequent growth (Peirce, 1974b, §§ 
2.302). This “expansion by social construct” position of Peirce is also notable for its remarkable 
similarity to ideograph (McGee, 1980, p. 7). However, while ideograph is poised in a frame of 
political ideology, Peirce’s notion of symbol was notably less exclusive to political relativity. 
However, as previously observed with ideograph, symbol also possesses expansive rhetorical 
potential. Interestingly, a commonly perceived difference between symbol and myth is purported 
to be the higher degree of elaboration that myth requires over symbol, and is a degree of 
elaboration that most often occurs in narrative form (Pafford, 1962, p. 132). Regardless the 
degree of elaboration, both are forged into existence in the realm of the signifier, and both 
receive their growth in the domain of the signified. A domain recognized by both Saussure and 
Peirce as the mental processes of the human mind. Therefore, the potentiality of Myth Context, 
occurs directly within us and exposes a myth’s ability to scale.   
Because Myth Context has inherent potential, Myth Context is therefore scalable. Lévi-
Strauss (1981) argued that myth “slowly expands to its full extent” (p. 87). Lévi-Strauss was 
telling us that myth will not only emerge, but that it can alter its scale, seeking to consume as 
much space as possible after it emerges. It is a position quite similar to that of Barthes (2012) 
who eloquently described myth’s push for “expansive ambiguity” (p.234). Barthes (2012) quite 
clearly articulated this notion of myth’s scalability when he argued that myth’s concept “can 
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spread over a very large expanse of the signifier” (p. 230), and when he asserted that there are 
“strong myths and weak myths” (p. 257). While it might seem, at first glance, redundant to 
differentiate myth’s potentiality from myth’s scalability, there is a difference. The former 
describes its hidden reserve potential, the latter the observable, experiential, and often 
measurable results that a myth’s potential reserve might produce. In metaphorical terms, I argue 
that myth can grow such that a concept’s “perceptual mass” can become far larger than the 
“atomic mass” of its form. Or to propose yet another metaphor, myth is a phenomenon that 
occurs when its “signified mass” expands to orders of magnitude greater than its “literal mass”. 
What this is intended to suggest is a further reinforcement of Myth Context’s dynamic character 
and variability, where myth can be measured on a comparative scale. It alludes to a perceptible 
range where we can experience myth from less to more, from empty to full, from weak to strong, 
or from hidden to observable. Myth Context’s scale as a “volume”, “strength”, or “visibility” can 
be measured independently or comparatively across a further scale of time and by the nature that 
myth propagates itself, its content, and its expansiveness across time (Brisson, 1998, pp. 22-23; 
2004, pp. 74-75; Calame, 2011, pp. 519-520; McGee, 1980, pp. 10-11). In other words, it alludes 
to yet another perceptible experiential range of myth from young to old—or age. Myth’s variable 
potential to be adapted, described in this thesis as “variability”, recognizes it’s high degree of 
resilience as a result of being an indispensable target of appropriators across culture, geography, 
and time. This potential to variably scale is also a potential for adaptability or malleability. For 
example, Raymond Firth (2011) referred to myth’s adaptive nature as it’s “plasticity” (p. 288). 
Calame (2011) also regarded myth to be endowed with “plasticity”, associating this quality of 
resilience to the temporal adaptation of myth (p. 520). Calame’s view of myth as being malleable 
is thus connected to both time and appropriation. Bignell (1997) argued that myths are 
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temporally moderated and gain power as a result of their contexts (p. 23). Bignell is thus 
suggesting that myth’s potency is directly relational to its ability to adapt to variable 
interpretations over time and that this ability of myth to variably scale, from the state of impotent 
to potent, is directly dependent upon the myth’s context. Context driven as much by situation as 
location. Bremmer (2011) argued that, since ancient times, myths would often propagate across 
“national, social, and cultural borders” (p. 540). Barthes (2012) had also noted myth’s ability to 
adapt by way of history and geography (pp. 263-264). In other words, as myth scales within us it 
eventually scales beyond us. Beyond the scope of our socio-cultural identity, beyond the scope of 
the time we exist, and beyond our cultural borders. We project our myths, and the contexts that 
we endow them with, so that they might become visible to other cultures, ethnographies, and 
generations that might appropriate them. In other words, a myth’s ability to cross generational 
boundaries is an evidentiary exhibit of myth’s scalability. Which is ironic, in a way, since myth 
can deviously hide in plain sight for significant periods of time, and through multiple 
generational periods, despite any ambitiously expansive scale it might possess or seek. 
Indeed, we note here myth’s ability to be scalable. Is it possible for myth’s scale to be 
small enough that we might not be able to observe it with the naked eye? Or do we potentially 
just ignore it? Do we know it’s there, but fear it and intentionally evade it or deny its existence? 
It was Socrates himself, when narrating his description of the afterlife in the Phaedo, who noted 
the inherent risk involved in embracing myth, and the significant value in taking that risk 
(Murray, 2011, p. 187). How many of us actively embrace being associated with derogatory 
insinuations of ignorance imparted by an accusation of “that’s a myth!” regarding some 
narrative? With myth there is often great risk at being subjected to its occasionally cruel 
ambivalence. We must risk the belief that what we cannot see, what we cannot prove, or what we 
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cannot logically explain or justify, has real or intrinsic value. With myth, we must at times take a 
leap of faith, to believe. 
3.3.3.3 Reverentiality and Unfalsifiability 
Myth Context occurs as a reverence for, or a belief about, the context itself. It is arguably 
the most controversial of attributes of Myth Context, but the reverence associated with it can be 
captured as belief, conviction, or ideology. At the opening of this thesis, a cohort of contrasting 
scholarly disciplines were documented to demonstrate where belief is commonly associable with 
myth. Since the time of Aristotle, it has been the goal of rhetoric, of persuasion, to convince the 
receiver to believe, or believe in, the message contained in the rhetoric presented (Dow, 2015, §§ 
2.1-2.2). Belief is then directly implicated with all acts of rhetorical persuasion. Rhetoric, and the 
need to be convinced, is no stranger to appropriation (Barthes, 1977, p. 49), and conviction is no 
stranger to myth (Malinowski, 1971, pp. 19, 25, 88). Socrates was arrogantly confident in his 
ability to persuade society to believe in his fantastic narratives (Murray, 2011, p. 183). But 
Barthes does not appear to have explicitly or significantly addressed the notion of belief’s direct 
influence upon myth. Rather, Barthes (2012) did imply a connection between ideology and the 
naturalization of myth using the myth of French national identity as a direct example (pp. 252-
253). One could argue that Barthes was suggesting that a belief in myth, synonymous with a 
belief in a common national identity, was further synonymous with that identity being perceived 
as a naturalized state of myth. As myth, the abductive reception of a fantastic narrative in a 
significantly mutated state, yet perceived as something natural, therefor implies a deeply held 
conviction in the potentiality of the narrative. In other words, if you perceive the myth as normal 
or natural, especially if its state as myth is still in obscurity, you consequently hold a deep 
conviction for the myth. 
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Campbell (1997) argued that the experience of myth is fundamentally intertwined with 
that of belief (pp. 20-21). Ackerman (1972) reaffirmed the problematic of the study of myth, and 
clarified myth’s central character, when he argued that myth was not exclusive to “archetypes, 
patterns, or stories” (p. 267), and asserted that the “overlapping functions of literature and myth 
lead finally to the problem of belief” (p. 267). Ackerman is thus reinforcing the premise, that 
myth is an experiential phenomenon central to the audience’s impassioned conviction in that 
narrative. In making the argument that there is a fundamental and inherent differentiation of 
myth, in contrast to art—assumed here that art refers to mimetic narrative—Cassirer (1956) 
asserted that the grounding of myth was due to the “belief in the reality of its object” (p. 75). 
Cassirer was arguing that without an audience’s belief in myth’s object, it is then only a form of 
art. Myth’s ground is directly related to the convictions held by the audience. Because art, or 
fictional narrative, is distinct from myth, the audience grounds the narrative with their 
convictions about it, endows the form with concept, abducting the narrative in the process, and 
finally brings myth forth. Segal (2004) argued that the condition that must be met for something 
to be myth is that “a story, which can of course express a conviction, be held tenaciously by 
adherents” (p. 6). Segal is attempting to define myth as a story, true or false, that takes it mythic 
meaning because of the strength and depth of one’s belief in the narrative. In other words, 
something becomes myth if the concept, developed by the adherent, or advocate, of the story, is 
taken as a matter of faith in that concept, and the advocate demonstrates a tenacious refusal, or 
denial, to permit their belief or conviction in the concept’s perceptual mass to be altered or 
modified in any way. Regardless how the myth, and the reverence for that myth, might be 
threatened by myth’s inherent contradictory nature. 
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 From a social perspective, Watts (2012) argued that myth promotes belief structure 
within social groups and enables identity performance in “emergent social practice” (p. 589). 
Subjective context, leveraged here by Myth Context, directly involves those shared beliefs 
constructed socially (Fetzer, 2012, p. 112). Because the second-order signification system of 
Connotation is synonymous with both ideology and rhetoric (Barthes, 1968, pp. 91-92), and 
because Connotation is socio-culturally context-dependent (Chandler, 2007, p. 138), the belief 
that something is different, bigger, or more exotic, than what a thing actually says about itself, 
can be used to transform a Literal Context into a Myth Context. Belief can then sustain Myth 
Context for as long as it is believed. Myth Context therefore involves a belief in, a belief for, or a 
belief about a myth. A belief held for a myth is a reverence for its corresponding narrative, the 
signification the concept conveys, and its raw importance to that individual, their culture, or their 
identities. Because I might not agree with a Myth Context someone else possesses, that does not 
make their Myth Context any less important to them or invalid. Above all, this thesis does not 
judge the veracity, prudence or morality of that context. The purpose of this thesis is to recognize 
where such expansive or dynamic personal reverence exists and how that reverence, for what is 
often perceived as or accused to be a false narrative, propagates itself across mortal boundaries. 
What is surprising though, is that myth brings with itself a congenital resilience or immunity to 
accusations of falsity.  
Myth Context is unfalsifiable. A common misperception is that belief in myth is 
interpreted as an explicit belief that the myth is, or was, in fact real. In contrast, I argue that 
belief or reverence in relation to myth should alternatively be understood as a belief in myth’s 
potentiality. The desire to believe that something of a fantastic but unproven nature is or was 
real, can be potentially indistinguishable from, the desire to believe that something of a fantastic 
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but unproven nature could be possible. In other words, belief in myth represents a range of belief 
between—a belief about myth and a belief in myth. As Brisson (1998) argues, it was Plato’s 
view that myth is an unfalsifiable form of persuasion that, though it might appear to be plausible, 
evades logical or rational explanation (pp. 9-10).  Indeed, Greek culture considered myth to be—
not true, but also not false—or a tertium quid (Doty, 2000, p. 227). James Wood (2008), in 
examining the hypothetical plausibility promoted by Aristotle, asserted that the burden to 
convince is a matter of “mimetic persuasion: it is the artist’s task to convince us that this could 
have happened” (p. 238). Just as when Barthes (1977) qualified Italianicity as “everything that 
could be Italian” (p. 48), myth is what could have been, or what still could be. Therefore, we 
believe in the myth’s rhetorical potential, the ability of its story to persuade us to believe—in the 
potential for some possible alternate future that has not yet occurred, or in the potential for some 
possible past for which there is no evidence that it never did exist. The audience or spectator 
permits themselves to believe in myth’s potentiality, and we do this especially when the Myth 
Context is in direct contradiction to Literal Context. 
3.3.3.4 Paradoxicality 
Myth Context is inherently paradoxical. Paradox is generally defined as the presence of 
contradiction (Birenbaum, 1988, p. 24), but more specifically, it refers to a contradictory 
condition that is potentially irreconcilable (Napier, 1986, p. 1). Paradox is supported logically in 
one regard, while simultaneously being supported illogically in another regard, such that the 
rational and the myth, the science and the conviction, the sign and the signification appear to 
occupy the same space paradoxically (Doty, 2000, p. 89). A. David Napier (1986) argues that 
recognizing the presence of a paradox requires “an acceptance that things may look like what 
they are not” (p. 1). In other words, before we can identify the existence of paradox, we must be 
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able to accept the possibility that a narrative, on appearance, can provide enough of an illusory 
appeal to attempt to deceive us, and we must accept the possibility that we are potentially 
susceptible to any illusion, or deception, by the narrative, if we are to acknowledge that a 
paradoxical condition exists.  
Peirce (1974b) defined contradiction as a “reciprocal relation” where propositions “deny 
one another” (§§ 2.476-2.477). Semiotically, recognizing a contradiction is straightforward. The 
signifieds of two signs, or alternatively a sign and signification, are contrary to one another. By 
this definition, a contradiction can entail a contrary condition as simple as a disagreement. In 
contrast, however, a paradox is irreconcilable (Napier, 1986, p. 1). Paradox and myth are 
fundamentally related in structuralist semiotic theory. Lévi-Strauss (1981) argued that myth is 
permeated with paradox, describing paradox in myth as a “fundamental opposition” (p. 87), due 
in part to the “binary oppositions” (pp. 78, 85), or “binary distinctions” (pp. 84, 87), found in 
language and nature (pp. 84, 87). Harland (1993) leveraged Lévi-Strauss’ theories on opposition 
(p. 197) to advance a similar theory, or binary-polarization technique, relational to myth (pp. 
195-210), and posited that this technique could expose the very specific problem of “what is 
actually inherent in reality and what is merely cast over the top of it” (p. 200). 
While these oppositions seem, at first sight, to be focused largely on paradox found 
specific to opposing objects (Lévi-Strauss, 1981, p. 87), or paradox within content, the approach 
is much more complex. Lévi-Strauss (1981) is arguing that myth is a mental activity that will 
compel “man…to accept…two self-evident and contradictory truths” (p. 87), and therefore 
results in an irreconcilable contradictory relationship between the “reality of being” (p. 87), and 
“the reality of not being” (p. 87). These oppositions are not intended to be received as entirely 
objective. They occur in the human mind. For example, Lévi-Strauss (1981) argued myth to be 
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directly and exclusively coexistent with human presence (p. 87), and he said further that 
“mythical thought always works from the awareness of oppositions towards their progressive 
mediation” (Lévi-Strauss, 1955, p. 440). Myth thus, is a result of oppositions occurring within 
human mental faculty, not exclusively oppositions of objective definitions. Myth is paradoxical 
as a result of the contradiction found between the collective construction of the narrative, and the 
way in which an individual experiences it (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 18). From an experiential 
perspective, paradox is argued here to be relational to the dynamics of belief and reverence. 
From a constructive perspective, the mimetic or imitative nature of literary fiction is considered 
to be paradoxical because it projects an appearance of something contradictory as a matter of 
mimetic representation (Rabinowitz, 1987, p. 94). In other words, narrative, or Prospective 
Myth, is then inherently predisposed towards paradox. 
Socrates recognized myth’s paradoxical character to be a false discourse, while 
simultaneously possessive of some kind of inherent truth (Brisson, 1998, pp. 108-109; Murray, 
2011, pp. 181-182). The Greek sense of myth as unfalsifiable (Brisson, 1998, pp. 9-10), or 
tertium quid (Doty, 2000, p. 227), placed it in a paradoxical state of being simultaneously a false 
discourse while also inherently unprovable. Niall Livingstone (2011) argued that what made 
myth invaluable to the ancient Greeks, as a means of instruction, was its “combination of reality 
and unreality” (p. 137). In establishing his principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle argued that 
“it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be” (Hatab, 1990, p. 274). 
Aristotle further distinguished the separation between conceptual reasoning and myth (Hatab, 
1990, p. 259), and it is this ancient moment, as Aristotle performs a significant role in 
establishing the foundations of the scientific method (Hatab, 1990, pp. 266-267), that the 
paradoxical nature of myth is positioned as a contrast against the logic of science.   
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Barthes (2012) recognized the significant relevance of paradox, in relation to myth, 
arguing that when the full first-order signified is converted to form, or second-order signifier, the 
distancing and emptying of the sign’s literal meaning produces a, “paradoxical permutation in 
the reading operations” (p.227). It will become a permutation that, as form, will stand 
paradoxically to the prior literal meaning of the linguistic sign. Barthes (2012) exposed this 
paradoxical nature inherent to the mythic signifier, when he described sign, or meaning, as 
occupied, and form as vacant (p. 227). But Barthes (2012) would further expose the complex and 
obscure nature of paradox in myth when he observes that sign and form tend to exhibit a lack of 
contradiction during the experience of myth (p. 233), but regardless, will still possess 
contradiction in the examination of the myth (p. 234). Myth is something that happens in the 
mind of the reader, is experienced by the reader, but the reader who experiences the myth may be 
unaware, or may purposefully avoid any awareness, of the paradoxical condition experienced, 
and subsequently any recognition of the myth. In other words, a contradiction regarding a 
contradiction. The paradox exists, within the reader, but to the reader, it does not. Or as Lévi-
Strauss (1995) argued, it exists “unbeknownst” to the reader (p. 3). The myth reader, Barthes 
(2012) argued, will “focus on the mythical signifier as on an inextricable whole made of meaning 
and form, I receive an ambiguous signification: I respond to the constituting mechanism of myth, 
to its own dynamics” (p. 239). In other words, the reader, by focusing exclusively on the form, 
may either intentionally, or incidentally, ignore any literal meaning. The reader imposes 
signification of myth, over the literal meaning, and this distorted relationship with the literal sign 
is believed by the reader to be something natural (Barthes, 2012, pp. 240,245), and is, 
consequently, not received as the paradox it is. Myth Context is therefore paradoxical because 
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the paradox occurs exclusively within us. A phenomenon with such fundamental influence that 
we may at times be inclined to imitate the paradox. 
3.3.3.5 Mimeticality 
 Myth Context is mimetical. To be more specific, mimetical behavior on the part of the 
myth receiver is frequently present in Myth Context. The term mimetical implies that imitative 
phenomena can often be found present within an audience’s reception of myth. As previously 
stated here, narrative is defined as a mimesis where it is assumed to be created by an author to be 
imitative of life in some way as a physical purpose of the narrative (Hume, 1984, p. 20; 
Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, p. 72). Most objects, facts, symbols, and images that become myth do 
so by way of narrative—written, verbal, or visual. Photographs and illustrations are imitative of 
the life events they capture. Icons and symbols imitative of the objects or events they represent. 
Facts and historical documents are expected to be as imitative of actual events as humanly 
possible in the scope of a literary endeavor. Even when producing fictions, the fictions are 
mimetic of the essence of human behavior if not at least imitative of an actual event. Mimesis 
plays an almost universal role in the production of Prospective Myth and is fundamentally 
behavioral since a human is assumed to create most mimetic representations that eventually 
become myth. But since formal mimesis is generally a means of constructing Prospective Myth, 
it is an antecedent to Myth Context. The mimetics we are concerned with at this juncture, 
however, are the internal and external mimetics that occur within us, the receivers of myth, 
because of Myth Context. I argue that this imitative behavior, observed to occur in a direction 
opposite artistic mimesis, occurs as an attribute of Myth Context demonstrable in the full range 
of indications of myth from appropriation to ritual.  
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The potential for myth to produce mimetical outcomes has been known since the time of 
ancient Greeks. In ancient Greece, myth was considered to be a form of magical incantation 
(Brisson, 1998, p. 10; Morgan, 2000, pp. 159, 199, 207). Plato recognized the potential for 
humans to exhibit behavior that reenacts myth, or project qualities of the experienced myth, in 
human behavior (Brisson, 1998, p. 74). It was perceived by Plato as a defect of myth (Brisson, 
1998, p. 9), partly because there was always the potential for a mimesis of a reprehensible nature 
to find its way to being imitated by the audience (Schaeffer, 2010, pp. 16-17). As Brisson 1998 
writes, “The imitation utilized by the transmitter affects the receiver, who tries genuinely to 
assimilate himself to the reality referred to by the discourse to which he is listening.” (p. 74). 
What Plato understood is that myth has the unique power to “train” the recipient of the myth to 
imitate the myth (Brisson, 1998, p. 74; Schaeffer, 2010, p. 21). Myth thus is a valid means of 
persuasion assuming, as Plato does, that the mimesis being imitated is carefully restricted to one 
of high moral quality (Brisson, 1998, p. 116). Plato employed myth, as did Socrates, for the 
direct and intentional manipulation of societal behavior (Murray, 2011, p. 183). The use of myth 
by the ancient Greeks, to invoke imitation as a behavioral outcome, then was measurable and 
observable. But this imitative by-product of myth, and subsequently Myth Context, is not always 
directly observable.    
As previously argued, myth can occur in complete obscurity. Myth can be present but 
hidden from direct observation by the culture in a socio-cultural setting. Imitative behavior, 
because of Myth Context, can occur as part of the cognitive or imaginative process internally 
within the individual, and might not be immediately observable. This could be thought of as an 
imaginative mimesis. As a function of Myth Context, this kind of imitative behavior is exclusive 
to an internal mental faculty and its existence can occur potentially obscured from societal view. 
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Barthes (2012) asserted myth to be experienced in a state of innocence, where the myth is taken 
inductively as “fact” (p. 242). It is a process where the artificiality of myth is naturalized into an 
equivalency perceived as factual (pp. 241-242, 255-256), because myth engages in a pretense (p. 
245), where it “transforms history into nature” (p. 240). Barthes (2012) referred to this condition 
as naturalization (pp. 240-242). In other words, myth works because it is not really perceived as 
myth by the audience. It is not perceived as an imitation. It is therefore conceived as a natural 
thing, in a natural state of obscurity, because we believe it to be completely normal, natural, and 
without the paradoxical qualities that a deeper logical evaluation might reveal. But if this 
naturalization of the paradoxical narrative is a pretense, as Barthes asserted, then it is we, the 
receivers of myth, who are responsible for this pretense. It is we that perceive it to be, imagine it 
to be, or believe it to be something else than what it really is. We take it within Myth Context, by 
deception or by mistake, by intent or by accident, knowingly or unknowingly, to be an imitation 
of something it is not. 
From a semiotic perspective, this kind of imitative behavior demonstrates a clear act of 
appropriation on the part of the audience. Barthes (2012) did connect the repurposing of the 
‘natural’ to the act of appropriation (p. 260), characterizing this appropriative act as the taking of 
an existing history to distort its meaning (p. 243), and then described the use of this transformed 
replacement of the literal, as a “surreptitious faking” (p. 236-242). Further, Barthes (2012) 
disclosed the mimetic quality of myth when he declared that the concept’s elements “are linked 
by associative relations” (p. 232). Associative relations, in the Saussurean tradition that Barthes 
was a part of, was typically indicative of similarity at either the level of form or the level of 
meaning (Chandler, 2007, p. 85), and a fake is generally regarded as a cheap imitation. An 
imperfect copy with a high degree of similarity to something else. A fake is also an appropriation 
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that is a blatant and egregious theft, by way of replication or duplication, meant to imitate 
something genuine. Barthes (2012) was clear in his view that myth occurred as the result 
something else generally being “stolen” (pp. 236, 242-244, 257). And Barthes (2012) revealed 
myth’s ability to promote, in the new history of the myth concept, an imitation of, a similarity to, 
or a likeness of a pre-existing history when he provided direct examples in his dialogs regarding 
the analogous or imitative natures of Siniess (p. 230), Basquity (p. 235), or Romanity (p. 19). In 
other words, myth is an illegitimate inheritance. Something we abduct to be used as a natural 
resemblance of something else. We perceive this ill-gotten and illegitimate contraband as an 
imitation of something we supposedly own. The mimeticality of Myth Context is therefore a 
process that occurs within us, the audience, knowingly or unknowingly, where the audience 
subsequently fakes ownership of an alien narrative in order to justify the variable remolding of 
that narrative into an imitation of yet another “something else”. Something potentially larger and 
grander that the author and/or audience might desire, in place of the original narrative. This 
mimetic behavior occurs first as thought—as a process which begins within us generally hidden 
from societal view—and has the potential to scale beyond us to evolve into imitation as action. 
Imitation that occurs as a result of which context of the narrative we selectively choose to engage 
and receive.  
3.3.4 Myth Context and Selectivity 
 Because myth always offers us dual contexts, a Literal Context and a Myth Context, myth 
occurs in a condition of selectivity. Roman Jakobson (1971) had recognized that context and 
selection were arranged as the complimentary operations of sign interpretation (p.243). Jakobson 
(1971) argued (1) that context occurred as a result of combination where different signs could be 
arranged in relation to a sign to alter that superior sign’s meaning, and (2) because different 
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context combinations were possible, one combination could therefore be substituted by a 
different combination thereby presenting the opportunity for someone to select one combination 
or the other (p.243). Jakobson’s argument was a semiotic argument pertaining to Saussurean 
structural linguistics. But it is highly relevant here since it positions both context and selection as 
two distinct and important sides of the interpretive equation within semiotics. For this thesis it 
reinforces that a choice exists between the Literal Context or Myth Context. We can select 
between these choices or, as in the case of myth because it is variable and scalable, further 
potential for choices of combination and selection will occur if we choose Myth Context. Myth 
therefore presents itself as though it were a mixed-case conditional statement. Myth permits us 
the ability to “select”, as both primary and as a substitution for the opposite context, whichever 
context we desire when it is most meaningful or advantageous to us. Barthes (1977), in defining 
the twofold nature of the image, regarded the image as polysemous, arguing that it contained “a 
‘floating chain’ of signifieds” (pp. 38-39), that the “reader was able to choose some and ignore 
others” (p.39), and that literal meaning and mythic form are always present, each with the ability 
to be called or dismissed at a moment’s notice (Barthes, 2012, p. 227). Therefore, messages that 
contain multiple signifieds, as do those in 2nd level significations, clearly present a choice to the 
reader or spectator, and what is chosen depends on how the reader wants to use it (Gould, 1981, 
p. 119). Barthes (2012) also argued that “it is the reader of myths himself who must reveal their 
essential function” (p. 239). Positing further that myth was, by its essence, depoliticized speech 
(p. 255). Speech that is purified of its original socially derived history and replaced with a new 
value perceived innocently and blissfully natural in origin, capable of stating something as 
though it were fact, and to appear as though it lacked contradiction (Barthes, 2012, pp. 255-256). 
But Barthes (2012) qualified that this naturalization, by way of depoliticization, occurs as a 
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direct result of the “needs” and “situation” of people who “use” myth (p.257). In other words, 
Myth Context is dependent upon use selections driven by our needs and motives where the 
invocation and selection of Myth Context acts as a substitute for the alternative context.  
3.3.5 The Indication of Myth Context  
The attributes of Myth Context are therefore descriptive of the imposition of human 
behaviors upon any narrative and significantly representative of the human condition. Myth is 
dependent because we appropriate narratives. Myth is variable because we purposefully vacate a 
narrative’s meaning and fill it with our new ideas. Myth has potential because we allow it to 
scale in our minds and take up expansive amounts of human mental real estate. Myth is obscure 
because at times we arrogantly assume, in the existence of a technologically superior age, that 
we are not capable of such “primitive” behavior. Myth is reverential because we believe in the 
raw power of its potential. Myth is unfalsifiable because we often choose to live in histories or 
futures of own desire that no one else can prove did not exist or hasn’t yet. Myth is paradoxical 
because our reverence for it is often more important to us than the logic of its literalness, and 
myth is mimetical because we often choose to imitate it, at times publicly and at times 
completely unaware of our ritual reenactments, emulations, or mimicry. These attributes of Myth 
Context are therefore relational to their co-existence as the human behaviors that can occur 
during the contextualization of myth. Further, they are the building blocks of more complex 
human behaviors that can be observed, measured, and documented and therefore function as 
indicators of Myth Context that can ultimately be used to identify the presence of myth in an 
audience’s reception of a narrative.  
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3.4 INDICATORS OF MYTH CONTEXT 
Barthes would eloquently characterize myth as a “confidence and a complicity” (p. 234-
235). The characterization was yet another metaphor. To Barthes, myth was a persuasive con 
artist. But as with any con game or hustle, there is always a “tell”. An indicator, multiple 
indicators, or an unintended divulgence that betrays the circumstance that is covertly transpiring. 
In defining the role of the mythologist, Barthes (2012) provided some guidance on how to 
determine the “tell”, or indicators of myth, describing it as a distortion in the mean relationship 
between the signified of the first-order sign and the concept of the second-order signification (pp. 
238-239). Consequently, while this thesis does not presume to identify all possible indicators of 
mythic distortion, relative to all narratives, I do argue that there are at least three dominant 
indicators of myth, that are grounded in the attributes of Myth Context, and are human behaviors 
observable as a result of an audience’s reception of a narrative as myth.  
The presence of any these indicators, in relation to a narrative, is not a judgement on the 
rationality of a narrative, the rationality of a narrative’s reception, or a judgement of the 
narrative’s audience. Rather, these are indicators of a reader’s willingness to engage with the 
Myth Context, to be complicit in the myth’s confidence game. These indicators are observable 
human behaviors. Each will rely on the indicators that precede it, and when present in 
combination, can assist in revealing a myth’s strength from weak to strong with Reverse-
Mimesis indicating the strongest Myth Context response. However, because myth, and Myth 
Context, can potentially be hidden from audience and observer alike, an audience may be 
completely unaware they are exhibiting such indicators. Where and when obscure, any indicator 
may be difficult to observe without detailed and directed comparative examination of both the 
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narrative and its respective audience. These indicators are the acts of paradoxical belief, 
appropriative imitation, and reverse-mimesis. 
3.4.1 Paradoxical Belief 
The first indicator of Myth Context that this thesis identifies is that of Paradoxical Belief. 
The word paradox is an English translation of the Greek words para and doxa, or “against” and 
“belief” respectively (Adamson, 2014, p. 44). Paradox is therefore inherently and etymologically 
linked to the idea of reverentiality, or belief, as posited here. The term paradoxical belief, though 
potentially redundant from an etymological perspective, is used here to clarify that the paradox 
being discussed is not a paradox of content. Rather, while that is possible, what paradoxical 
belief seeks to describe is the way in which an audience’s beliefs about a narrative are 
paradoxical to the stated literalness of the narrative. In other words, whenever Myth Context is 
present, the context of the reader’s belief in, of, or about the myth should generally be 
paradoxical to the Literal Context. 
The poetry of Wallace Stevens is frequently linked to both myth and faith (Ackerman, 
1972, pp. 266-267). It was Wallace Stevens who penned the verse, “The final belief is to believe 
in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to 
know that it is a fiction and that you believe it willingly” (Von Hendy, 2002, pp. 305-306). In 
this verse, Stevens imagines for us a phenomenon, experienced paradoxically, where something 
verifiably established as fiction, is willingly taken by the receiver as a matter of faith, to be 
enthusiastically and willingly embraced and believed as much more than the sum of its 
recognized and verifiable fictive limitations. Von Hendy (2002) cited this verse by Stevens and 
argued that it represents the “paradoxical quintessence of the constitutive conception of myth” 
(pp. 305-306). The significantly important observation to be made, in this critique of Stevens’ 
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verse, is not necessarily a reinforcement of the power of belief to promote myth, but rather Von 
Hendy’s conclusion that the constitution of myth, represented as a contrary belief 
enthusiastically held for a literal narrative, is ‘quintessentially’ a paradox.  
Barthes (2012) did directly identify paradox to exist in the “reading operations” of myth 
(p.227), further telling us that myth “hides nothing: its function is to distort” (p. 231), that the 
“meaning is distorted by the concept” (p.232), and that “the concept literally, deforms, but does 
not abolish the meaning” (p.232). He asserted that the literal meaning and myth form, while 
occupying the same space, are observed in constant ambiguous alternation of one another as 
result of the concept’s distortion (Barthes, 2012, p. 233). Barthes (2012) described this 
ambiguous alternation to be “at once intellective and imaginary, arbitrary and natural” (p. 233). 
Barthes’ tendency was to speak of myth by way of metaphor. I argue that he was eloquently and 
consistently describing the persistence of paradox in myth, and that further, Barthes (2012) did 
implicitly connect the concept of belief, to this alternating ambiguity, when he argued that myth 
is a rhetoric seeking to persuade him of its contingent, yet ambiguous, forceful argument (p. 
234). Since the point of rhetoric is to persuade someone to believe the argument, and Barthes 
(2012) presented myth as a “summons” addressed with great specificity to Barthes himself as the 
intended addressee (p. 234), the efficacy of any myth is dependent upon Barthes’ willingness to 
believe its rhetoric. To believe paradoxically that the myth is natural and absolute when it is 
presented as contingent and ambiguous. Since the narrative’s solicitation is a summons, an “ask” 
or “pitch”, it presumes an “answer” forthcoming. A choice is presented to Barthes to accept the 
expansive ambiguity—or not. In other words, he is expected to select the Literal Context or the 
Myth Context as a result of the solicitation. If Barthes chooses to believe that the expansive 
ambiguity is a natural thing, then belief in the argument serves as justification to allow the 
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deformation of the literal into myth and thus enable its final appropriation. Belief therefore 
catalyzes the myth deformation and subsequently sustains it.  
Barthes (2012) was very precise is saying that there was no contradiction, no paradox, 
between the literal meaning and the myth form (p.233). The paradox is not a contradiction of the 
first-level meaning and second-level signifier but rather a contradiction in the connotative 
binding of the second-level signification. The paradox exists not within content, but within the 
Myth Context. It is a contradiction of behavior. As a belief, it exists exclusively within us, the 
reader or audience, and is contextual to what we choose to paradoxically believe about the 
narrative and our willingness to believe. Gregor Sebba (1962) had eloquently argued that a myth 
“may be historically true, legendary, or invented; but for the believer, it is ‘truer than truth’ and 
therefore highly impervious to refutation by a show of facts to the contrary” (p. 145). While 
Sebba reinforces the idea that the source of myth can be factual or fictive, what is distinctive 
about this comment is that (1) Sebba recognizes that belief in myth is variable, not everyone 
believes, and that (2) myth’s signified mass can be so scalable that it may become resistant to 
falsification regardless the scientific evidence, or literal contradiction, that is used to deny it 
veracity. It is this comparative difference, where beliefs are held paradoxically, that can 
potentially indicate when a Myth Context has been selected over a Literal Context. 
3.4.2 Appropriative Imitation 
The second indicator of Myth Context that this thesis identifies is that of Appropriative 
Imitation. Ricoeur (1981) defined appropriation as “to make what was alien become one’s own” 
(p. 113), and argued that “interpretation ‘brings together’, ‘equalises’, renders ‘contemporary and 
similar’, thus genuinely making one’s own what was initially alien” (p. 159). To be different, but 
also be equal and similar, as a process of interpretation, is to suggest an event of imitative 
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significance. In other words, appropriation is a form of imitative ownership predicated upon an 
acculturation or assimilation of something alien to the appropriator. Further, the link from 
imitative mimesis to appropriation can be found in the work of Rene Girard. Girard (1987) 
argued that “What is missing in Plato’s account of imitation is any reference to kinds of behavior 
involved in appropriation…There is no reason to exclude appropriation from imitation” (p. 8). 
The argument is that one party, that imitates another party’s behavior, is engaged in an 
“acquisitive mimesis”, or an appropriation of the second party’s behavior (Girard, 1987, pp. 8-9). 
Further, Girard’s acquisitive mimesis provides a means to connect the appropriation associated 
with Barthes’ view of myth with the imitation associated to Plato. In other words, imitation that 
occurs on the part of the audience, as an attribute of Myth Context, is inherently and 
unambiguously appropriative. It is an acquisition, or appropriation, by way of imitation. Or more 
concisely, it is an “appropriative imitation”. 
Barthes (2012) did explore the association between appropriation and possession in his 
essays (pp. 84, 87 – 88, 182, 265). What Barthes (2012) described as appropriation was 
characterized as a criminal acquisition, calling myth a “larceny” (p. 236), and a “robbery” (pp. 
242-244, 257). But this appropriation is more complicated than it appears. As an acquisition, it is 
the taking of something to be used, and repurposed, to become something else, or something 
new, regardless its original intent. It is a phenomenon resembling a theft, where the thing stolen 
is ransomed in exchange for something of a different or greater value. Barthes (2012) referred to 
the targets of myth’s appropriation as “prey” (p. 218), that myth is an “arrest” (p. 235), that myth 
“takes it away en bloc” (p. 243), carried “away bodily” (p. 243), and that what myth takes hold 
of is emptied (p. 226), to ultimately become “speech stolen and restored” (p. 236). Barthes 
(2012) tells us that what is abducted, or appropriated, when it is put back (p.236), it possesses a 
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concept with an ambiguous “new history” (pp. 228, 234), so distorted (pp. 231-232, 243), or 
transformed (pp. 242, 244), that it is expansively larger than (pp. 230, 234), or disproportionately 
voluminous in relation to (p. 230), that which was initially abducted. In other words, for myth to 
become an expansive new rhetoric, it is paradoxically and helplessly dependent upon the thing 
being appropriated for its future ability to imitate something else. 
Barthes (1977) connected imitation with rhetoric by using a culinary advertising image 
characterized as having been presented in French, that visually included “some packets of pasta, 
a tin, a sachet, some tomatoes, onions, peppers, a mushroom, all emerging from a half-open 
string bag, in yellows and greens on a red background” (p. 33). Barthes (1977) defined the 
condition of this analogy, or likeness, as “Italianicity” (p. 32-33), such that “Italianicity is not 
Italy, it is the condensed essence of everything that could be Italian, from spaghetti to painting” 
(p. 48). Barthes (1977) equated the ideology of Italianicity to be synonymous with rhetoric, 
because of the commonalities the constitutive elements share (p. 49), or a rhetoric where the 
inherent syntagmatic relationships, of these elements, naturalize it into a “symbolic message” (p. 
49-51). Harland (1993) recognized Barthes’ essay on “Italianicity” to be similar with Barthes’ 
dialogs on Imperiality or Basquity in relation to myth (pp. 204-205). In his dialog on Basquity, 
for example, Barthes (2012) describes the mythic appropriation at work in a French chalet 
imitatively modeled in the architectural style of a house commonly found in the Basque region of 
Spain (pp. 234-235). These likenesses, “Basquity” or “Italianicity”, are imitations that 
appropriate a historical character to elicit the myth of “everything Basque”, or “everything 
Italian”, respectively, and impose that essence upon these new things that are clearly not Basque, 
nor Italian. However, because this appropriative imitation is so perceived as something 
“naturalized” (Barthes, 1977, p. 51), it is potentially undetectable. It is potentially a deformation 
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perceived not to be deformed, or an unnatural history perceived to be a natural one. A further 
paradoxical condition of myth where there is no guarantee that an audience will even be aware of 
its own appropriative or imitative behavior while engaging with the myth. In other words, myth 
can remain obscure even as the result of a blatantly obvious appropriation.  
Appropriative Imitation functions as an indicator of Myth Context because of the 
comparative differences it reveals in relation to myth. These appropriations and imitations, 
however discrete or obscure, are demonstrable of comparative observable differences in origin, 
appearance, location, relationship, intent, and ownership. They are further the result of human 
behaviors. Appropriated imitations with well-established historical character that, as a result of 
an artificial imposition of myth contextualization, a mimetic abduction of their character, they 
now possess the paradoxical distinction of having been displaced from their natural environment 
and repurposed for a detectable foreign duty. I am engaged in a paradoxical belief, that my 
appropriative imitation is sufficiently Basque or Italian, and that I, being of neither history, 
believe I am justified in owning or manipulating such “contraband”. All of which indicate a clear 
engagement of a Myth Context.  
3.4.3 Reverse-Mimesis 
The third indicator of Myth Context that this thesis identifies is that of Reverse-mimesis. 
Reverse-mimesis is grounded within the larger mimetic process of narrative that this thesis has 
asserted myth to be a part of. Mimesis is typically described as a mode of imitation where art 
imitates life (Dowling, 2011, p. 1). In contrast, reverse-mimesis functions in the contrary to 
mimesis (Currie, 2013, p. 45), and describes a mode of imitation where life imitates art (Longxi, 
1988, pp. 90-94). Reverse-mimesis, as employed here, describes an appropriative imitation 
inversely related to that of the mimetic narrative where someone in the audience, who consumes 
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a work of art [narrative] through reception, becomes an agent that appropriates that art as an 
example, or template, for enacted behavior that imitates the narrative.  
This thesis asserts that reverse-mimesis is a distinct higher-order extension of 
appropriative imitation, that demonstrates the strongest and most observable paradoxical human 
behavior in relation to myth, and is therefore a clear indicator of Myth Context. Reverse-mimesis 
is an imitative human behavior meant to embody the myth. In other words, it is an attempt to 
homogenize reception by making human behavior similar with, congruent with, or imitative of 
the myth’s narrative. While this imitation may appear, at first glance, to have the effect of 
removing any difference between narrative and audience behavior, reverse-mimesis is 
measurable both in its effectiveness at imitating the narrative and against perceived societal 
norms that may interpret the imitation as culturally controversial. Per Barthes’ (2012) notion that 
any myth can be variable in strength (p.257), reverse-mimesis can assist in giving some 
indication of a Myth Context’s strength because it indicates where and when a culture is willing 
to take great risks to imitate, despite controversy or societal taboo that might be associable with 
such imitation. As James S. Hans (1981) points out, mimetic appropriation—observed here as 
reverse-mimesis—is known to be associated with significant societal risk since the times of Plato 
(p. 64). Using Girard as his guide, Hans (1981) asserts that since ancient times we have generally 
attempted to ignore our innate and natural human inclination to imitate, because “to be possessed 
by the gods, as any poetic player is, is to be in an irrational state, and our desire has always been 
to turn away from possession, to keep our feet firmly planted in the ground of reason” (p. 64). In 
other words, reverse-mimesis indicates behavior which may be paradoxical to socially acceptable 
behavior. 
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Yet regardless any fear that might be associated with the risk of engaging in reverse-
mimesis, it is a normal and ubiquitously common innate human response. Imitation of facial 
expressions has been scientifically observed in infants within hours of birth (Goldman, 2005, p. 
81), and imitation is implicated as an agent in the bonding between imitator and imitated 
(Anisfeld, 2005, p. 108). It is further a fundamental tenet of parental guidance that children will 
imitate their parents and imitation is observed across the lifespan as a recognized means of 
passing social custom across generational boundaries (Meltzoff, 2005, p. 55). Hurley and Chater 
(2005) argue that “human imitation is flexible, ubiquitous, effortless, and intrinsically 
rewarding” (p. 20), and the effortlessness that humans engage in imitation is attributed to child 
and adult alike (Meltzoff, 2005, p. 55). With automatic and unconscious ease, humans imitate 
gesture, accent, facial expression, and vocal tone in order to assimilate into our social 
surroundings (Dijksterhuis, 2005, pp. 207-208), often completely unaware that we imitate social 
behavior (Dijksterhuis, 2005, p. 211). We further imitate the attitudes, goals, and emotions of 
others (Prinz, 2005, p. 276). Perhaps more controversial is that imitation is implicated as a broad 
performative tool in the art of human deception (Gambetta, 2005, p. 226). Imitation is further 
perceived as such a powerful force in the transmission of human cultural behavior that is has 
been implicated as one possible cause of the phenomena of suicidal contagion (Morin, 2015, p. 
23). A claim that is no less disturbing than controversial, and one with such grave consequences 
as to make any fear of imitative behavior seem quite normal. Still, I suggest that reverse-mimesis 
relational to myth is paradoxically ubiquitous and common while are often blissfully unaware of 
its natural presence. Barthes (2012) had asserted that the controversies inherent with myths are 
generally naturalized, such that a myth can be perceived without controversy or contradiction 
(pp. 240-242, 255-256). And because imitation is a natural human response, it is understandable 
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that an audience or culture might be unaware of their own expressive reverse-mimetic behavior. 
This is a suggestion consistent with the general premise in Oscar Wilde’s declaration that “life 
imitates art far more than art imitates life” (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2015, p. 135; Wilde, 1889, p. 
47).  
Plato and Socrates were well acquainted with myth’s ability to train an audience to 
imitate desired moral or physical social behavior. (Brisson, 1998, pp. 10, 74; Murray, 2011, p. 
183; Schaeffer, 2010, p. 21). So powerful and spectacular was myth’s ability to induce imitation 
in its audience that Plato regarded it as a form of magic capable of exerting significant influence 
and modification upon the human soul of all ages (Brisson, 1998, pp. 10, 82, 138; Morgan, 2000, 
p. 159). It was perceived so powerful by Plato, that he feared it could be deployed unvirtuously 
(Munteanu, 2004, p. 156), and argued for the strict regulation of myth’s moral content and 
distribution (Brisson, 1998, pp. 83, 116). Aristotle, always the rational scientist, held the 
alternative view that myth can produce positive effects on an audience simply because imitation 
is a natural human tendency that we enjoy because it initiates mental processes that directly 
affect learning (Munteanu, 2004, p. 97). Or as Jerome Bruner (1959) argues, “myth becomes the 
tutor, the shaper of identities; it is here that personality imitates myth in as deep a sense as myth 
is an externalization of the vicissitudes of personality.” (p. 352). 
It is arguable that there is no more profound an example of alternating shifts of 
personality than in the act of ritual. Ritual is a well-known associate to myth, and I argue further 
that ritual is the highest form of reverse-mimesis in relation to myth and Myth Context. Ritual is 
a phenomena that permits the ability to express and convey emotional understanding by way of 
imitation (Valeri, 2018b, p. 187). Burkert (1979) observed the timeless and inherently 
reverential, paradoxical, and irrational qualities of ritual when he writes that “‘Ritual’ is 
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something atavistic, compulsive, nonsensical, at best circumstantial and superfluous, but at the 
same time something sacred and mysterious” (p. 35). Ritual relational to myth, especially 
initiation ritual, was widely practiced in ancient Greece (Dowden, 2011b, p. 488). Ritual today is 
a common and ubiquitously shared human behavior, and as suggested by Valeri (2018a), can 
include “behaviors of courtesy, good manners, ceremonies of installation of political and 
religious authorities, the ceremonial of the court, weddings, baptisms, and so forth” (p. 15). Like 
myth, ritual has been perceived as a form of magic (Tudor, 1972, p. 29), and is directly 
implicated as a means of modifying human behavior (Scheub, 2012, p. 19). Further, ritual is also 
considered to be a context. For example, Allen (2011) suggests that ritual is synonymous with 
“contexts of transmission” (p. 342). However, there is no guarantee that myth will induce ritual. 
Myth and ritual have been regarded to not be explicitly codependent or mutually inclusive 
(Tudor, 1972, p. 29). Burkert (1979) suggests that while myth can persistently occur exclusive of 
any associated ritual (p. 56), the two can potentially “form an alliance for mutual benefit, indeed 
a symbiosis” (p. 57). But when they do occur together, myth gains a distinct strength advantage. 
For example, Malinowski had asserted that myth’s power was a direct result of societal agents 
directly imitating other societal agents (Strenski, 1987, p. 52). 
Myth and ritual therefore are cohorts, sometimes they work together, sometimes not, but 
the goal of both is to communicate by way of contextual experience. Ritual demonstrates a clear 
example of Myth Context’s ability to scale until it eventually induces reverse-mimesis. It further 
demonstrates such a clear fundamental commitment to the appropriation of a myth, by the 
receiver, that any fear or inhibition to imitate is ignored in spite of cultural resistance. The 
inducement of such resolve showcases the ability of a myth’s strength to variably scale. If we 
accept that we can be unaware of our imitative nature (Barthes, 1982, p. 406), then we can 
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reasonably argue that a reverse-mimesis has the potential to scale until it is no longer obscure. In 
other words, if the Myth Context possesses the potential to grow stronger, it will manifest itself 
first as a privately held and obscure paradoxical belief, then as an appropriative imitation, and 
may potentially and finally scale into the reverse-mimesis of an openly expressive public ritual. 
The clearest and most obvious indicator of a Myth Context. Along the way, each indicator 
highlights a myth’s pattern of expansion, evolution, and growth as a result of measurable or 
observable human behavior. Behavior not only imitative but also communicative. 
Communicative to such a powerful degree that it is not limited to the transmission of message or 
even action, but also the transmission of mental state. As Radcliffe-Brown argued in the case of 
ritual, it can directly transmit the critical disposition of a society’s emotional affect across 
generational boundaries (Valeri, 2018b, pp. 187-188). Just one further indication that this 
lifeform known as myth might also possess a lifespan. 
3.5 LIFESPAN OF MYTH CONTEXT 
The purpose for defining a Lifespan of Myth Context is that it can directly assist in the 
identification of a myth. I argue that it is critical for myth to be understood from both a lifespan 
perspective and from a perspective of myth itself having a lifespan. Ascertaining a myth’s 
lifespan provides us with yet another template for observable patterns of its evolutionary scale of 
growth. In other words, a myth can scale not only in volume of signification but can also scale in 
temporal scope. When myth manages to overcome the mortal impasse that a generation’s 
lifespan confronts it with, the myth’s own lifespan dynamically expands. As a result of this inter-
generational resilience, the myth itself becomes more resilient, and potentially less obscure.  
Myth does not precede the advent of human consciousness. To the degree that myth 
transforms from a literal narrative into a “living thing”, it does so in the vessel of human thought 
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and experience. Tito Vignoli (1978) adamantly stressed that myth was a “special faculty of the 
human mind” that “still exists in all men…whatever people and class they may belong” (p. 3). 
Von Hendy (2002) wrote that myth “objectifies a deeply felt subjective sense of the unity of all 
life, a sense that stands as the contrary of scientific analysis” (p. 156). Malinowski (1971) wrote 
that myth is an “indispensable ingredient of all culture” (p. 92). Further, myth is inherently 
dependent upon human consciousness and experience for its existence (Birenbaum, 1988, pp. 4-
5; Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 12). In other words, myth is ubiquitous, flourishes still in modern times, 
is present in all cultures, and its ubiquity is predicated upon both its inherent paradoxicality, and 
the fact that it is exclusively dependent upon us for its very existence. Regardless how apparent 
that dependence might seem, with significant regularity we metaphorically characterize myth as 
if it were an independent and sentient living entity. Barthes (2012) did describe myth as a 
signifying “consciousness” (p. 233). Malinowski (1971) had argued that myth, as studied in 
primitive cultures, is not a fiction such as that found in literary fiction, but rather a “reality lived” 
(p. 18). Birenbaum (1988) captures this same feeling of myth as a living “lived thing”, when he 
wrote in his notes that the myth form “suggests unlimited aspects of life to which it can refer by 
implication…myth is a projection -- a qualitative extension -- of the condition of life that it 
embodies” (p. 235). Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2010) metaphorically describes myth as a deceptive 
charlatan when saying that it is “explicitly conceived as an imposter that knows itself to be false 
but wants to be accepted as true” (p. 18), and Von Hendy (2002) asserted that myth is “also 
simultaneously ‘a life form’” (p. 156). Time and again, myth is characterized as a “living” entity 
that occurs outside the normal semiotic process and possesses the ability to plead for its right be 
recognized, respected, and believed. This unusually common regard for myth, as though it were a 
living creature, is also timeless. Dowden (2011a) writes that even in ancient times “Mythology 
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was integral with the stages of life, its special moments, and its values. In a real sense, Greeks of 
the Archaic Age lived the mythology” (p. 53). Considering the degree to which we might 
perform a reverse-mimesis, or imitate our myths, such imitative behavior would reinforce any 
suggestion that we are inclined to attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to live out our myths. 
In that vein, to metaphorically suggest that myth might be a “living thing”, does not seem all that 
unreasonable. And as with all living things, there is typically a span in which it is born, and lives 
for a while, before it passes on. 
3.5.1 The Life, Propagation, and Death of Myth 
 Myths have what appear to be a lifespan. Myths can be born, evolve, and can die. Barthes 
(2012) had argued that myths can “come into being, alter, disintegrate, disappear completely” 
and that they can be suppressed by history (p. 230). German myth theorist Hans Blumenberg 
argued that myth had the potential to die (Nicholls, 2015, p. 176). Lévi-Strauss (1963, 1981) had 
argued similarly, that myths can die (p. 256; p. 77). He had observed the unique similarities in 
the lifespan of the human-myth relationship, known as mythology, with the lifespan of all earth-
bound biological organisms—characterized by life’s inclination to perish as a result of 
evolutionary diversification—and postulated that should man perish from the Earth so would any 
his creations, art and myth included (Lévi-Strauss, 1981, p. 87). The crucial distinction is that 
myth exists on this Earth because it exists exclusively within our human minds (Birenbaum, 
1988, pp. xii, 4-5; Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 12; Vignoli, 1978, p. 3). The extrapolation is quite 
simple—myth lives because we live. Yet, we are human—and we are mortal. Therefore, by 
virtue of myth’s dependence upon human mortality, myth must also be inherently mortal.  
However mortal that myth might be, it does not always succumb to the same fatal reality 
that awaits all human minds that harbor it. Myth can grow incessantly, evolve, persist, and even 
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propagate its “species”. Barthes (2012) had observed myth’s prospective potential to evolve and 
propagate when he said that “some objects become the prey of mythical speech for a while, then 
they disappear, others take their place and attain the status of myth” (p. 218).  Sanfeliu (2014), in 
the biographical study of Object Relations theorist Karl Abraham, writes that Abraham asserted 
“that a myth can disappear if society rejects is [sic] old beliefs and modifies its aspirations” (p. 
140). Cruz and Frijhoff (2009) write similarly, identifying the death and rebirth of myths as a 
natural aspect of their generational progression (pp. 6-7). Lévi-Strauss (1963) had argued this 
exact point, that myths can die when confronted by critical socio-cultural boundaries (p. 256-
268). Not only can and do some myths die, but they also have a unique power to perpetuate 
“offspring” by convincing succeeding generations, that they may have a need for a new version 
of it. Lévi-Strauss (1963) had observed that after multiple cross-cultural transformations, where a 
myth is retold in novel variation, a myth could simply disintegrate to be replaced by something 
new (p. 263). By virtue of its ability to produce offspring, it very much resembles the life that 
gives it life. Like life, and unlike the Literal Context—the rigid host that myth is dependent 
upon—myth can evolve. It is an evolution dependent upon myth’s ability to appeal to succeeding 
generations and persuade those generations to selectively re-appropriate it as their myth. Of 
course, just so long as those generations will also agree to bring myth’s literal host along for the 
ride. 
3.5.2 Multi-dimensional Nature of Myth’s Lifespan  
The span of a generation is associated with an aggregate computation relative the limited 
lifespan of the individuals born into it, who become its members. Therefore, each generation has 
a limited span. Strauss and Howe (1991) argue that the span of a generation is approximately 
twenty-two years (pp. 31 – 35). Myth, though it occurs in the individual human mind with a 
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corresponding limited human lifespan, further has the potential to outlive the individual and the 
generation the individual is a member of. But the lifespans of individual, generation, myth, and 
even culture or society, can all exist within different temporal scopes. The lifespan of myth, 
demonstrated especially in the case of the Greek legacy, can clearly last for millennia. So how 
does one define lifespan characteristics for any myth? To establish that requires an examination 
of the multi-dimensional quality of Myth Context.  
An audience can ultimately appropriate anything it wants so that it might become myth, 
but an audience can be a unit of one or a collective of a great many. Any appropriation can be 
performed, as Barthes (2012) observed, by “reader” (pp. 239 – 240), “group” (p. 229), or 
“society” (p. 218). Barthes, in making these observations independent of each other, 
inadvertently distinguished that myth has a multi-dimensional quality when it comes to its 
appropriation. That any appropriation can occur within a context unique to the body making that 
appropriation at a particular time, and that the bodies themselves are subject further to the 
contexts of their own makeup. A reader can be an individual. A group can be any larger body of 
individuals that share a commonality, such as generation. A society can be a culture or even a 
nation state. Each can exist for varying degrees of time, from years to centuries or longer, and 
their interests and beliefs can be widely divergent or narrowly common. And while the spans of 
each might occur at different times, their spans may further intersect or be co-related. A group 
can be made of many readers. A society of many groups. This condition of multi-dimensional 
contexts that myth occurs therefore reinforces the Myth Context concept, and can enable the 
defining of lifespan parameters relevant to myth. 
Context, relevant to linguistics, is recognized to occur in multiple dimensions. (Meibauer, 
2012, pp. 9-11). In other words, the interpretation of any discourse may be impacted by multiple 
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levels of contexts that are simultaneously relevant the discourse. Meibauer (2012) says that this 
can include dimensions of context considering a word situated relational to other words in a 
sentence, the word situated relational to the entire body of a work, the relation of that text body 
to other bodies of text, or the environment the text was created within (p. 11). This multi-
dimensional nature of linguistics is also present in the field of lexical semantics. Belica et al. 
(2010) argue that in lexical semantics “(i) meaning is construed, ‘constructed’ and ‘co-
dependent’; (ii) meaning is connotational rather than denotational, and (iii) meaning arises only 
in context.” (p. 119). Belica et al. (2010) argue that lexical meaning can be influenced by two 
subtypes of context which they identify as “local or collocational context” and “global or 
situational context” (p. 120).  Further, Belica et al. (2010) argue that, because contexts are never 
always exactly the same, to properly interpret contexts of local and global nature the interpreter 
must be able make conscious and unconscious connections regarding similarities (p. 121). 
Meibauer (2012) adds a time relation component to this argument, arguing that “localness or 
globalness” can be a matter of temporal protocol such that the relationship between things that 
occur first and things that occur later can affect meaning (p. 25), adding further that “time is a 
very important property of context” (p.26). In other words, lexical meaning—co-dependent and 
connotational—is construed from co-relational dimensions of context that are locally and/or 
globally situated and further influenced by conditions of time relationship and variable 
comparative conditions of likeness or similarity. This distinction holds significance because the 
concept of a generation is that of a peer social group defined by the similarities of its members as 
a result of temporal placement, and because the lifespan stages of a myth are greatly impacted by 
the local or global contexts of the environment that the myth might be born into. 
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3.5.3 The Lifespan Stages of Myth 
The sequence of myth’s lifespan stages will occur both locally and globally. That is, 
Myth Context can occur local to any individual reader’s lifespan, yielding a local myth lifespan 
specific to only that reader. But Myth Context will alternatively also occur as a global myth 
lifespan which reflects the cumulative lifespan of a myth across multiple local myth lifespans 
unique to many different readers across time. This is a multidimensional character of the lifespan 
of any myth and it can have profound effect upon the variable scale of the myth. In other words, 
it recognizes that there are different contextual vantage points from which any myth can be 
viewed specific to reader, group, society, or generation. For example, it can be local to the reader 
relational to the reader’s lifetime, local to the reader against the myth’s global lifespan, or global 
to a group or society across the myth’s global lifespan. From each vantage point a different 
multidimensional layering of contexts for the same myth can be present. And these different 
contexts, recognized to also occur in temporal location, relationship, and span contexts, expand 
this multidimensionality, and the myth’s potential and variable scale, to new levels. Further, in 
recognizing that the global context of myth’s lifespan is comprised of multiple successive local 
myth lifespan contexts, we are also recognizing that there are repetitive opportunities for a myth 
to perish associated with a reader or a group’s inherent mortality, or end of generational span. 
These junctures, where one lifespan or one generation is survived by another, are therefore 
potentially fatal impasses for any myth. A fragile point in the life of a Myth Context where it 
might not succeed in crossing over from one local context to another successive local context, or 
may fail to become a globally received context because it did not cross enough successive local 
myth lifespans to sufficiently scale so that it may be shared by society and history.   
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In developing hypothetical lifespan stages for myth, we can draw inspiration from the 
human life cycle stages as theorized by Erik Erikson (Greene, 2012, pp. 199-202). Erikson had 
divided the human lifespan into 8 distinct life stages, divided according to time and social 
demand from infancy to old age, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 
Erik Erikson’s Stages of The Life Cycle 
 
 Stage Approximate Age     
 Infancy Birth to 2 years  
 Early childhood 2–4 years 
 Play age 4–6 years 
 School age 6–12 years 
 Adolescence 12–22 years 
 Young adult 22–34 years 
 Adulthood 34–60 years  
 Old age 60 years–death     
 
Note. Adapted from Erik Erikson’s stages of the life cycle as presented on page 201 of Greene, R. R. (2012). 
Psychosocial theory. In C. N. Dulmus, K. M. Sowers, & B. A. Thyer (Eds.), Human behavior in the social 
environment: Theories for social work practice (pp. 193-223). [ProQuest Ebook Central]. Retrieved from 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/odu/detail.action?docID=980956. 
 
Erikson’s model was divided largely upon stages of social development with broad stages such 
as childhood and adulthood divided further into stages that correlate with distinct and well-
defined social activities of focus such as play or school. Similarly, a model can be drawn for 
myth that correlates to distinct social behaviors that are responsible for the creation, 
development, distribution, and acceptance of myth. I suggest that these conceptual stages—(1) 
Conception, (2) Obscurity, (3) Emergence, and (4) Ascendance—can be distinguished as the 
Lifespan Stages of Myth, and they can be defined as follows. 
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3.5.3.1 Conception 
 The myth lifespan stage of Conception is a myth’s “birth” stage. It refers to the moment 
of a reader’s mental signification of myth concept. It should refer to the event when a narrative, 
regardless its origin or purpose, presents a choice to the reader to select between the Literal 
Context or Myth Context of a narrative, and the Myth Context is subsequently selected by the 
reader. At a minimum the Myth Context should be dependent upon the narrative’s Literal 
Context, and should exhibit potential for the variability and scalability of its signification, and 
should involve some kind of paradoxical belief held by the reader, about the dependent narrative, 
that the reader is resistant to evaluate for potential falsification.  
A Myth Context conception can be observed as local or global dependent upon its 
relationship to the current generation. From a local lifespan context, a local conception is the 
point a reader first conceives a myth or first encounters the narrative and is presented with the 
opportunity to appropriate it. In the context of a myth’s global lifespan, conception refers to the 
point when the myth in question was first ever conceived relative to history. Its “birth” relative 
the global span of its entire existence in time. Alternatively, the local and global conception of a 
young myth, which has not yet had time to exceed the span of a single generation, would be one 
and the same. Whereas with an old and venerable myth, conceived in prior centuries, it would 
have a global conception of many centuries old. But may also have been reconceived with a new 
Myth Context by a younger generation at a later century. 
 It is this variable dynamic that exposes the general nature of myth’s ability to cross 
generational boundaries, and while conception is synonymous with appropriation, it can also 
point to a re-appropriation. Per Barthes (2012), all objects can be open to being appropriated (pp. 
217-218). Myth can also be appropriated from a pre-existing myth. Lévi-Strauss had argued that 
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an existing myth could be transformed into another different and unique myth (Liszka, 1989, p. 
9). Barthes (2012) had argued that a “reconstituted myth” was the definition of a mythology (p. 
247), and that myth’s ability to recur was its “major power” (p. 246). Any appropriation of a 
standing myth is therefore a re-appropriation, and it is this ability for one generation to re-
appropriate a prior generation’s myth, that endows myth with great resilience and longevity.  
Contextually, an appropriation would typically point to a myth’s conception global to all 
history, while any reappropriation would typically point to a myth’s conception or re-conception 
local and relative to a specific generation. Appropriations of narrative can expose the variable 
base potential of the myth. While reappropriations expose the inherent resilience of that myth’s 
potentiality. Indeed, in ancient times Plato and other poets had reappropriated Homer (Dowden 
& Livingstone, 2011, p. 16; Murray, 2011, pp. 181-184, 190-191). It is a practice that continues 
to this day. Liz Gloyn (2019) writes that “The plasticity of myth allows popular culture to use it 
as an inspiration for revised and altered storytelling.” (p. 125). Despite such ubiquity, any 
conception of a myth can occur without the knowledge of reader, group, or society, and can 
persist that way for an indefinite period. 
3.5.3.2 Obscurity 
 The myth lifespan stage of Obscurity is a myth’s “developmental” stage. It refers to the 
span of time when a myth, previously appropriated and conceived, begins to develop greater 
sophistication in the mental subconscious of the reader, while the reader and/or the culture are 
unaware of this development. Lévi-Strauss (1995) asserted “that myths get thought in man 
unbeknownst to him” (p. 3). During this developmental stage, the conceived Myth Context is 
permitted to incubate in the minds of individuals independently and/or collectively. However, 
regardless any collective experience of the Myth Context by large numbers of individuals within 
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the culture, during Obscurity the culture will generally remain unaware of the Myth Context that 
is present in themselves or others. As a result, any paradoxical beliefs or imitative behavior will 
generally be hidden, or go unobserved, even if present. Alternatively, while such behavior might 
be observed, these behavioral indicators may be considered so natural or normal that they will 
fail to stand out. For example, Barthes (2012) had observed that we are generally inattentive to 
myth’s existence where its powers of naturalization can make the myth appear as something 
perceived normal (p. 252). 
An obscure Myth Context can be observed as local or global dependent upon its 
relationship to the current generation. A period of obscurity in a local context refers to its 
obscurity status relative or local to the generation it was conceived in. A myth’s obscurity can be 
further local to the reader, as well as being local to the generation. In the context of a myth’s 
global lifespan, obscurity refers to the period that the myth has remained hidden, across multiple 
generations, since the time the myth was conceived in a global context. Alternatively, a myth 
might potentially remain obscure local to multiple successive generations but may have only 
been obscure for a short period of its cumulative global lifespan over a span of centuries. 
Proximity to a Myth Context behavior, or lack of attention to it, can potentially isolate 
observation by some members of the group. Further, if young enough and weak enough, the 
Myth Context can potentially die during this stage. Especially if it is still obscure at a 
generational boundary, and/or if the myth is inadvertently subjected to repeated attempts to 
disqualify the paradoxical beliefs that are sustaining the myth’s rhetoric. Barring such attempts at 
falsification, or any willingness by the audience to permit falsification, a Myth Context’s 
obscurity will generally remain variable, relative the life stage context it occurs in, until the time 
that the myth emerges and asserts itself in the collective consciousness of the group or culture. 
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3.5.3.3 Emergence 
The myth lifespan stage of Emergence is a myth’s “young adult” stage. It refers to the 
period when a myth, previously appropriated and conceived, and still largely obscure, begins to 
emerge from the reader, or readers, to be spread across the group, culture, or society, and will 
begin to operate outside of obscurity. Joseph Campbell argued that because myth resides in the 
unconscious it “is something waiting to be brought forth in everyone” (Campbell & Moyers, 
1991, p. 71). Barthes (2012) argued that “a myth ripens because it spreads” (p. 263), adding 
further that myth can reach “the entire community” (p. 272). Emergence is a social distribution 
stage where the audience, consciously or unconsciously, begins to engage with and disseminate 
the myth. It is a variable phenomenon that can take seconds or centuries to coalesce into a more 
unified socially shared signification with less and less deviation or difference. During this 
transition, a greater number of individuals become susceptible to selecting Myth Context over 
Literal Context. Any paradoxical beliefs, or imitative behavior will occur with increasing scale, 
promoting and disseminating the myth with greater ease, while also magnifying its potential and 
aiding in its eventual emergence from obscurity. As a result, any associated Myth Context 
indicators become progressively more observable, and therefore measurable with some degree of 
effort. The myth loses its anonymity while gaining notoriety.  
 An emergent Myth Context can be observed as local or global dependent upon its 
relationship to the current generation. Emergence in the local context refers to its emergence 
status local to a specific generation. A myth could potentially emerge and reemerge local to 
successive, or different discontinuous generations, in the event of multiple reappropriations 
during its global lifespan. In the context of a myth’s global lifespan, emergence refers to that 
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time in history, regardless the generation, when the myth first becomes socially recognized 
beyond the confines of its obscurity.  
In spite of its emergence, a Myth Context can still go undetected by some in the culture, 
remaining obscure for this limited minority, if its context is perceived as a natural or uneventful 
circumstance. Further, it can still perish at the generational boundary where members of that 
generation begin to expire. Especially if the myth has been subjected to forces with the ability to 
destroy or counter any paradoxical beliefs held, about the myth, by that group. However, barring 
such circumstances, a Myth Context might otherwise scale indefinitely with each new local 
reappropriation, and each subsequent global generational transmission. Until its emergence 
becomes visible, and remains so, to all of society and history. Toward this latter stage of 
emergence, fewer and fewer in the culture will remain unaware of the Myth Context as it ascends 
into an ethereal and diffuse signification of a discretely obvious nature. 
3.5.3.4 Ascendance 
The myth lifespan stage of Ascendance is a myth’s “maturity” stage. It refers to the 
moment when a myth is considered, within a culture, group, or society, to be instantly and 
unarguably obvious. Dowden and Livingstone (2011) wrote that “We know a Greek myth when 
we see one and have need of no definitions, guidance, or codes of practice to identify it as such” 
(p.3). It should refer to the time when the average reader, and society at large, require no 
persuasion to be convinced of its myth status because it has the pedigree, in the form of a 
magnificent or difficult to comprehend history, to give its claim instant credibility. At a 
minimum, any indicators of Myth Context associated with the myth should be immediately or 
historically observable, and its Myth Context should exhibit an inexhaustible reserve of potential, 
scale, and variability. It is ascended because it has “risen” for all to see and understand it for 
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what it is. However, it should not be confused with transcendent, a term commonly used in 
association with myth. Further, ascendance is not as a relation of a myth to a political or social 
ascendancy, order, or class. Northrup Frye (2009) had used the term “ascendant” to describe 
myths associated or promoted by an ascendant social class (p. 32). Rather, as used here, it 
describes a myth’s general ascendancy into a state of permanence in the culturally obvious. That 
is, the myth is no longer obscure and no longer emerging. Regardless the caveats of its rhetoric, 
its status as myth is undeniable.  
An ascendant Myth Context can be observed as local or global dependent upon its 
relationship to the current generation. In the context of a myth’s global lifespan, ascendance 
refers to the point when the myth is infinitely obvious as a Myth Context and typically requires 
significant spans of time and reappropriation for this to occur. Generally, most ascended myth is 
viewed as ascendant in a global context. Alternatively, from a local lifespan context, a myth can 
be conceived, emerge, and ascend in a matter of seconds. Though less common, an ascendance 
in local context typically occurs relative the generation it is local to or within the span of less 
than a generation. An instantaneous ascendance of local to global is typically relational to a 
monumental or super-historical event. For example, in the short span of a footstep NASA 
influenced the appropriation of newly and instantly ascendant myths such as ‘NASA is the ‘can-
do’ agency that can accomplish anything’ or ‘the moon landing was faked’, while at the same 
time destroyed or weakened millennium old ascendant myths such as ‘the moon is a god’. These 
examples demonstrate that ascendent myths do not require significant analysis for identification. 
Though not all myths are yet ascendent and are therefore more difficult to identify. 
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3.6 IDENTIFICATION OF MYTH 
Because myth can hide in the experiential consciousness of a single reader such that even 
that reader may be unaware of the myths they contextualize, detection of all myth should be 
considered a virtual impossibility. In contrast, at times identification of myth can be effortless. It 
is the position of this thesis that Ascendent myth is synonymous with myths that are instantly 
detectable and obvious. For example, ancient myth is generally observed as a matter that should 
be obvious (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011, p. 3; Woodford, 2011, p. 159). But not all myth has 
yet reached Ascendance, nor is all myth immediately obvious. Throughout the length of this 
thesis, I have attempted to stress the persistent way in which Myth Contexts manage to hide in 
plain sight. If we are to clearly understand myth’s true power, we must be able to identify 
obscure myths. Jensen (2014) argued similarly, that there is a need for better methods of 
identifying myths that we are potentially unaware of (p. 433). Further, if we are to show that 
narratives passed down through generations may do so as a direct result of myth, then there is a 
direct need to demonstrate a clear myth context in relation to that narrative. The procedure 
proposed here seeks to address this need.  
3.6.1 Definitions 
The terms reception, interpretation, and response may possess ambiguity when used 
together, with the potential to be mistaken for one another. These terms will now be defined:  
The term reception is used here to describe an all-encompassing social “result” of the 
consumption of a narrative. Jensen (1991) defined reception analysis in a broad contextual scope 
that included history, culture, and media in its composition (p. 139). This thesis regards the term 
reception similarly, as a broad category that represents a comprehensive social perspective 
considered from all potential sources, all potential contexts—literal, mythic, situational, 
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historical, social, or affective—and all potential interpretations. Reception therefore refers to an 
act of comprehensive meaning, understanding, and behavior by reader, group, or society.  
The term interpretation is used to define how an individual interprets a narrative, both 
privately and socially, to produce personalized meaning or understanding about that narrative. 
Barthes (2012) regarded the act of a distortion, of first order meaning into second order 
signification or myth, to be an interpretation (p. 243). For this thesis, interpretation refers to an 
individual reader’s unique construction of understanding regarding a narrative or idea. 
Interpretation can be literal or figurative, logical or affective, static or dynamic, or both. It can be 
taken as an equivalent to an act that produces first order meaning or second order signification 
that one might hold for a narrative.  
The term response is observed as the ability of an individual to articulate their own 
unique interpretations of a narrative. Comparative reception analysis, as designed here, is used as 
a means of discovering which context, Literal Context or Myth Context, is active, dominant, or 
exclusive within the reception of a narrative, by seeking a response from audience members 
regarding their interpretations of the narrative. 
3.6.2 Reception and Myth Identification 
The Myth Identification Procedure employs a Comparative Reception Analysis, which 
leverages the general characteristics of the Myth Context Reception Model, to aid in the 
identification of Obscure or Emergent myth. However, Myth Context is significantly more than 
just a reception. The Myth Context Reception Model charges that human behaviors, as a result of 
reception, are fundamental to any contexts we associate with a myth. The model has sought to 
identify these unique behaviors, and charges further that they can be observed, discovered, or 
revealed in the audience through an ordered evaluation of the social act of reception. Calame 
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(2011) argues that the determination of myth’s character is a matter of production and reception, 
saying that “everything depends on the author’s intentions and on the associations which the 
narrative rouses at the point of its reception” (p. 516). Calame (2011) added further that if a 
narrative is to be effective as myth, it is due to “the strong relationship that narrative fiction and 
the world of text have with a world of cultural representations that corresponds to a universe of 
belief inscribed in space and time” (pp. 516-517).  In other words, myth works because it is 
inherently dependent upon the context of an audience’s beliefs about that narrative further 
contextually situated in relation to culture and history. Resilient beliefs that manifest themselves 
both paradoxically and mimetically.  
The critical distinction of reception is that it is a variable phenomenon. Jensen (1991) 
argues that reception is “a social act that serves to negotiate the definition of social reality in the 
context of broad cultural and communicative practices” (p. 137), that is synonymous with 
audience (p. 138). However, the anticipated reception of any narrative should not be perceived as 
a predetermined conclusion. Jensen (1991) argued that multiple interpretations of meaning can 
occur (p. 137), and implied that there can exist in reception “an important theoretical distinction 
between potential and actualized meanings” (p. 137). In other words, while a narrative or text 
can exist in determinate literal form, because reception is a negotiated social act driven by 
context, a form possesses significant indeterminate potential to be variably interpreted. Variable 
interpretation that can occur within a single comprehensive audience, by reader, group, or 
society, can be further variable across time, and that can be evaluated for by way “audience-cum-
content analysis” (Larsen, 1991, pp. 132-133), otherwise regarded to as “reception analysis” 
(Jensen, 2011a, p. 160). Jensen (1991) defines a reception analysis methodology as “a 
comparative textual analysis of media discourses and audience discourses, whose results are 
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interpreted with emphatic reference to context, both the historical as well as cultural setting and 
the “con-text” of other media contents.” (p. 139). Jensen (2011a) further clarified reception 
analysis as the result of content analysis compared against audience response (p. 160). In other 
words, reception analysis involves a comparative analysis of a narrative’s literal character on one 
side, against an analysis of the character of an audience’s articulated affective interpretation of 
that narrative, or response, on the other. Because reception analysis of this kind is considered 
against historical or situational contexts, of potentially both textual context and audience context 
(Jensen, 1991, p. 140), this type of comparative analysis within context is regarded as a frame 
(Jensen, 2011a, pp. 164-165), and can be performed through a combination of both qualitative 
and/or quantitative evaluations (Jensen, 2011a, p. 165). The result of the comparison, framed in a 
close relationship between the narrative and its relevant audience, can be used to identify any 
unique qualities of reception regarding that narrative by the relevant audience (Jensen, 2011a, p. 
165). The proposed design of this Comparative Reception Analysis will be tailored to use K. B. 
Jensen’s reception methodology as a base template for the method, but with some modification. 
3.6.3 Comparative Reception Analysis 
The Comparative Reception Analysis is an optional multi-step analysis intended for the 
exclusive purpose of identifying Obscure or Emergent myths that are not obvious. The steps for 
this reception analysis will include (a) the performance of a Content Analysis that establishes the 
literalness of a narrative, (b) an Audience Response Analysis that gathers audience interpretations 
about the respective narrative content, and (c) a final Comparative Analysis of Content and 
Response that compares the content analysis findings against the audience response findings. In 
this final stage, if the audience response demonstrates evidence of reception that is paradoxical 
and/or imitative of the narrative, this will demonstrate a Myth Context to be present in the 
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reception of the narrative. Alternatively, if the audience response instead aligns with literalness 
of the narrative, this will demonstrate a Literal Context to be present in the reception.  
Not all narratives will require a Comparative Reception Analysis because their status as 
myth may be obvious or any paradoxical or imitative phenomena produced by the audience may 
also be clearly obvious. In contrast, narratives where a myth context may be ambiguous, or not 
obvious, are the primary candidates this reception analysis is intended for. The presence of a 
Myth Context can only be quantitatively measured by this reception analysis against a current 
living audience that can be actively surveyed and/or interviewed. Further, this reception analysis 
is not a standardized uniform test. Use of this reception analysis to identify for myth, is a process 
that looks for a reception behavior unique to a specified narrative and its respective audience. 
Since no two myths are the same, nor do they produce identical audiences or identical audience 
receptions, there is no single list of queries that can be applied to all narratives to ascertain their 
relationship to myth in all circumstances. Each reception analysis is a “designer” evaluation that 
must be custom tailored to that narrative content and its unique audience. 
3.6.3.1 Content Analysis 
 The Content Analysis is an analysis of a text’s literalness and its findings will contribute 
to the final comparative analysis. Since the host narratives of many myths are in a text form, it 
would be reasonable to identify the analysis of a text’s literalness as a Textual Analysis. 
However, not all myth hosts are textual narratives. Some host narratives are either so brief or so 
driven by visual or image that a physical text is unnecessary. Barthes’ observation of E=mc2 as 
myth and this thesis’ previous observation of the moon as myth are just two such examples. In 
principle, this Content Analysis will adhere to the mechanics of a Textual Analysis as the 
template for its construction and operation. The Content Analysis is a qualitative logical 
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examination and should adhere as closely as possible to only what the narrative says while 
rejecting any perceptions, opinions, or biased interpretations on the part of the audience or 
examiner. It should follow a rigor as defined by Barthes (1968), where the text should only be 
examined relevant to an immanent understanding of its strict expression (pp. 95-96; Larsen, 
1991, p. 124). In other words, analysis of the text must be focused only on the text and its strict 
literal character. The attempt should be to capture, as best as possible, the static and rigid 
character of the narrative’s literalness. The guideline here is simple. If the narrative does not 
explicitly and literally express an idea, that idea is invalid from the strict vantage point of the 
content analysis. Where any extrapolation of the narrative might be required, such extrapolation 
should follow strict rules of progressive logic that evaluate only the first-order semiotic system 
of the narrative to arrive at a first order signification or meaning. All second order significations 
are to be excluded and ignored. The goal should be to ascertain “what the literal content logically 
articulates”, and to exclude “what the audience rhetorically infers about the content”.  
3.6.3.2 Audience Response Analysis 
The Audience Response Analysis is an analysis of an audience’s interpretation of a 
narrative and its findings will contribute to the final comparative analysis. This response analysis 
can be a quantitative and/or qualitative evaluation. At a minimum, a quantitative survey should 
be used, but a mix of survey and qualitative interview is recommended. The purpose of this 
response analysis is to obtain an audience response regarding the perceptions, opinions, beliefs, 
attitudes, and interpretations that the audience members possess regarding the examined 
narrative. A survey should follow a rigor as described by Gunter (2011) where it should seek to 
acquire data “from respondents about their knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviours 
on a post hoc basis” (p. 242). An interview should follow a rigor as described by Jensen (2011c) 
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where a respondent is asked to “put into discourse certain ideas and notions that otherwise may 
remain unarticulated” (p. 270). The attempt, regarding survey and interview, is to develop 
narrative relevant inquiries for the respondent, where such inquiries are tailored directly to the 
respective narrative, and its constitutive elements or characteristics, such that the inquiries can 
obtain personalized interpretations, such as beliefs or behaviors etc., that the respondent harbors 
for the narrative. The kind of questions inquired should always be uniquely tailored to the 
narrative, the narrative’s relevant and relative audience, and on any special insight that an 
examiner might have observed in the narrative/audience relationship. What the response analysis 
seeks to find is a composite data collection of multiple reader interpretations of the narrative in 
question that reflect an aggregated dataset of biased and personalized beliefs, perceptions, and 
affective interpretations that the audience has developed for the narrative. We are concerned only 
with the audience’s active interpretation of the narrative’s discourse, and not why it is interpreted 
that way. In other words, what does the audience think or feel about the narrative. Another goal 
of the response analysis is to discover whether that dataset yields a dominant subset of similar 
responses that are shared within the audience and to what degree those shared responses produce 
measurable patterns in the audience at large.  
3.6.3.3 Comparative Analysis of Content and Response 
The Comparative Analysis of Content and Response will compare the outcome of the 
content analysis data collection with the outcome of response analysis data collection. The 
purpose of this final comparative step is to evaluate for any differences between the content 
analysis and the response analysis, and further, to determine if these differences, should they 
exist, match any indicators of Myth Context. This comparative analysis should use a rigor such 
that it can meet the same objective for a comparative analysis as set forth by Jensen (2011b) 
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where a media discourse is compared to an audience discourse for the purpose of decoding an 
audience’s interpretation of that media discourse (p. 178). When comparing the outcomes of the 
content analysis and response analysis, the comparison should yield a result in the range from no 
difference between content and response—to—significant difference between content and 
response. Where there is little or no difference between content and response a literal 
interpretation has occurred, and the reception of the narrative would reflect a reception in Literal 
Context. Where there is significant difference between content and response, further 
characterized by paradoxical and/or imitative behavior relevant the narrative, a myth 
interpretation has occurred, and the narrative would reflect a reception in Myth Context. Such a 
finding of difference, between content and response, should fall into one or more categories 
synonymous with the core Indicators of Myth Context as defined by this model—Paradoxical 
Belief, Appropriative Imitation, and Reverse-Mimesis. 
  A Paradoxical Belief indicates the presence of a Myth Context because it is a 
phenomenon where the reader or audience member possesses a belief about or for the narrative, 
that is paradoxical to a reception of the narrative in Literal Context. Paradoxical beliefs held 
about a narrative, and leading to Myth Context, can occur in one of several operations that 
demonstrate paradoxical difference between narrative content and reception response: 
• Reception eq Myth Context if ((!Literal == Response) || (⊥Literal ==Response)) 
o False Ground 
▪ Literal evidence, created with intent to be false, is Believed 
• Reception eq Myth Context if ((Literal) != (Response)) 
o Antithesis or Disbelief  
▪ Existing Literal evidence is 180 degrees counter the Belief 
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▪ Existing Literal evidence is irrelevant to the Belief 
▪ Existing Literal evidence is incapable of altering the Belief 
• Reception eq Myth Context if ((Literal == Null) != (Response)) 
o Nonexistent Ground 
▪ There is no Literal evidence to counter or falsify the Belief 
▪ The Belief is foreign to the Literal 
• Reception eq Myth Context if ((Literal < Response) || (Literal > Response)) 
o Inconsistence 
▪ Existing Literal evidence is unable to adequately support the Belief 
▪ Existing Literal evidence lacks ground or veracity 
An Appropriative Imitation indicates the presence of myth because it is a higher order 
example of a paradoxical reception where a narrative, or element of a narrative, is appropriated 
to become an imitation of something else which it paradoxically is not, and in imitating that 
thing, it is received as a genuine naturalized authority of or about the thing which it imitates. It 
functions to leverage paradoxical belief so that whatever the reader interprets the narrative to be 
while myth, this interpretation which is a belief that the narrative represents an authority on the 
subject matter, is believed to be its natural state. For example, if one were to believe or perceive 
that the popular culture fiction James Bond was an authoritative account of everything to do with 
spies and spy culture, then the image of James Bond is an appropriative imitation that represents 
a “Spy-icity”. In other words, it is an appropriative imitation, an element of narrative abducted to 
imitate something which it is not, and the imitation naturalized to be paradoxically “real”. A 
myth evidenced by a paradoxical belief that Bond is to be taken as the complete authoritative 
essence and character of everything related to “Spies” or “Spying”. 
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 A Reverse-mimesis indicates the presence of myth because it is another high order form 
of imitation related to paradoxical reception. A reverse-mimesis is a condition where an 
individual, knowingly or unknowingly, will imitate the narrative through cognitive or physical 
action. That is, the audience member will treat a narrative, or narrative element, that is known to 
be a fiction or pretense, as a template for action to be imitated mentally or physically. For 
example, a fictional element of a narrative might promote a suggestion or instruction, as part of 
the fictional narrative, such that the suggestion is cognitively acted out in the receiver’s mind, or 
in animated action. At the furthest extreme, a fictional element of the narrative may be 
ritualistically acted out as a ritual or celebrated behavior that mimics the narrative. That is, in an 
attempt to reconcile the paradoxical reception, to reconcile the difference, that which is different 
and paradoxical is acted out in an attempt to make it common and accepted, but it is also a 
pretense in action not just a pretense in thought. In the pursuit to naturalize the narrative by 
acting it out, the paradoxical reception is magnified because the ritual action, which is real, 
becomes ever more contradictory to a narrative which is fictional, and not real. An example of a 
reverse-mimesis experienced cognitively might include the paradoxical belief that a fictionalized 
biographical account, of an actual person who really lived, is believed to be the factual account 
even when parts of the work are known to be a fiction. Historical dramas about famous figures 
who lived in centuries past (e.g. Julius Caesar, Anthony and Cleopatra, Moses, etc.) where lost 
dialog is recreated and partially fictionalized, but believed to have occurred, would classify in 
this example. Further, an example of a reverse-mimesis experienced through physical action, 
might include ritual reenactment, costume use, or celebratory ritual where the receiver of the 
narrative acts out the narrative or encourages or teaches others to act out a fictional narrative 
through imitative immersion. 
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To arrive at a comparative finding between content and response, we should determine if 
the audience response to a narrative matches the progressively logical conclusion of the 
narrative’s literalness such that the message of a narrative accomplishes the narrative’s literal 
goal. That is, the response should logically match the content’s “instructions”. For example, a 
narrative about a mouse that ran up a clock might logically and literally be interpreted by a 
respondent that they believe the narrative to depict a small furry mammal clawing its way up a 
timepiece. In contrast, a narrative about a boy who traveled up a hill with a bucket and a female 
companion, and subsequently suffers injury on the journey, might be paradoxically interpreted 
by a respondent if they were to believe the narrative to depict the boy to chase the girl up a hill to 
make lewd sexual advances toward her, the boy’s injury was due to the girl pushing him down 
the hill to avoid him, and finally as the coward ran for his life, the brave young heroine chased 
him down to finish the job and teach him a lesson about undesirable behavior. In this latter 
hypothetical example, if the narrative provides no literal evidence or guidance, that can literally 
or logically reach this conclusion, then the respondent would be exhibiting evidence of a Myth 
Context. In this case a human behavior, a paradoxical belief that the narrative surreptitiously says 
something that in literal form it clearly did not articulate. The premise for this myth identification 
procedure therefor relies on the observation of specific human behavior, defined by the 
attributes, indicators, and lifespan parameters of the Myth Context Reception Model, for the 
identification of myth. 
3.6.4 Myth Identification Procedure 
The Myth Identification Procedure is a procedural evaluation of a narrative against 
temporal, behavioral, and interpretive Myth Context factors that would demonstrate a narrative 
to be received as myth. A visual flowchart for this procedure is depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 
Myth Identification Procedure Flowchart     
  
              
Note. Visual flowchart of the Myth Identification Procedure as designed by Joseph G. Ponthieux, 2021, for the Myth 
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This procedure works through a process of elimination that begins with an evaluation of the 
myth context lifespan seeking out obvious or Ascendent Myth first, subsequently prescribing a 
test for the presence of Myth Context where it may not be obvious such as Emergent or Obscure 
Myth, and works its way progressively toward an evaluation where no presence of a myth can be 
found. That is, at the final step, having failed all previous analysis, the narrative would be 
considered void of myth context or that its myth context is so weak and ineffective to be 
considered undetectable or nonexistent. During this procedure, at stages where the presence of 
myth is not obvious, vague, or uncertain, the previously defined Comparative Reception Analysis 
is employed to identify any indicators of Myth Context that might be present, but potentially 
hidden, in the audience’s reception of the narrative. The value of this test is its specific design 
towards the identification of obscure myth.  
3.6.4.1 Prerequisites 
Prior to performing this procedure, one must be familiar with the general background and 
scope of the source narrative, symbol, or sign. This would typically involve three prima facie 
categories of information about the narrative to include (a) what its source content says and what 
it is about, (b) what its origin, history, and alterations over time are, and (c) what its observable 
reception and use appears to be. This does not need to be a deep analysis of literal content or a 
deep analysis of audience reception but rather should be a synopsis of evidence that is, at a 
minimum, easily obtainable and can establish that the source is an obvious Ascendent Myth.  
3.6.4.2 Procedure 
The general procedure for Myth Identification as prescribed by this Myth Context 
Reception Model is:  
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Determine if source is immediately obvious as myth: 
• If OBVIOUS:  
A. Can you identify clear obvious indicators of Myth Context, for example, obvious 
paradoxical or imitative behavior, ritualistic culture, ancient myth, and so on?  
• If YES:  
i. Identify all obvious Myth Context indicators. 
ii. Source host is an Ascendant Myth. Procedure complete. 
• If NO:  
i. Determination made in error or inconclusive.  
ii. Research source’s history and audience more thoroughly. Start over. 
• If NOT OBVIOUS:  
A. Perform a Comparative Reception Analysis. 
B. If Reception Analysis yields any indicators of Myth Context: 
Are one or more of the following exceptional observations present: 
a. Were any Myth Context indicators, discovered through analysis, observable 
because of the analysis though not immediately obvious? 
b. Is there any kind of evidence, in the common public or published record, that 
might suggest, insinuate, or otherwise hint at a recognition of myth context, or 
myth, in relation to the source? 
• If YES: 
i. Identify all Myth Context indicators discovered by the analysis. 
ii. Identify the exceptional observations. 
iii. Myth Context is Emergent. Procedure complete. 
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• If NO: 
i. Identify all Myth Context indicators discovered by the analysis.  
ii. Myth Context is Obscure. Procedure complete 
C. If Reception Analysis yields no indicators of Myth Context 
i. Myth Context may be weak, undetectable, or nonexistent. 
ii. Determination is inconclusive.  
 
This outlined procedure will provide an avenue through which at least one exemplar of this 
thesis will be required to perform, in order to determine its status as myth.  





This thesis will now present several narratives as exemplars analyzed using the Myth 
Context Reception Model. In accordance with the model, a background will be given for each 
narrative and an attempt will be made to pre-determine if that narrative is an obvious Ascendent 
myth. Where not obvious the narrative will be evaluated using a comparative reception analysis 
to determine if it is an Obscure myth, and if necessary, it will be examined further to determine if 
it is instead an Emergent myth, or alternatively whether a myth status is inconclusive. Evidence 
will then be submitted to support any indications of Myth Context that can be found associated to 
the narrative that may support a determination of myth. Finally, an evaluation of generational 
influence, in relation to the myth determination, will be performed. The exemplars to be 
evaluated will include Classical Myth, Santa Claus, and Batman. The selection of these 
exemplars is intended with the hope that their variable ranges of age can assist in realizing the 
broad potential of this model. All exemplars being put forward are fictions and are not being 
examined to determine their status as fictions. Rather, we are examining the narrative’s abilities, 
obviously or obscurely, to produce a Myth Context response in their audiences, and to further 
determine if that response remains evident across multiple generations. 
4.2 CLASSICAL MYTH 
This thesis presents classical myth as its first exemplar. Because any singular classical 
myth narrative may exist in numerous re-appropriations, re-interpretations, and novel re-tellings 
across time and culture (Lewis, 2011, p. 447), and because Greek myths are often viewed by 
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some as an endless chain of inter-related serial narratives (Bremmer, 2014, p. 6), this exemplar is 
presented not as a specific narrative but rather as the class of narratives known as classical myth. 
Further, selecting just one classical myth sub-narrative to examine would significantly limit the 
role that the whole of classical myth still imposes upon modern culture. The intent is to place 
classical myth in its proper relation to the narrative exemplars that follow and to position this 
class of narratives not as one exemplar, but as two. As both an example of the extraordinary 
success that its Myth Context has had on its propagation, and as an example where such 
propagation can also be shown to have failed. 
4.2.1 Narrative Background 
For the purpose of this thesis, classical myth refers to the Greco-Roman tradition of 
storytelling that occurred predominantly in ancient Greece and Rome. Greek myth begins with 
the works of Hesiod and Homer in the 7th century BCE, continuing through the 1st century BCE 
with works such as those depicting the fall of Troy (Dowden, 2011a, pp. 47-48, 65), and ending 
as late as the 4th century CE (Bremmer, 2011, pp. 539). Many of the myths of ancient Rome are 
known to have concepts appropriated from Greek myths (Denova, 2019, p. 3), and the two are 
understood to be deeply connected with distinct parallels between them (Hays, 2017, p. 29). 
Classical myths told stories about the gods, their origins, and their relationships with humans 
(Denova, 2019, p. 4), and the tradition includes the influence of Plato’s novel philosophical 
contributions to myth during the 4th century BCE (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011, p. 11; Hard, 
2019, p. 13). Dowden and Livingstone (2011) regard this tradition as a form of rhetoric in the 
style of an “allusive poetic shorthand” that is “highly charged (with authority, glamour, beauty, 
and emotive force)” (p. 9), and that can be used as “virtual learning environments” (p. 11). 
Classical myths were conveyed and exchanged by oral recitation before living audiences across 
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many centuries and were repeatedly and significantly deformed by poetic privilege before being 
recorded in written form (Denova, 2019, p. 48; Dowden & Livingstone, 2011, pp. 3-4; Henrichs, 
2014, p. 248; Lewis, 2011, p. 447). Mythography, or the recording of classical myth through 
literacy, is believed to have begun only as late as the 6th century BCE with very little that may 
have been written before that time to have survived (Denova, 2019, pp. 31-32; Fowler, 2017, p. 
17). Much of the Greek mythology from this period, to have survived in writing, is available in a 
text known as the Library which is believed to have been created by Apollodoros in the first 
century CE (Dowden, 2011a, pp. 50, 66-72). 
4.2.2 Myth Identification Analysis 
4.2.2.1 Evaluation for Pre-determination of Myth 
It is generally assumed that most of the classical narratives of the Greek tradition are 
received with special regard as myth. It can be asserted without reservation that classical myth is 
immediately obvious and Ascendent. For example, the fantastic and surreal qualities of Greek 
myth are known to have long contributed to its obvious nature (Woodford, 2011, p. 159), and in 
arguing for this obvious nature of Greek myth, Dowden and Livingstone (2011) adamantly insist 
that no standard of practice is required for its identification as such (p.3). As a class of Ascendent 
myths, these narratives can be shown to have exhibited obvious indicators of Myth Context, at a 
minimum within their audiences of origin, and also within the audiences of generations that have 
followed. 
4.2.3 Evidence of Myth Context 
4.2.3.1 Paradoxical Belief 
Indications of paradoxical belief were culturally present and can be shown to have been 
obvious for the historical audiences of this narrative class and can subsequently be shown to still 
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be present in modern audiences. Given the significant breadth of this class of narrative, it could 
be argued that paradoxical belief of classical myths has occurred in every possible logical 
operation suggested within the Myth Context Reception model. However, it could also be argued 
that in ancient times classical myth presented itself most likely and most often as a paradoxical 
belief held for a nonexistent ground in the logical operation of “Reception eq Myth Context if 
((Literal == Null) != (Response))”, e.g. a belief in deities that could not be proven to not exist. 
For example, we know that ancient culture perceived their myths as being unfalsifiable (Brisson, 
1998, pp. 9-10), and that many in the ancient world did believe in their myths (Denova, 2019, pp. 
11-12; Dowden & Livingstone, 2011, p. 5; Griffiths, 2011, p. 196). Though such beliefs were 
often challenged (Griffiths, 2011, p. 197), as Fowler (2017) argues their “desire to believe in the 
myths remained strong, though, and is visible in the stratagems adopted to save them” (p. 21). 
Further, the relevance of the paradoxical beliefs that ancient society held for their myths can be 
seen in the great efforts they put forward in the architecture they created to celebrate and honor 
their myths. For example, Greek society would build extraordinary temples such as the 
Parthenon for the goddess Athena (Lambrinou, 2018, p. 126), and we know that they did worship 
their myths in such temples (Hard, 2019, p. 22). Temples that, as we will soon show, will play a 
role in this Myth Context being observable still in the modern day. 
4.2.3.2 Appropriative Imitation 
Indications of appropriative imitation were culturally present and obvious for many of 
these narratives. This Myth Context indicator occurred with great intensity in the ancient world 
and has continued with intensity into the modern day. We know that the ancient Greeks 
appropriated their myths as a direct source for imitations of narrative found in ancient art and 
pottery (Lewis, 2011, p. 448). But perhaps more profound is the way in which appropriative 
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imitation was built into the very construction of the Greek tradition of myth itself. Jean Alaux 
(2011) argues that the tragedies of ancient Greece, during the 5th century BC, were the result of 
common and blatant selective appropriations of pre-existing content (p. 141). Plato, Socrates, 
and others openly appropriated from ancient sources (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011, p. 16; 
Murray, 2011, pp. 181-184,190-191), and those who engaged in the telling of myth were 
significantly competitive (Calame, 2014, p. 155; Morgan, 2000, pp. 21; Parker, 2014, p. 189), 
with narratives often being altered with radical or novel deviation so that they might appeal to 
the audiences of the moment (Lewis, 2011, p. 447). As Sian Lewis (2011) asserts, regarding this 
variability within the narratives of the Greek tradition, there was “no single version of the story, 
nor a single meaning, but instead a series of meanings expressed at different times and in 
different ways.” (p.447). As we shall soon see, this indication of Myth Context, in relation to 
these narratives, is still obvious and active in the modern day.  
4.2.3.3 Reverse-Mimesis 
Indications of reverse-mimesis were present and obvious for many of the narratives in 
this narrative class in the culture of its origination. This Myth Context indicator occurred as both 
ritual and performative reverse-mimetic social behavior in the ancient culture that worshipped 
these myths, and this indication of Myth Context occurred with such significant societal import 
that the behavior is regarded today as having been part of a daily religious social behavior for 
which its absence could not have been conceived by the ancient culture that was immersed in it 
(Denova, 2019, pp. 2-4). It is known that it was Plato’s purpose for myth that it would induce an 
audience to imitate the myth (Brisson, 1998, p. 74; Murray, 2011, p. 183; Wohl, 2016, p. 483), 
We also know that the ancient Greeks did celebrate the gods of these myths in ritual activity 
(Hard, 2019, p. 202), such that they did behaviorally “act out” their myths. They are known to 
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have performed initiatory ceremonies that enabled transformations of social status for young 
adults. For example, as part of a wedding ceremony held in shrines to the goddess Artemis, a 
mock-death of the bride was often staged in a ritual imitating the myth Arkteia (Dowden, 2011b, 
pp. 489-492). Young boys transitioning into warriors acted out similar initiatory rituals 
conforming to myth narratives, such as the acting out of hunts (Dowden, 2011b, pp. 492-494), or 
the acting out of the conquest of a castle (Bremmer, 2014, p. 3). In both cases, myth was used as 
a conduit for one generation to celebrate a successive generation’s transition in social status or 
rank.  
4.2.4 Assessment of Generational Propagation 
4.2.4.1 Propagational Success 
Evidence for the generational influence upon the propagation of classical myth is 
significant. Classical myth has influenced appropriative cross-generational communication since 
ancient times (Brisson, 1998, p. 116). There are countless examples of how narratives from the 
classical tradition continued to impose Myth Context upon successive cultures and generations 
separated by time and geography. For example, Greek mythology was repurposed for use by the 
Romans (Fox, 2011, pp. 253,258; Griffiths, 2011, p. 198), and appropriated by the contemporary 
literature of late 1800s Japan (Amitrano, 2016, p. 91), and by the propaganda of Nazi Germany 
(Hall, 2016, p. 168). Today we can see similar kinds of re-appropriations in NASA’s naming of 
their successful mission to the moon in the 1960s, and future mission to the moon in the 2020s, 
as Apollo and Artemis, respectively. But perhaps no more profound a case exists, for the lasting 
effects of paradoxical belief associated with Greek Myth, than that of the mythical city of 
Atlantis as told by Plato in the Timaios and the Kritias (Murray, 2011, pp. 179-180). It is a prime 
and obvious example of the propagation of a Myth Context where the persistent paradoxical 
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belief in Atlantis’ existence has continued into the modern day complete with the reverse-
mimetic behavioral enaction encompassed in the continual search for its existence across many 
generations. As Murray (2011) explains “literally thousands of books have been written on the 
whereabouts of Atlantis” (p. 180).  
In holding with Barthes supposition that an image can be as susceptible to myth as a 
narrative, take for example the universal symbol of justice. It can be seen today in modern art 
depicted in architecture at the U. S. Supreme Court, such as the relief of a blindfolded woman 
bearing a sword and balanced scale (Justicia, 2021). Colloquially known as Lady Justice, it is a 
symbol, historically appropriated and imitated from the Roman goddess Justitia and Greek 
goddesses Themis and Dike (de Ville, 2011, p. 325), that has evolved into a modern icon 
complete with the clear visual influence of its myth origin. And finally, as with Barthes (2012) 
own example of the power of myth that he revealed in the imitated Basque chalet (pp. 234-235), 
we can also demonstrate the numerous times that ancient Greek architecture has been 
appropriated and imitated (Denova, 2019, p. 2). One specific example is the Parthenon, a temple 
constructed in the 5th century BCE (Lambrinou, 2018, p. 126), that has been commonly 
appropriated as a part of the Greek Revival architectural movement occurring across the world 
since the Renaissance (Lambrinou, 2018, pp. 126-150), and that began, as Lambrinou (2018) 
points out, when the “turn towards Greek antiquity was marked by the beginning of European 
familiarity with the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Homer” (p. 126). These examples provide but 
just a few disparate cases of the successful multi-generational propagations of Myth Context 
associated with classical myth. However, as apparent and obvious that such successes might 
seem, many have also failed. 
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4.2.4.2 Propagational Failure 
Despite the wealth of classical myth that has survived, or all the power that it is 
commonly known to have wielded upon audiences throughout the millennia and across the 
world, for a variety of reasons a significant sum of classical myth has failed to propagate into the 
modern day (Dowden, 2011a, p. 66; Hard, 2019, p. 204). Because transmission of myth was 
performed through oral recitation, many ancient myths were never archived for posterity. Other 
works are partially lost to us as evident by existing narrative fragments and recorded testimonials 
(Hard, 2019, p. xxi), and through references to myths depicted in surviving wall paintings, 
sculpture, and pottery (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011, p. 12; Lewis, 2011, pp. 449, 551). For 
example, the goddess Eos depicted in the epic Aithiopis is considered a marginalized narrative 
barely known to modern culture because only fragments of the epic are available to us (Lewis, 
2011, pp. 448-449). But while such losses might be considered matters of ancient technological 
deficits, even classical myth was susceptible to forces of cultural approval and popularity, and 
the popularity of a myth in ancient culture was often determined by situation or location. For 
example, temples to Poseidon were frequently situated near seashores (Denova, 2019, p. 97), or 
spirits such as nymphs might be more popular to only rural cultures (Hard, 2019, p. 190). Many 
of the classical myths were popular due to social context, such as the appeal of Artemis to young 
girls and women (Denova, 2019, p. 120), or Dionysos relation to banquets (Lewis, 2011, p. 448). 
Myth in ancient times could be at the mercy of an artist’s willingness to include it on popular art 
or architecture (Denova, 2019, p. 48; Lewis, 2011, p. 448; Parker, 2014, p. 196), or a particular 
poet’s willingness to recite it (Denova, 2019, p. 48). And though the improvisation of the ancient 
Greek poets was often considered to be divinely inspired, the success of their recitations was 
highly susceptible to popular reception and to what content the audience would accept or reject 
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(Bremmer, 2014, pp. 3-4). Further, the rejection of a poet’s myths could come at great cost. The 
conviction and execution of Socrates, on the charge of disrespect of the gods, was the result of a 
generational dispute where the elders of Athens took egregious offense to the youths of Athens 
imitating Socrates behavior (Nails, 2006, p. 5). Some myths in classical times were more popular 
than others and their popularity could change over time. For example, Herakles was known to 
have been the most popular myth even in ancient times with a broad and variable appeal across 
many of the Mediterranean cultures (Burkert, 2014, p. 14), while as Albert Henrichs (2014) 
explains, marginalized myths such as those regarding Triptolemos, demonstrate a “local 
mythology which was once so popular in Eleusinian circles but which perished in later antiquity” 
(pp. 250-251). Finally, in the context where the belief in deities was an indispensable cultural 
norm in the ancient Greco-Roman world (Denova, 2019, p. 2), and understanding from the 
historical record how myth decreased in importance in the daily life of poet and myth consumer 
alike over the millennia (Bremmer, 2014, pp. 4-5), it is safe to assert that where the Myth 
Contexts of ancient cultures did not fail, those myths that survived are arguably less potent in 
their contextualization of myth in the modern today than they were in ancient times.  
4.2.5 Summary 
 Classical myths demonstrate a significantly Ascendent Myth Context with a profound 
ability to propagate narrative across generational boundaries. Over the millennia classical myths 
have shown themselves to be obvious and ascendent, wildly unlimited in their significations, 
popular, and possess great variability and potential. Classical myths functioned as contextual 
frames in which variable meaning could occur (Johnston, 2017, p. 148). For example, Artemis 
could variably be a goddess of cruel relentless vengeance and death or a compassionate goddess 
of women, unborn children, and birth (Hard, 2019, pp. 150-152). A singular example of 
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experiential paradox that demonstrates the willingness of ancient culture to endow these 
narratives with significations of expansive scale, reverence, and potential. Classical myth is 
perceived to possess significant raw potential due to its ability to integrate the past with the 
present and produce many possible and variable interpretations within its fundamental context as 
a storytelling vehicle (Gaisser, 2017, p. 338; Tolliday, 2017, p. 244; Willis, 2017, p. 109). As 
Doherty (2017) explains, its “always been possible to make reverent allusions to classical myth” 
(P. 158). In other words, the ability of ancient narratives to propagate was dependent on the 
variable and potential scale of its Myth Context to reverently appeal to wider and more divergent 
audiences, across both geography and time, and in different ways. But the context of that 
reverence has changed over the millennia. Myths from the classical age could still be physically 
lost or disappear from the consciousness of an ancient society. We know for example that even 
Plato, in his time, exploited the existence of lost or fragmentary myths as a source for skillful 
reappropriations that he could transform into new myths (Murray, 2011, pp. 181-186). Yet, 
however weak or altered their significations have become in the modern day, the paradoxical 
beliefs in these narratives are still strong enough to persuade cultures across the world to dress 
their dwellings withs facades that imitate and allude toward a grand and expansive myth history 
once constructed to honor Greco-Roman gods. Even though modern society paradoxically does 
not worship the gods of ancient cultures in the same way it once did, or at all. Successive 
generations have clearly been selective in what Myth Contexts they have chosen to appropriate 
from the ancient classical tradition. Acts of selection that would overcome any resistance to a 
strict focus on deities and evolve into a whole new kind of myth. 
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4.3 SANTA CLAUS 
This thesis presents the narrative of Santa Claus as its second exemplar. Santa Claus 
provides an example that is immensely popular and possesses a significant social pedigree from a 
generational perspective. Considered a mature and modern narrative, it also possesses a rich 
history and a deep connection to antiquity.  
4.3.1 Narrative Background 
From what is commonly known to us within modern popular culture, the Santa Claus 
narrative tells the story of an elderly and obese man with a flowing white beard that delivers toys 
to obedient children across the world every Christmas eve. This story tells us further that he 
dresses in a grand suit made of red furs, possesses magical powers, and is a resident of the North 
Pole where he is the proprietor of a great workshop that employs many elves to produce 
children’s toys. On the eve of his annual journey, he travels the world in a flying sleigh pulled by 
eight airborne reindeer that can land Santa’s sleigh on the rooftops of homes with precision 
accuracy. Then, by spiriting himself down a chimney, or using some other method of entrance, 
Santa enters the homes he visits and leaves gifts for well-behaved children on his approved 
recipient list that have anticipated his coming arrival throughout the year. With his rewards 
delivered, and the appointed visit complete, he and his agile reindeer will swiftly depart. In the 
span of a single Christmas eve, he will travel across the entire world to complete all his pre-
scheduled arrivals that are anticipated, welcome, and carefully prepared for. 
The Santa Claus narrative is considered to be a modern creation uniquely specific to 
American culture (Belk, 1993, p. 78; Siefker, 1997, p. 5). The origin of this American Santa 
Claus narrative is attributed to a combination of efforts that took place in the early 19th century. 
The Santa Claus narrative is attributed to a 1823 poem anonymously published in the Troy 
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Sentinel titled ‘A Visit from St. Nicholas’ (Siefker, 1997, pp. 3-4), reproduced in Figure 4, and is 
subsequently credited to Clement Moore as the author (Belk, 1993, p. 79; Siefker, 1997, p. 4). 
The modern visual appearance of the Santa Claus character is largely attributed to drawings 
produced by Thomas Nast, as seen in Plate 1, that were published in Harper’s Weekly from 1863 
to 1886 (Belk, 1993, p. 79; Palo et al., 2020, p. 68; Siefker, 1997, pp. 34-37). While others, such 
as Washington Irving, have been recognized to contribute to the development of the American 
Santa Claus narrative (Curtis, 1995, p. 19), Moore and Nast are given the predominant share of 
credit as the source from which modern Santa Claus originated and is considered to be largely 
unchanged since the mid-19th century (Belk, 1987, p. 87). Belk (1993) argues that since the 
advent of the modern Santa Claus narrative, American popular culture—in the form of feature 
films, literature, and electronic media—has significantly contributed to the expanded backstory 
and ephemeral details of the modern narrative (pp. 79-81). In a similar way, Moore and Nast’s 
vision for Santa in the 19th century was itself an appropriation and modification of a much older 
and far more complex narrative that preceded their vision of Santa Claus. 
 Lévi-Strauss (2016) argued that Santa Claus was a “modern creation” (p.8) whose 
identity was the result of a “phenomenon of convergence” regarding several historical figures 
(pp. 7, 12). Belk (1993) suggests that the direct predecessor to Santa Claus is Saint Nicholas of 
Myra (p. 77), a Bishop from the 4th century known for destroying the temple of Artemis and for 
using his personal wealth for compassionate purposes (Curtis, 1995, pp. 17-18, 24). According to 
Belk (1993), among other predecessors to Santa Claus are the “British Father Christmas, the 
French Père Noël, the Dutch Sinter klaas, the Danish Jules-Missen, and the Romanian Moş 
Craicun” (p. 77).  
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Plate 1 
Rendition of Santa Claus by Thomas Nast from the late 1800s. 
 
Scanned from p. 37 of Santa Claus, last of the wild men: The origins and evolution of Saint Nicholas, spanning 
50,000 years. by Siefker, P. (1997). Jefferson, NC: McFarland. 
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But there is evidence that the convergence responsible for producing our modern Santa Claus 
may have involved appropriation of factors that were less than virtuous or saintly. For example, 
Phyllis Siefker (1997) argues that the Santa Claus of Moore and Nast’s imagination is also 
influenced by the ancient “Wild Man” rituals that gave birth to the German Pelznichol, a 
character also regarded as “Furry Nicholas” or Bellsnickle” (pp. 5, 17-19). Siefker (1997) 
suggests that the name “Claus” was a German name for both “Wild Man” and “Satan”, the latter 
who was alternatively known as Old Nick (p. 69). Siefker (1997) offers further the suggestion 
that Santa’s “Ho! Ho! Ho!” is derived from a salutation known as the “devils bluster” which was 
also attributed to Robin Goodfellow (pp. 69, 117). The suggestion is, much like the convergence 
that Lévi-Strauss proposed, that the Santa Claus we know today eventually crystalizes from a 
pool of many appropriated but disparate elements, each gleaned for their contribution in a new or 
alternative narrative. By 1821, just a few years before Moore’s “A Visit from Saint Nicholas”, a 
character named “Santeclaus” appears in the book The Children’s Friend in a poem that depicts 
“Olde SANTECLAUS” to be transported “O’er chimney-tops” by reindeer so that he can deliver his 
“yearly gifts” (Siefker, 1997, pp. 30-31). By the mid-19th century Kriss Kringle, which is also 
German in origin, can be connected with Bellsnickle and it is known that Kringle was 
deliberately “impersonated” in the department store of Philadelphia merchant J.W. Parkinson in 
1841 (Siefker, 1997, pp. 33-34). An imitative ritual commonly reenacted every Christmas in the 
modern era. 
4.3.2 Myth Identification Analysis 
4.3.2.1 Evaluation for Pre-determination of Myth 
 Santa Claus is fundamentally recognized as an obvious myth (Belk, 1987, p. 87; 1993, p. 
77; Palo et al., 2020, p. 54; Sunday, 2011, p. 12). Given the clear, obvious, and culturally 
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ubiquitous nature of the modern Santa Claus narrative, it is easily pre-determined that Santa 
Claus is an obvious Ascendant Myth. As an Ascendent myth, the Santa Claus narrative exhibits 
clear and obvious indicators of Myth Context that can be easily found present within popular 
culture, public discourse, and observable common social behavior. 
4.3.3 Evidence of Myth Context 
4.3.3.1 Paradoxical Belief 
Indications of paradoxical belief are culturally present and obvious in the audience of this 
narrative. For example, societal integration of the Santa Claus narrative is observed to be a 
practice of irrational thought (Lévi-Strauss, 2016, p. 9). This Myth Context indicator occurs in 
the logical operation of “Reception eq Myth Context if ((!Literal == Response) || (⊥Literal 
==Response))” where the belief is paradoxical because it is held for a narrative with a known 
false ground. The belief is not only a matter of reception, but also as a part of the narrative ‘s 
fundamental “textual” design, where the narrative’s content enthusiastically encourages belief in 
the fiction of Santa Claus in an open social context where such belief may also be viewed to be a 
belief in a questionable or false narrative. This social dynamic is poignantly captured in The 
Polar Express, a 2004 animated motion picture adaptation of a book by the same name authored 
by Chris Van Allsburg (1985), in which the core fictional narrative depicts a child’s struggle to 
believe in Santa Clause set within the frame of a fantastical Christmas eve train ride to meet 
Santa at the North Pole where the credulousness of belief in Santa is then confronted (Zemeckis, 
2004). From a broader perspective, the general premise of the Santa Claus narrative is a social 
dynamic where members of one generation, typically adults, actively encourage members of 
successive generations, such as children and grandchildren, to believe in a fictitious character 
(Lévi-Strauss, 2016, p. 9; Searle-Chatterjee, 1993, p. 183; Sunday, 2011, p. 12). This dynamic is 
                                    125 
a premeditated act of encouraged paradoxical belief, of such intensity, that it occurs through 
significant deceptive practices (Lévi-Strauss, 2016, p. 9). Further, evidence of the paradoxical 
belief in Santa Claus is so complex and deeply structured, it includes supporting beliefs that 
Santa has a place to live, familial relations, and friendships (Belk, 1993, p. 78).  
4.3.3.2 Appropriative Imitation 
Indications of appropriative imitation are culturally present and obvious for this narrative. 
This Myth Context indicator occurs both as a raw source for appropriation and as an 
appropriation used to serve as a paradoxical authority for something that it literally is not. As a 
source of appropriation, the Santa Claus narrative and image has been openly appropriated to 
promote commercial products with great effect (Belk, 1987, pp. 93-95). Perhaps the most famous 
and successful of such appropriations was the advertising effort using Santa Claus to promote 
Coca-Cola in advertisements (Connelly, 1999, p. 207). This Santa Claus campaign for Coco-
Cola, conceived by Sundblom in 1931, was so successful that it continued with variation for 
decades and was exported far beyond the confines of the American culture it was originally 
conceived in (Belk, 1993, p. 79; Connelly, 1999, p. 207).  
As an appropriative imitation Santa Claus can be shown to function as a resolute 
authority on material consumerism (Curtis, 1995, p. 20), and as a surrogate repurposed to be an 
imitation of the very focal point of the holiday that the character was created to serve in a 
supporting role. Belk (1987) would argue that Santa Claus was the figurative “god of 
materialism” (p. 91). Adding that Santa functioned as “the god blessing Christmas materialism in 
early department stores” (Belk, 1993, p. 91), and that his presence in these stores further 
operated as the “spirit of spending with little concern for cost” (Belk, 1993, p. 91). In other 
words, in this context, Santa Claus was an appropriative imitation that served as a surrogate 
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authority for everything related to consumerism in relation to the Christmas holiday. Even 
though there is nothing directly literal in the narrative that demonstrates a direct promotion of 
commerce or capitalism, rather than an act of simple altruistic giving. But perhaps more 
controversial is the way in which the Santa Claus narrative is perceived to function as an 
appropriative imitation of Christ. For example, Belk (1993) argued further that “Santa is a 
secular version of Christ” (p. 83), and that Santa is a secular mythology where American 
materialism and excess, is to some degree, a poorly executed imitation of Christian spiritualism 
(pp. 82-85). In other words, as a Myth Context, in this alternative view Santa is perceived as the 
secular god of commercial Christmas, paradoxically becomes an appropriative imitation of the 
holiday’s literal purpose, and has the potential, for those willing to contextualize it that way, to 
be a resolute symbol for “all things Christmas”. Even though its literalness was only meant to 
function in a supporting role for the holiday. 
4.3.3.3 Reverse-Mimesis 
Indications of reverse-mimesis are present and obvious for this narrative. This Myth 
Context indicator occurs as both ritual and performative reverse-mimetic social behavior, with 
significant and reliable frequency, and is easily observed. For example, the annual presence of 
Santa is considered a ritual with equal stature to the Christmas rituals of gift wrapping and 
exchange (Belk, 1993, p. 91). Children are encouraged to actively participate, and routinely do, 
in the annual ritual of writing letters to Santa (Miller, 1993b, p. 135; Searle-Chatterjee, 1993, p. 
176). Adults, in a variety of ways, actively engage in role-playing imitation where they dress in a 
Santa Claus costume to provide “evidence” of Santa’s existence through imitative and 
performative pretense and charade. While both parents (Belk, 1993, p. 78), and departments 
stores (Lévi-Strauss, 2016, p. 4), are known to have engaged in this reverse-mimetic behavior of 
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imitative masquerade, the most common and obvious venue for this activity is arguably in the 
retail sphere. Some of the earliest records of store sponsored performances of Santa are traceable 
across significant time and distance. Kris Kringle was imitated at a Philadelphia retailer in 1841 
(Siefker, 1997, pp. 33-34) while Santa’s Grotto was known to have been imitated in the J.P. 
Robert department store in the Stratford suburb of East London as early as 1888 (Connelly, 1999, 
p. 192). The Grotto itself would evolve into detailed productions that might include Santa’s 
reindeer, a replica of his winter wonderland, and any variety of supporting actors or Claus-like 
ambience (Connelly, 1999, pp. 192-193). These imitative “productions” highlight the significant 
and determined will to faithfully execute a complete imitation of the myth, and the imitation of 
both Santa and the Grotto occur to such a degree in the modern day that it is often an inescapable 
shopping mall experience during the Christmas season. This modern American Santa Claus 
narrative is recognized to have been imitated in many places. In post-World War II France (Lévi-
Strauss, 2016, pp. 1, 4, 8), in Europe (Belk, 1993, p. 78), and across the world. The Santa myth 
has been assimilated by foreign cultures such as Japan (Belk, 1993, p. 82), where Santa Claus 
has even been imitated in costume by young Japanese women (Moeran & Skov, 1993, p. 116). 
The character has been assimilated by people of Jewish and Hindu faiths that have immigrated to 
the US (Belk, 1993, p. 81). The need to mimetically perform the Santa Claus myth has even 
included an attempt to produce a physical recreation of “Santa’s home” in Lapland, Finland, to 
be staffed with performance actors for a month prior to Christmas, and the venue marketed as a 
tourism experience where one could travel to meet Santa in his personal residence (Palo et al., 
2020, pp. 53, 58-59, 63-64). But perhaps one of the more evidentiary circumstances 
demonstrating the strength of this myth, to produce acts of reverse-mimesis within its audience, 
is the public admission made by Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy 
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and Infectious Diseases and advisor to the White House Coronavirus Task Force, during the 
worldwide Covid-19 Pandemic of 2020. Prior to the Christmas of 2020, Dr. Fauci publicly 
informed a group of school age children that he had personally vaccinated Santa Claus for the 
Coronavirus (Hines, 2020). In the depth of an ongoing and progressively worsening worldwide 
pandemic this senior medical expert, and administrator entrusted to advise the Federal 
government and the President of the United States on matters related to the pandemic, saw fit to 
publicly embrace the narrative as a Myth Context and imitate Santa’s personal physician so that 
he might “immunize” Santa Claus and enable the gift-bearer to fulfill his annual commitment to 
the younger generation. 
4.3.4 Assessment of Generational Propagation 
The very fabric of the Santa Claus myth is predicated upon a direct inter-generational 
relationship. The myth’s source narrative is purposefully invented by adults (Lévi-Strauss, 2016, 
p. 3), the actions of adults are directly implicated in the intentional transmission of the myth to 
the successive generations (Belk, 1987, p. 93), and adults actively, and with great sophistication 
and encouragement, attempt to convince the younger generation to believe in the invented 
narrative (Belk, 1987, p. 89; Lévi-Strauss, 2016, p. 9). Lévi-Strauss (2016) asserted that the myth 
exists for the practical purpose of attempting to directly influence desirable societal behavior in 
the successive generation such that Santa’s “generosity” will be distributed as a matter of 
meritorious award (p. 10). Alternatively, in different cultures gifts may be awarded not on 
grounds of behavior, but as a result of status (Searle-Chatterjee, 1993, p. 184). A circumstance 
that still implies a condition where members of one generation are making selective award 
decisions about members of another generation. Lévi-Strauss (2016) stressed that to believe in 
Santa Claus was a “transaction between the two generations” (p. 10), and that revealing the 
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secret of Santa was synonymous with a rite of passage that enabled the younger generation to be 
assimilated into the older generation (p. 9). Further, while it is evident that inter-generational 
propagation of the Santa Claus myth is clear and well-established, this intergenerational cycle of 
propagation has repeated itself without interruption over a significant span of time. The modern 
American version of Santa Claus as conceived by Moore, and improved upon visually by Nast, 
has remained intact with minor alteration and improvement for nearly 200 years (Belk, 1987, p. 
87). Using the schedule of generational boundaries outlined by Strauss and Howe (1991, p. 84) 
this would translate into 12 living generations or more that would have had an opportunity to 
engage with the contemporary vision of Santa Claus and subsequently usher the narrative 
forward to successive generations. While this only considers the more recent and documented 
American contribution to the myth, if the vestiges, elements, and other contributions—that 
preceded and influenced the modern convergence of Moore, Nast, and others—are also taken 
into consideration, then the myth has been propagated forward across dozens of generations. All 
that time doing what myths do, becoming appropriated, imitated, and transformed. 
4.3.5 Summary 
Santa Claus demonstrates a significantly Ascendent Myth Context with such intensity and 
effect that it has propagated itself across generational boundaries for two centuries or more. The 
Santa Claus narrative is constructed within a sub-context that is recognized as an intentional 
fiction with the purpose of encouraging an obvious and expansive paradoxical belief that the 
pretense of the narrative’s sub-context, is not in fact a pretense. This sub-context of the 
narrative’s social purpose and pretense, intentionally and cooperatively forged by society to 
ignore attempts to falsify the narrative, is thus integrated with the greater contextual whole of the 
social narrative and the variable social behavior it promotes. By engaging with the Santa Claus 
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narrative in the way that it does, the audience is clearly contextualizing the narrative as myth by 
openly promoting a reverent paradoxical belief in that narrative, by appropriating the narrative to 
imitate things that the narrative was arguably never intended to promote, and by committing 
reverse-mimetic behavior through the imitation or reenactment of the narrative in physical 
gesture, action, and ritual. The narrative provides clear evidence of an Ascendent Myth Context 
that is socially shared and encouraged across generational boundaries in the hope that successive 
generations will choose to continue contextualizing the narrative in the same way. Further, it 
demonstrates an impressive and expansive magnification to its second-order signification, such 
that the potential of its appeal is appropriated on a world-wide scale. For example, the narrative 
is recognized as an eagerly and enthusiastically experienced local context perceived to exist 
within and contribute to a much larger globally shared context (Miller, 1993a, p. 31). So 
powerful is the social fabric of paradoxical belief invested in the fiction of Santa Claus, that it 
possesses significant Myth Context attributes of unfalsifiability and raw future potential. For 
example, Searle-Chatterjee (1993) argues that Santa Claus endows one’s childhood to be 
perceived as a magical period in their life (p. 183), and Sunday (2011) argues that to believe in 
Santa, is to be “grounded in the purity of possibility and a boundless supply of faith” (p. 40). 
Belief in Santa is therefore not exclusively a belief in his physical existence, but rather a belief in 
the potential of the spirit of the narrative’s message. A belief in that potential, which is 
remarkably obvious in the Santa Claus narrative, but surprisingly obscure in others.    
4.4 BATMAN 
This thesis now presents the narrative of Batman as its third and final exemplar. This 
narrative is young and modern but possesses content that is well-established and immensely 
popular. Unlike the prior exemplars presented here, this narrative will be used to demonstrate the 
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efficacy of a comparative reception analysis as prescribed in the Myth Context Reception model, 
and to demonstrate how myth can exist obscurely and further produce an audience response of 
myth quite unexpected for a narrative of its caliber and age.  
4.4.1 Narrative Background 
The Batman narrative is a modern entertainment detective fiction. It depicts a story in 
which the lead character, Bruce Wayne, witnesses and survives the brutal and cold-blooded 
murder of his parents as a child (Bat-bio, n.d.; Rosenberg, 2013, p. 13). As a result of the 
tragedy, the young victim will swear vengeance upon the entire criminal world for his loss, 
devise a plan to become a vigilante crime fighter by preparing himself physically and mentally 
through years of training, and will disguise himself in the appearance of a large bat because he 
believes that this creature has the symbolic power to impose great fear and dread in the hearts of 
his adversaries (Bat-bio, n.d.; Rosenberg, 2013, p. 14). With no super-powers beyond his 
deductive intellect, physical skills, advanced technology, and wealth, the heir to the extravagant 
Wayne family fortune will venture out nightly disguised as Batman and engage in combat with 
all manner of criminals in Gotham City to impose his own special kind of vigilante justice upon 
them (Bat-bio, n.d.; Brooker, 2000, pp. 37-39; Langley, 2012, p. 5; Wainer, 2014, p. 44).  
The Batman narrative is a popular culture media franchise owned by DC Comics (Bat-
bio, n.d.; DC-copyright, n.d.). The Batman character was conceived as the result of a 
collaborative effort between Bob Kane and Bill Finger (Daniels & Kidd, 1999, pp. 17-25), and 
was first published in Detective Comics #27 in May 1939 (Brooker, 2000, p. 34). The character 
and narrative have been in continuous serial comic book publication for nearly 82 years, and is a 
commercial franchise that has been developed and distributed in various other media forms 
including motion picture serials, live and animated television serials, and feature films (Pub-
                                    132 
history, n.d). Since its conception, Batman has grown into one of the comic book industry’s most 
prolific and popular narratives (Cronin, 2015; Dondero, 2013; Nine-best, n.d.; Top-100, n.d.) and 
has been experienced by billions of people all over the world (Langley, 2012, p. 5).  
4.4.2 Myth Identification Analysis 
Positions on whether the Batman character or narrative constitutes a myth is varied and 
complex. The notion of Batman as myth is largely rejected by some because it is perceived to 
complicate the narrative’s general credibility. For example, David Seidman (2008) wrote that, 
“Batman isn’t utterly a creature of myth and fable. His writers have worked like demons to make 
their star believable” (p. 210). Alex M.Wainer (2014) argued not that Batman is a myth, but 
rather that it is “mythic”, or myth-like, arguing that Batman is a mythic figure that possesses 
qualities that resemble Greek myths (p. 10). In clarifying what mythic means, Wainer (2014) 
explains that Batman is “not a myth itself but drawing on mythical patterns” (p. 166). In his book 
Batman Unmasked, Will Brooker (2000) attempted to analyze the larger and comprehensive 
long-term cultural impact and audience response of the Batman narrative and franchise across a 
wide spectrum of media and cultural conditions including television, film, comics, and others. 
Brooker (2000) wrote bluntly that “Batman has now reached the point where he could live on in 
the cultural imagination, as myth, if that institution [DC Comics] decided to cut him free” (p. 
11). Brooker’s thesis was that all evidence of Batman’s cultural appropriation demonstrates 
Batman’s potential to eventually become a modern myth (Brooker, 2000, p. 17), but with the 
caveat that Batman, as myth, is realizable only within some future possibility, and that possibility 
comes into play if the Batman narrative is abandoned and released by its owner to become fully 
and completely appropriated by its audience (Brooker, 2000, pp. 329-333).  
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4.4.2.1 Evaluation for Pre-determination of Myth 
Batman is a serial pulp whose original target audience was young children. It is a very 
young narrative when compared to the myths of the Greek legacy. It is easy to see why there 
might have been apprehension on the part of Wainer, Seidman, or Brooker to take such a leap of 
faith to argue that a comic book character is experienced in the same way as a classical Greek 
myth. However, a decade after Batman Unmasked, Brooker (2012) would then argue in his book 
Hunting The Dark Knight that “Batman is more than a character, more than a brand: he is a 
myth” (p. 217). Brooker (2012) asserted that he was using “Batman as a case study to explore 
broader issues of cultural meaning and cultural power” (p. xii), and that his examination was 
focused on the “policing, promotion, and pushing aside” of the Batman property (p. xii). I 
suggest that Brooker’s evolution on the matter was well-founded and his conclusion correct. 
Ironically, however, it was Brooker’s previous argument in 2000 for the appropriation of the 
narrative by its audience that might have satisfied, to some degree, at least one indicator of Myth 
Context. However, his new thesis was positioned in a study of political economy, and not a 
comprehensive examination of myth itself. Further, the direct competing arguments for and 
against Batman as a myth add to the complications in determining a status. A pre-determination 
of Myth Context is therefore inconclusive, and a comparative reception analysis will now be 
performed to determine whether there is in fact merit to any claim that Batman is a myth. 
4.4.2.2 Comparative Reception Analysis 
In performing a comparative reception analysis, as prescribed by this model, a 
comparison of content, and audience response associated with that content, will be made to 
determine if myth is associable with this narrative. The Batman narrative spans more than 80 
years of continuous serial story development with thousands of storylines and story arcs over that 
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time. To perform a comprehensive comparative analysis on the entire Batman narrative would be 
a daunting task that this thesis neither has the time or space to accommodate. This analysis will 
be limited, as much as possible, to the serial episodes of the comic book titles Detective Comics 
and Batman, published by DC Comics Inc. and their predecessors, since the introduction of 
Batman in Detective Comics 27, in May of 1939. Within this constraint, analysis will be 
narrowed further to examine only aspects of the narrative that can be shown to be both 
foundational to the narrative and consistent over the span of the narrative’s existence. For 
example, the origin and motives of the character are considered to be critical and foundational 
structural components of the narrative (Porter, 2008, p. 86). Will Brooker (2000) has described 
this structure as a “rigid and consistent template which specifies not just the character’s 
appearance but his location, associates, motivation and attributes” (p. 39). Further, as Reynolds 
(1994) asserts, “every Batman story is to some extent an extension of the origin story, as 
Batman’s motivation is wholly derived from the trauma of witnessing his parents shot in cold 
blood” (p. 67). Despite the many serial episodes, plot tangents, and creative licenses taken by the 
writers and artists since the narrative’s conception, the origin and underlying structure of the 
character has remained largely unchanged (O'Neil, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, the focus of both 
content and response analyses will be narrowly limited to the perceived identity of the lead 
character of the narrative as defined by his origin and motivations. 
4.4.2.2.1 Content Analysis 
The Batman origin was first told (Plates 2-3) in Detective Comics #33 in November 1939 
with a more detailed account to follow in Batman #47 in June 1948. It was retold again (Plates 4-
5) in Batman #404, May 1987, and in Batman Vol 2 #21-23, in 2013. While accommodating 
differences in artistic style and variance in the order in which events are revealed, in each 
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retelling a similar story is told with varying degrees of detail, backstory, and dialog. These 
versions depict a wealthy Bruce Wayne as a young adult making the decision to become a 
vigilante crime fighter in the guise of a large human-like bat, because of the Wayne family 
tragedy (Kane, 1988, 1990a; Miller & Mazzucchelli, 1987; Snyder & Capullo, 2013). The tragic 
circumstance that motivates Wayne is the senseless and brutal murder of his parents that he 
witnesses as a child as seen in Plates 2 & 4 (Kane, 1990a, p. 1; Miller & Mazzucchelli, 1987, p. 
21). Wayne’s reaction is to swear vengeance upon all criminals as seen in Plate 3 (Kane, 1990a, 
p. 2), and by committing to the task of vigilante justice as a career in adulthood (Miller & 
Mazzucchelli, 1987, pp. 1-19). The narrative also tells that Wayne will fail to accomplish his 
goal in his early endeavors and will place his life and family legacy at great risk in the course of 
his vigilante actions (Miller & Mazzucchelli, 1987, p. 20). Wayne comes to believe that to be 
successful he will need an unorthodox tool that can make criminals fearful of him and thus give 
him an advantage (Kane, 1990a, p. 2; Miller & Mazzucchelli, 1987, p. 20). As seen in Plate 3, 
Wayne reasons that “criminals are a superstitious cowardly lot, so my disguise must be able to 
strike terror into their hearts. I must be a creature of the night, black, terrible…” (Kane, 1990a, p. 
2).  As a bat flies into the window of his study as seen in Plates 3 & 5, Wayne will suddenly 
realize the significance of the creature’s frightening imposition and exclaim “I shall become a 
bat” (Kane, 1990a, p. 2; Miller & Mazzucchelli, 1987, p. 21). This seminal event, that the adult 
Bruce Wayne characterizes as “an omen” (Kane, 1990a, p. 2), motivates Wayne to engage in a 
premeditated and intentional effort to fabricate a semiotic illusion, in the form of a novel 
signifier, that he can wear as a disguise to evoke fear in minds of Gotham’s criminals. As seen in 
Plate 3, Wayne will use a fabricated cape and cowl to endow himself with a new persona that 
Wayne will call “the Batman” (Kane, 1990a, p. 2).  
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Plate 2 
First telling of Batman origin story from 1939 – Exhibit A.  
 
Note. Scanned from p. 1 of Detective Comics No. 33 by Kane, B. (1990) in J. Kahn (Ed.), The Batman archives: 
Volume one (pp. 65-77). New York, NY: DC Comics. (Originally published 1939). Copyright 1990, DC Comics. 
                                    137 
Plate 3 
First telling of Batman origin story from 1939 – Exhibit B. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 2 of Detective Comics No. 33 by Kane, B. (1990) in J. Kahn (Ed.), The Batman archives: 
Volume one (pp. 65-77). New York, NY: DC Comics. (Originally published 1939). Copyright 1990, DC Comics.  
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Plate 4 
Re-telling of the Batman origin from 1987 – Exhibit A. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 21 of “Batman year one - Who I am how I came to be”. Batman, 1(404), by Miller, F., & 
Mazzucchelli, D. (1987). New York, Copyright 1987, DC Comics. 
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Plate 5 
Re-telling of the Batman origin from 1987 – Exhibit B. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 22 of “Batman year one - Who I am how I came to be”. Batman, 1(404), by Miller, F., & 
Mazzucchelli, D. (1987). New York, Copyright 1987, DC Comics. 
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This new persona will provide Wayne with both anonymity and a unique psychological 
edge over his adversaries. As seen in Plate 6 Wayne will use Batman’s image to produce fear and 
dread in the criminal mind (Wolfman & Aparo, 1990, p. 5).  But the persona that Wayne creates 
through the Batman signifier is more than just an illusion, it is also a performance. A 
premeditated and strategic act that Wayne performs with the direct intent to convince “Gotham” 
that the Batman is a “real creature” that possesses supernatural traits and powers. A strategy by 
Wayne that has been part of the narrative’s essence since its conception. For example, as seen in 
Plate 7, Detective Comics 1(37) from 1940 depicted Wayne to use an advanced vision technology 
to deceptively convince his adversaries that Batman has extra-ordinary powers not possessed by 
normal humans (Kane, 1990b, p. 6). But Wayne’s performance will also have effect on a wider 
audience to include all of “Gotham”, not just its criminal element. For example, Batman 2(24) 
from 2013 depicts a dialog between a young and inexperienced Wayne and his butler and 
confidante Alfred Pennyworth (Snyder et al., 2013, pp. 47-48). In this exchange, as seen in Plates 
8-9, Wayne voices his concern regarding the possibility that Gotham might learn Batman’s true 
identity and Alfred responds to counsel Wayne that, in the case of the innocents of Gotham at 
least, this audience will not care who Batman is, but rather desire to be influenced by the direct 
passion of Wayne’s performance, adding that: 
they want to believe in you up there, Bruce…they want to forget it’s you by virtue 
of the passion of your performance. They want to be transported…to a world 
where bigger truths are at work, and anything - - anything - - can happen. A world 
where the impossible is possible. Batman can be something like that for them, 
Bruce.” (Snyder et al., 2013, pp. 47-48).  
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Plate 6 
Criminal cowering before Batman. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 5 of “The coming of Crimesmith”. Batman, 1(443), by Wolfman, M., & Aparo, J. (1990). 
New York, Copyright 1990, DC Comics. 
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Plate 7 
Batman’s performance as a “supernatural” power. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 6 of Detective Comics No. 37 by Kane, B. (1940/1990) in J. Kahn (Ed.), The Batman 
archives: Volume one (pp. 115-127). New York, NY: DC Comics. (Originally published 1940). Copyright 1990, DC 
Comics. 
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Plate 8 
The audience wants to believe in you – Exhibit A. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 47 of “Zero year - Secret city: Part three”. Batman, 2(24), by Snyder, S., Tynion, J., Capullo, 
G., & Albuquerque, R. (2013, October). New York, Copyright 2013, DC Comics. 
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Plate 9 
The audience wants to believe in you – Exhibit B. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 48 of “Zero year - Secret city: Part three”. Batman, 2(24), by Snyder, S., Tynion, J., Capullo, 
G., & Albuquerque, R. (2013, October). New York, Copyright 2013, DC Comics. 
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Notable about this conversation between Wayne and Alfred is that (1) it transpires in the Batcave 
with Wayne sitting at a computer and wearing an incomplete Batman costume without the cape 
and cowl, (2) Alfred addresses the person before him not as Batman but as “Bruce”, (3) it is a 
direct literal admission by the narrative that the image of Batman is in fact literally a 
performance by Wayne, (4) that the performance is a ruse that Wayne desperately does not want 
discovered, and (5) that the performance, originally intended for Wayne’s narrow target audience 
of Gotham’s criminals, has the added advantage of also being enthusiastically received by the 
audience of Gotham’s innocents. In other words, while Wayne’s performance is terrorizing, it is 
also far-reaching and inspirational, and Wayne will use both the signifier and the performance as 
a rhetoric to persuade Gotham to believe in the possibility that this artfully crafted deception is 
the actual identity of the mysterious creature Gotham thinks of as Batman. 
 The content analysis provided so far examines Wayne’s motivation, intent, and methods 
for engaging in his unorthodox activities and fabricating the bizarre image and persona of the 
Batman. The narrative also provides us, through narration, clear evidence that it is Wayne who is 
the true focus of the narrative. For example, in the storyline “One Batman too many!” in Batman 
1(403), Wayne must defeat a psychotic individual named Tommy Carma who is a former law 
officer whose wife and child were murdered and whose psychosis leads him to kill others while 
being a Batman imposter (Collins & Cowan, 1987). As seen in Plate 10, when Carma is defeated 
and the story concludes, Wayne will assume responsibility to get him treatment and the narration 
will tell us that “the avenger within the Batman co-exists with the compassionate man. Batman is 
indeed two men…and both are Bruce Wayne” (Collins & Cowan, 1987, p. 22).  
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Plate 10 
And both are Bruce Wayne. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 22 of “One Batman too many!”. Batman, 1(403), by Collins, M., & Cowan, D. B. (1987). 
New York, Copyright 1987, DC Comics. 
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The story appears both as an allegory for how Wayne’s own path might have looked very 
different under alternative circumstances and as an affirmation that its Wayne’s motives, 
compassion, and sacrifices that are the very reasons for Batman’s existence.  
We now provide evidence of how the narrative tells us Wayne perceives his own self. The 
“Bruce Wayne: Murderer”, “Bruce Wayne: Fugitive”, and “Aftermath” storylines, spanning 37 
issues across multiple DC Comics titles in 2002 (BW-Fugitive, n.d), told the story that Bruce 
Wayne is framed for the murder of Vesper Fairchild, a woman that Wayne had been romantically 
involved (Brubaker & McDaniel, 2002d, pp. 3,17-19,37; Rucka & McDaniel, 2002, pp. 1-6). 
Throughout the storyline a despondent and angry Bruce Wayne struggles with yet another tragic 
murder of a person dearly close to him, and with the burden that an incarcerated (Brubaker & 
McDaniel, 2002a, pp. 13-20) and legally burdened Bruce Wayne has now become a liability to 
Batman’s mission such that he will abandon his true identity by declaring that “there is no Bruce 
Wayne” (Brubaker & McDaniel, 2002b, p. 16), and further abandon those in his inner circle to 
focus solely on Batman’s mission (Brubaker & McDaniel, 2002b, p. 31). Toward the end of the 
storyline Wayne is vindicated and the truth discovered (Brubaker & McDaniel, 2002d, p. 37). 
But as Batman he is faced with another situation where he must choose whether to protect the 
life of a killer by using his own body to shield the criminal from weapons fire (Brubaker & 
McDaniel, 2002c, pp. 15-17). The situation causes Wayne to take stock of his recent troubled 
perspective of his identity and, as illustrated by Plates 11 and 12, he realizes that his instinct 
could not permit even a killer to be murdered because his moral codes are those passed on to him 
by his father and he reasons finally that “I am Bruce Wayne. I always have been.” (Brubaker & 
McDaniel, 2002c, pp. 22-23). The conclusion of this storyline provides a case where Wayne 
consciously reconciles with his past in a way that is clearly consistent with the greater narrative.  
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Plate 11 
I am Bruce Wayne - Exhibit A. 
 
Note. Scanned from p.22 of “Bruce Wayne: Murderer? – Reasons”. Batman, 1(604), by Brubaker, E., & McDaniel, 
S. (2002). New York, Copyright 2002 DC Comics. 
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Plate 12 
I am Bruce Wayne - Exhibit B. 
 
Note. Scanned from p.23 of “Bruce Wayne: Murderer? – Reasons”. Batman, 1(604), by Brubaker, E., & McDaniel, 
S. (2002). New York, Copyright 2002 DC Comics. 
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But perhaps one of the most unique and interesting examples for how the character truly 
perceives his self, from a subconscious perspective, occurs in the 2-part storyline “Whatever 
happened to the Caped Crusader?” as told in Batman 1(686) and Detective Comics 1(853). In this 
story, Wayne finds himself a subconscious witness to Batman’s funeral in some future setting 
(Gaiman & Kubert, 2009). As seen in Plates 13 and 14, the story comes to reveal that the event is 
an imagined near-death experience where Wayne’s deceased mother, Martha Wayne, is also 
present in the experience. In the vision Wayne is in full Batman attire, but his mother directly 
addresses him instead as “Bruce”. Yet the vision is Wayne’s, and the apparition of his mother 
would be more aptly discerned to be Wayne’s own subconscious dialoging with his unconscious 
self—that takes the appearance of Batman. It is an event where Wayne’s own subconscious is 
depicted by the narrative to reveal the complex internal dynamic between the way Wayne might 
desire for others to see him—as Batman—and how he sees his own self—as Bruce Wayne. 
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Plate 13 
Bruce Wayne’s near-death experience – Exhibit A. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 10 of Detective Comics 1(853), by Gaiman, N., & Kubert, A. (2009). New York, Copyright 
2009, DC Comics. 
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Plate 14 
Bruce Wayne’s near-death experience – Exhibit B. 
 
Note. Scanned from p. 11 of Detective Comics 1(853), by Gaiman, N., & Kubert, A. (2009). New York, Copyright 
2009, DC Comics. 
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4.4.2.2.2 Audience Response Analysis 
 In a separate study, Ponthieux (2015) conducted an audience response analysis that 
gathered audiences’ perceptions of the mental state and self-aware identity of the Batman 
character. This study gathered from attendees of the Comic-Con held in Baltimore Maryland on 
September 25-27, 2015, that included 243 respondents. I returned to reanalyze that data set for 
the purpose of ascertaining if it contained empirical evidence that might support or not support 
my model of intergenerational myth transmission. In particular, the value of this survey data is 
that it was drawn from a multi-generational audience purporting to be knowledgeable about a 
mythic narrative and shown to be invested in the subject matter by virtue of having chosen to 
pro-actively attend the comic-con. The original purpose of the survey, included here in Appendix 
C, focused upon a wider examination of audience members’ perceptions regarding the Batman 
narrative, including perceptions of the character’s mental state. However, it also contained a 
subset of response data that is directly relevant to the previously presented content analysis of the 
Batman narrative in this thesis. Therefore, a selected part of the data from this sample can be 
effectively used to perform a comparative analysis of content and response as defined by the 
Myth Context Reception Model. Only four data points from the original sample are relevant here 
and will be used. They include the respondents’ age, a knowledge index composite 
corresponding to the respondent’s familiarity with the narrative, and two questions specific to 
respondent perceptions of the Batman character. 
The survey requested demographic information on the respondent’s year of birth and 
limited survey participation to an adult age of 18 years or older per IRB restrictions. This 
information will be defined as the independent variable Year. The IV Year will be used to 
calculate a second variable for the respondents approximate age in years at the time the survey 
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was taken and will be defined as the independent variable Age. The survey requested information 
regarding the respondent’s knowledge and familiarity of the narrative and the respondent’s level 
of exposure to the narrative through reading or viewing of comic books, graphic novels, film, 
games, or other means. This information was used to create a composite knowledge index that 
will be defined as BatFanIQ on a composite range from 0 to 125. The sample demonstrated an 
average participatory age of 34.6 (std=10.575) where the respondents possessed an average 
BatFanIQ of 76.3539 (std=24.57099) as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Batman Audience Response Descriptive Statistics       
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation  
 BatFanIQ 243 24.00 125.00 76.3539 24.57099 
 Age 243 18 63 34.60 10.575 
 Valid N (listwise) 243        
 
The two selected survey questions of interest from the survey are the seven-point 
Semantic-Differential like scales that captured respondent perceptions of the Batman character’s 
“ego” identity and respondent perceptions of whom the character’s decision-making skills can be 
attributed to. The questions are depicted in Figure 3 and their response results will be defined as 
the dependent variables Ego2 and Decisions respectively.  
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Figure 3 
Questions Taken From Survey 
The dominant identity (ego identity or self-awareness) of the character is:  
Batman     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Bruce Wayne 
 
The identity making all of the decisions is: 
Bruce Wayne     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Batman 
 
Note. Audience response questions taken from survey by Ponthieux, J. G. (2015) Audience Perceptions of the 
Batman Character. The first question is represented by the DV Ego2. The second question is represented by the DV 
Decisions. Unpublished raw data.  
 
The Ego2 DV is a post-processed variable inversely rescaled from its original polarity to bring it 
into a common polarity with the Decisions DV such that scales of both variables are anchored to 
Bruce Wayne as 1 and to Batman as 7. Examination of these two DVs seeks to determine 
whether audience perceptions of the characters ego identity and audience perceptions of whom is 
responsible for making the character’s decisions leans more toward Bruce Wayne or more toward 
Batman. The sample responses clearly demonstrate that the audience leans more towards Batman 
than Bruce Wayne in the case of both DVs. Regarding the question of self-aware ego identity, 
Ego2 demonstrates a Mean of 5.32 (std=1.622) leaning in favor of Batman. Regarding the 
question of whom is making all the decisions for the character, Decisions demonstrates a Mean 
of 4.94 (std=1.722) leaning in favor of Batman. More remarkably, 75% of respondents reported 
Ego2 as 7.00 and Decisions as 6.00 [or higher] as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2  
Batman Audience Response Statistics       
   Ego2 Decisions    
 N Valid 243 243 
  Missing 0 0 
 Mean  5.32 4.94 
 Median  6.00 5.00 
 Mode  7 6 
 Std. Deviation  1.622 1.720 
 Variance  2.632 2.959 
 Range  6 6 
 Minimum  1 1 
 Maximum  7 7 
 Sum  1293 1200 
 Percentiles 25 4.00 4.00 
  50 6.00 5.00 
  75 7.00 6.00    
 
 
Finally, the Year DV was again post-processed to separate the data into subgroups 
according to the generational boundaries established for peer group inclusion, according to birth 
year, by Strauss and Howe (1991, p. 32). The postprocessing of the data found that each 
respondent, whose birth year had occurred at least eighteen years prior to the time the survey was 
taken, belonged to one of three distinct generations to include the Boomer, Thirteenth, and 
Millennial generations. A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run to see if there was a 
mean difference, across the three generations of the dependent variables Decisions and Ego2, and 
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Table 3 
Batman Audience Response ANOVA  
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.  
Decisions Between Groups 4.257 2 2.129 .718 .489 
 Within Groups 711.817 240 2.966   
 Total 716.074 242     
Ego2 Between Groups 7.425 2 3.712 1.415 .245 
 Within Groups 629.538 240 2.623   
 Total 636.963 242     
 
 
Analysis of the responses captured by this survey clearly indicate that most of the audience leans 
in favor of the distinct belief that the narrative depicts Batman, and not Bruce Wayne, to be the 
self-aware identity with the direct responsibility for making all the decisions for the character’s 
actions. Further, it is a finding of audience response with remarkable consistency across 
generational boundaries. This finding supports the argument of this thesis concerning the 
persistent intergenerational transmission power of myth, because it shows that belief in the 
Batman myth (versus the Bruce Wayne reality) continues to persist across these three 
generations.  
4.4.2.2.3 Comparative Analysis of Content and Response 
In comparing the content analysis against the response analysis, we find a significant 
difference between content and response. The content analysis tells us that the identity of the 
lead character of the Batman narrative is Bruce Wayne. That it is Bruce Wayne’s tragic life 
experience that motivates his unorthodox actions. It is Wayne who expertly crafts a deceptive 
signifier in the form of a cape and cowl, that it is Wayne who makes full use of this deception to 
simultaneously mask his true identity and evoke fear and terror in the hearts of his adversaries. It 
is Wayne engaging in a premeditated and disguised performance, and it is Wayne that is the 
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dominant subconscious over the Batman persona that is making all decisions on Batman’s behalf. 
In contrast, the response analysis tells us that most of the audience leans towards the belief that it 
is Batman, and not Wayne, that is the self-aware identity making all the decisions for the 
character within the narrative. This difference reveals a contradictory condition to exist between 
content and response that is directly relevant to a determination of myth for this narrative. 
4.4.2.3 Analytic Determination of Myth 
 In following the procedure of this model, any evidence of exceptional recognition of 
Myth Context, that might be observable in the common record, can assist in distinguishing 
whether an Obscure Myth Context is completely Obscure or potentially Emergent. Will 
Brooker’s (2012) assertion that the Batman narrative is a myth (p. 217), previously cited by this 
thesis, qualifies as an exceptional observation. It can therefore be determined from the 
Comparative Reception Analysis that such a significant difference between content and response 
exists in the reception of this narrative that the Batman narrative is, at a minimum, an Obscure 
Myth, but with the potential to also be an Emergent Myth. In either case, the analysis 
demonstrates evidence and indications of an obscure Myth Context to be vibrantly present and 
active in its audience. Indications that, while obscure, are still discoverable and measurable and 
which may also be slowly emerging into the shared culture to become obvious. 
4.4.3 Evidence of Myth Context 
4.4.3.1 Paradoxical Belief 
Indications of obscure paradoxical beliefs are present in the audience of this narrative. 
This Myth Context indicator occurs in the logical operation of “Reception eq Myth Context if 
((Literal) != (Response))” where the belief is paradoxical because it is held in direct 
contradiction to the clear literalness of the narrative. This obscure paradoxical belief, evident in 
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the comparative analysis of content and response in this thesis, takes the form of a dominant 
belief that the deception Wayne creates is the mimetic self-aware identity of the character, rather 
than Wayne. A position that is contradictory to the literal content and contradictory to what is 
generally understood about the literalness of the narrative. It is Wayne who precedes the advent 
Batman. Its Wayne’s choice and decision to fight crime, and it is Wayne’s decision to create the 
Batman image. For example, clinical psychologist Robin S. Rosenberg (2013) asserts that it is 
Bruce Wayne who “renounces a normal life” so that he can “dedicate himself to fighting crime”, 
adding that for Wayne it is a “life encompassing career” (p.12-13). Grant Morrison (2012), a 
writer at DC Comics, wrote that “young Bruce…chose to fight crime on his own somewhat 
unconventional terms” (p.25). Those unconventional terms include a choice by Wayne to engage 
in an epic semiotic deception that as Uricchio and Pearson (2015) explain, is a costume in the 
form of a cultivated “non-human image” (p.228), that further enables him “to seize the 
psychological element of surprise from Gotham’s criminal element” (p. 210). As Randall M. 
Jensen (2008) asserts, it is Bruce Wayne that “makes himself into Batman” (p. 86), and becoming 
Batman is recognized as being an explicit decision made by Wayne (Ananth & Dixon, 2008, p. 
108; Langley, 2012, p. 54). Yet the cape and cowl, as conceived by Wayne, is paradoxically 
believed to be the identity capable of making all the decisions for the character, thus indicating a 
Myth Context to be actively functioning within the audience.  
4.4.3.2 Appropriative Imitation 
Indications of appropriative imitation, though obscure, are present in the audience of this 
narrative. The audience appropriates the image of Batman—the cape and cowl—to imitate 
something that the Batman image literally is not and can never be. The narrative tells us that it is 
Wayne who devises the plan to embody himself in the chimeric image of a bat so that the image 
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might ultimately be perceived by Gotham’s criminals as a terrifying “creature of the night” so 
that this signification might give the criminals cause to fear him, thereby providing him a distinct 
advantage in his vigilante efforts (Kane, 1990a, p. 2; Miller & Mazzucchelli, 1987, p. 21; 
Wolfman & Aparo, 1990, p. 5). Thus, Wayne creates and wears the Batman costume as a uniform 
to signify a role that he has assumes in the line of duty (Rosenberg, 2012, p. 8). Rosenberg 
(2012) regards Batman’s uniform to be similar to a policeman’s uniform and asserts that the 
“uniform immediately conveys context to understand the wearer’s behavior” (p. 8). In other 
words, as the audience we are supposed to understand that the wearer is Wayne, and that the cape 
and cowl Wayne is wearing is a second-order semiotic sign functioning as a metaphor for ‘Bruce 
Wayne: Costumed Vigilante’. However, the response analysis tells us that most of the audience 
ignores the metaphoric nature of the cape and cowl and paradoxically appropriates the Batman 
image and performance to function as an imitation of the mimetic consciousness and identity 
making all the decisions for Batman within the narrative. To this segment of the audience, 
Batman is no longer an image, or tool, or asset that serves Wayne’s motivations and goals, but 
rather Batman is an appropriative imitation seen as the authoritative figure with the ability to 
make all the decisions for the character within the narrative.  
4.4.3.3 Reverse-Mimesis 
Indications of reverse-mimesis are present in the audience of this narrative. This Myth 
Context indicator occurs as an obscure performative reverse-mimetic social behavior, that is 
remarkably hidden within the audience’s reception of this narrative. Wayne willingly chooses to 
wear the disguise of a bat not just to satisfy very specific strategies and goals, but also to hide his 
true identity (Rosenberg, 2012, pp. 7-8). From the onset of Wayne’s conception of Batman, it is 
Wayne’s goal to convince the criminals of Gotham that the image of Batman is all that Gotham 
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need know or concern itself with, by seeking to maintain his deception [Batman] as a secret from 
Gotham (Kane, 1990b, p. 6; Snyder et al., 2013, pp. 47-48; Wolfman & Aparo, 1990, p. 5). To 
reveal his involvement in the deception would reduce the efficacy of the image and would place 
Wayne and those close to him in great jeopardy. Wayne will therefore take advantage of 
Gotham’s willingness to believe in Batman’s existence (Snyder et al., 2013, pp. 47-48). Within 
the narrative, Gotham is expected to receive Batman as the identity. The audience response data 
tells us that many in the real audience also want to receive Batman as the identity. In other 
words, the real audience is demonstrating evidence of reverse-mimesis behavior where the 
paradoxical belief and appropriative imitation that it holds for the narrative is also a behavioral 
re-enactment of that same narrative. The real audience is receiving Batman as the identity in the 
same way that Wayne hoped that he might persuade Gotham to receive Batman as the identity.  
4.4.4 Assessment of Generational Propagation  
It can be shown that the Myth Context attributable to this narrative is generationally 
shared. This shared experience may also be due, at least in part, to the depicted origin and 
motivations of the lead character of the narrative. For example, in the book Fan phenomena: 
Batman, when asked by author Liam Burke why Batman fans are so devoted to the character, fan 
KC responds that: 
it translates from generation to generation, you know a guy who loses his parents when 
he’s a kid and then grows up and decides ‘I’m going to stand up and do something about 
it’. I think everyone wishes they were a little bit like that (Burke, 2013, p. 66). 
KC’s response reveals that the narrative’s origin story arc, which was also the narrowed focus of 
the content analysis of this thesis, is a sub-narrative that persistently and rhetorically appeals to 
multiple generations, and the audience response data from this thesis gives credibility to KC’s 
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opinion. In the span of the narrative’s nearly 83 years of existence, at least 6-8 generations would 
have had the opportunity to experience it first-hand. At least three consecutive generations, from 
that lot, were evaluated in the audience response data sample. The analysis of that data found 
insignificant variation in the narrative’s Myth Context reception across those three generations.  
4.4.5 Summary 
Batman demonstrates evidence of an Obscure, if not potentially Emergent, Myth Context 
that is dominantly shared across the generational boundaries of the narrative with uniform effect. 
The Literal Context of this narrative tells a tragic story about Bruce Wayne. His personal 
motivations and goals, his material participation in acts of vigilante justice, and the unique if not 
bizarre approach he uses to cope with his tragedy and succeed at his stated goals. His audience, 
by appropriating the image Wayne creates so that it can become an imitation of the mimetic 
consciousness, paradoxically believe this image to be capable of making life choices. A dynamic 
that reveals how passionately the real audience believes the image to be the identity despite the 
possibility that the real audience may be unaware that their obscure Myth Context is perceiving 
the image in exactly the way that the fictional Wayne wants everyone to imagine it. A passion 
that the audience holds for the semiotic signification, over the mimetic literal, in reverence of the 
very real power that the signification embodied in the image wields. Cory A. Friedman 
eloquently articulated the dichotomy of just that experience when he said: 
Which is the real identity—is it Bruce Wayne or is it Batman? The really cool answer, of 
course, is when we say ‘Oh, its Batman,’ but I think that misses the point. What defines 
the character is the essential humanity that the character possesses. (Langley, 2012, p. 64)   
A quote that further illustrates how the hero of this narrative functions as a Myth Context 
variable. Within the narrative the Batman image can be as easily a symbol of inspiration as a 
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symbol of terror (Snyder et al., 2013, pp. 47-48; Wolfman & Aparo, 1990, p. 5). Within the 
audience, he can as easily be Wayne as he can be Batman. It is a condition indistinguishable from 
Michael Calvin McGee’s (1980) sense of the ideograph, with Batman functioning as an example 
for how the audience can selectively choose the context it wishes to impose—Literal, or Myth, or 
some context that is a variation of one, the other, or both. It is further a variable context of 
reception equally divided among the writers and artists who create the narrative (Langley, 2012, 
pp. 64-65). As DC writer Scott Snyder asserts “It’s not like Bruce is some phony thing he wears, 
but in the scale of the superhero identity, Bruce is deeply tilted towards Batman.” (Langley, 
2012, p. 64). Within this variability, the scale of potential for paradoxical belief in the narrative is 
profound. As Robin S. Rosenberg (2012) articulates, “part of what makes him [Batman] such a 
compelling character is thinking about what it would be like if he did exist, if he were real” (p. 
3). 
4.5 REVIEW 
Dick Giordano (1988), a former Vice President and Executive Editor at DC Comics, 
recalling some of his earliest exposure to the Batman story, once editorialized that “I felt like an 
‘insider’ when I saw Bruce acting silly at a party because I knew he was The Batman…No one in 
the story knew, but I knew!” (p. 9). What Giordano is articulating here is an understanding of the 
special relationship audiences have with the narratives they consume. The audience, because it 
exists external to the mimesis, has privileged access to all details within the narrative. This 
privilege is always present whether we are reading from Batman, Santa Claus, or Hercules, and it 
reminds us of the role the audiences play in a narrative’s reception and potential longevity. 
Though classical myth is aged and venerable, the overall effect it has had on its audience 
has changed. In some ways it has dramatically declined over the millennia (O'Flaherty, 1988, pp. 
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25-26). No longer worshipped or ritualized in the same way it once was, it has nonetheless 
continued ascending and expanding over the millennia to grow strong in one respect while 
becoming weak in another. The paradoxical beliefs it once fostered have arguably become less 
potent. Where it was once strong in ritual and worship, today it is an endless source of 
appropriative imitation. As it passed from generation to generation, and even though successive 
generations resisted the call to worship the deities of old, the narratives survived to become more 
ethereal and expansive. However, they would become more susceptible to the permutations 
imposed by each new re-appropriation. As with Triptolemos, the permutations caused some 
myths to weaken, be rejected, or become irrelevant and fail. At risk of being lost forever. In 
contrast, their ascendent expansion caused other classical myths to gain a novel kind of strength. 
The permutations, while permitting the myths to aggressively disseminate, would also produce 
an ethereal essence now appropriable by the entire world. They would develop an expansive 
potential for being contextually repurposed, and with that the ability to appeal to generation after 
generation. Much like the reputation of an aged and respected senior citizen, the voluminous and 
ethereal strength of classical myth comes by way of sheer stamina rather than brute literal force. 
From the perspective of a narrative’s stamina, Santa Claus also provides an excellent 
example where a narrative is transformed into myth through repeated generational re-
appropriation and re-assimilation. While a relatively young narrative on the historical scale, it 
has undergone modification across both time and culture. A narrative now also perceived 
appropriable by many cultures across the world. This narrative highlights the way that the 
paradoxical beliefs about some narratives, though they occur, do not always occur as a direct 
contradiction to the literalness of a narrative. Rather, the paradoxical belief that its fictional 
Literal Context is true, is an intentional feigning or active pretense. With Santa the literal and 
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paradoxical belief are in sync—neither can be proven to be real. The paradox exists as a result of 
arguing that the false narrative, known empirically to be in fact false, is feigned to be believed 
not false. A condition no different than arguing that a true narrative, known to be in fact true, is 
believed to be false. Both conditions are paradoxical. Further, Santa Claus forms as a series of 
appropriations, modifications, and even rejections over time. Actions that altered the narrative 
through selective and reductive revisions. For example, as Siefker (1997) tells us, during St. 
Nicholas’s gift-bearing rounds in Holland, he was often accompanied by a servant called Black 
Pete, disguised to appear as a grotesque ogre-like creature, who would distribute coal or sticks to 
the children who Nicholas judged unworthy (pp. 10-11). Over time this aspect of the Nicholas 
legend fell out of favor. However, rather than terminate the entire narrative, successive 
generations selectively appropriated those elements that appealed them or were acceptable in the 
frame of their generation’s sensibilities. In the case of Santa Claus what we have today is an 
amalgam filtered through many selective re-appropriations by successive generations. By 
selecting elements of the Literal Context or the Myth Context, or both, something new was 
created. The context of the narrative was changed as elements were left behind, but the 
overarching essence of the narrative was preserved for another generation.  
We can also see a passive rejection of a literal element within a narrative, by way of 
selective appropriation, in the rejection of Bruce Wayne as hero of the Batman narrative. While 
consistent with the mechanics of appropriation, it occurs here with an interesting perspective. 
Here we see a clear paradoxical tension between the Literal and Myth Contexts, where many in 
the audience, across multiple generations, desire the image within the narrative to assume a 
greater level of import than seems supportable by the narrative’s Literal Context. This 
paradoxical belief for the image comes at the cost of rejecting a Literal Context that the audience 
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is intimately privileged to, and it is a tension magnified by a literalness that is dutifully 
controlled and maintained by the property owner (Pearson & Uricchio, 2015, pp. 25-26). With 
Batman, a constant state of persistence and resistance exists between creator and consumer, but it 
is a tension that is also obscure. There is little or no evidence to suggest that many in the real 
audience are even aware they are imitating mimetic behavior literally depicted within the 
narrative. Further, it is a signification on the part of the audience that is not easily observable, as 
evident by the effort put forth in this thesis to draw this distinction out. In other words, the 
narrative is strong in Myth Context at a local [individual] level but weak in Myth Context at a 
global [social] level. At the individual level Batman promotes a strong paradoxical belief, 
appropriative imitation, and reverse-mimesis. Still, at a social level these indications remain 
largely hidden. The context is shared and common among a large segment of the audience, 
though the shared paradoxical belief is deeply hidden within the social fabric. A dynamic of this 
narrative that directly supports the notion that myth often occurs as an unconscious behavior 
perceived completely normal that may also only be observable through external evaluation 
(Barthes, 2012, p. 252; Brisson, 1998, p. 9; Lévi-Strauss, 1995, p. 3). In other words, Batman 
shows how we are so often unaware of our complicity in the production of myth. Despite being 
provided the privilege of knowing Wayne’s secrets, tragic history, motivations, and deceptive 
behavior—because they have direct access to all aspects of the narrative—many in the audience 
still selectively appropriate the Myth Context. A Myth Context with such intense potential that 
the paradoxical belief in the narrative ends up being an imitation of the narrative itself. A 
reception that, if I may be so bold to assert, would have been the envy of Plato.  





It was the objective of this thesis to demonstrate that myth is an effective means of 
influencing the propagation of narratives across generations. It argued that narratives 
transformed into myth become endowed with a unique dual-contextuality of Literal and Myth 
Contexts, and that these dual contexts offer future generations more choices for how a narrative 
might be appropriated and experienced. Choices that will permit future audiences to overcome 
resistance to a narrative or permit it to be transformed into something more appealing. However, 
this thesis also recognized the inherent difficulties in correlating the existence of myth with 
temporally transmitted narratives, the potential mortality of the audience sharing or receiving a 
narrative, and the conditions of social change and generational difference that can provide 
resistance to such propagation. Further, to determine a myth’s influence upon the propagation of 
a narrative, one must be able to confirm that a narrative is in fact producing myth in its audience.   
To address these constraints and fulfill the objective of this thesis, a Myth Context 
Reception Model was designed to reliable identify myth in the human behavioral responses of 
the audience of a narrative. The model—established in the theoretical frameworks of mimetics, 
semiotics, contextualism, and belief—defined the general premise of Myth Context. Myth 
Context described the behavioral contexts that an audience can be shown to impose upon a 
narrative when it is received as myth. The model defined the core attributes, indications, and 
lifespan stages of Myth Context, and outlined an optimized identification procedure that uses a 
process of elimination, regarding the lifespan stages of Myth Context, to more efficiently 
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evaluate for indication of myth. Indication of myth is confirmed when the presence of 
paradoxical beliefs, appropriative imitation, or reverse-mimesis behavior is evident in the 
narrative’s audience. Where such indication is unobservable, an alternative method of 
comparative analysis of content and response was prescribed that could be used to identify 
behavioral indication of Myth Context when it might occur obscurely or be emerging. 
With the model defined, three narrative exemplars were then put forth—classical myth, 
Santa Claus, and Batman. Each was procedurally evaluated using the guidelines prescribed by 
the model and evidence of Myth Context behavioral indications were presented for each. Finally, 
if the exemplar could be determined to be myth, an assessment of generational propagation was 
performed on the narrative and a summary provided of the exemplar’s findings. All exemplars 
were determined to be myth. All exhibited observable or discoverable indications of Myth 
Context in their audiences, and all were determined to be successful at propagation across two or 
more generations. Notable differences in the findings included (1) an alternative assessment of 
propagational failure in some but not all classical myths, (2) the requirement to perform a 
Comparative Reception Analysis on the Batman narrative, and (3) the determination that the 
Batman narrative is a confirmed obscure myth with the potential to be also emergent. 
5.2 DISCUSSION 
5.2.1 Implications of the Exemplar Analysis 
When we look at these exemplars, we tend to see entirely different things. Classical 
myths are often the gold standard from which we view the term myth. As Joseph Campbell 
asserted, we often exclusively position the Greek and biblical traditions above all else (Campbell 
& Moyers, 1991, p. 88). Santa Claus is a fun social exercise that we use to humor and excite our 
children or reminisce about our own childhood experiences with the narrative, as we celebrate 
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the Christmas holiday. Batman is a commercial entertainment science fiction about a billionaire 
whose tragic life experience encourages a career as a vigilante detective dressed as a bat. Both 
classical myth and Santa Claus are open narratives that today are vastly re-appropriated and 
variant. They are the result of voluminous spontaneous and cooperative authorship across 
generational and cultural divides. Due to their nature in the public domain, one can easily see 
how classical myth and Santa Claus might take on expansive scale and variability. Further, we 
know that ancient cultures intended their narratives to become myth. Santa Claus encourages rich 
paradoxical belief and reverse-mimesis participation in an annual ritualized form. This behavior 
could arguably be viewed as a modern analog for how some myths might have been socially and 
ritually practiced in ancient times. Batman, however, is a strictly controlled commercial property 
with many restrictions placed upon its literal depiction by its owner and is still actively published 
on a serial basis. Further, there is little or no evidence that its creators or owners ever intended 
Batman to be anything more than entertaining science fiction—much less a myth in the classical 
or Platonic sense. Regardless, we see that it is functioning as myth and that this response is 
virtually indistinguishable across the generations evaluated. The analysis demonstrates that 
Batman’s reception is clearly susceptible to the will of the audience regardless how closed or 
controlled its literalness is. In other words, the Batman myth is still occurring even though its 
corporate owners appear to act as a persistent force attempting to prevent any undesired 
alterations to the narrative.  
Batman, much like Santa Claus, may also provide valuable insight on how we might 
experience narratives as myth in the modern day, the way the ancients once did. For example, the 
reverse-mimetic behavior within the obvious myth reception of Santa Claus, and the obscure 
myth reception of the Batman, might today rival reception of ancient myths in the past, or even 
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exceed our reception of many classical myths in the present. It is further possible to see how the 
Batman reception—in the interrelationship that the appropriative imitation and reverse-mimesis 
behavior, so tightly bound to the paradoxical belief held for the Batman image—might provide a 
glimpse for how ancient classical myths may have once been experienced unbeknownst to the 
audiences of the ancient Greek poets and philosophers. An assertion of obscure myth experience 
that may be equally applicable to the experience of political myth in the present day. 
5.2.2 Belief and Myth Context 
This thesis sought to show how belief is more than just a symptom of myth. Belief is 
present in many of the disciplines that study myth and is the singular most import catalyzing and 
sustaining factor of a myth’s existence. It is the paradoxical glue that binds the Literal Context 
and Myth Context together. For example, we must believe that their difference is rational, and 
we must believe that the logic of one will not cancel out the potential of the other. And, to 
rationalize the appropriation of something to become myth, that is not of our culture or time, we 
must believe that such a larceny—to use Barthes’ (2012) vernacular (p. 236)—is warranted. We 
use semiotic transactions to offer up these new contexts, still imbued with our beliefs, in the hope 
that the contexts will be enthusiastically appropriated, received, and preserved. Knowing that, 
even if the value of any context is replaced with something different, a ghost of the original 
context always lingers. The Literal Context always wistfully gesturing towards any earlier or 
older Myth Context despite any new Myth Context, desperately pleading for our attention, that it 
might simultaneously harbor. A context that we, the audience, impose through paradoxical 
beliefs and behavior that can occur in a variety of ways. 
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5.2.3 The Variability of Paradoxical Belief 
In designing the Comparative Reception Analysis procedure within the model, one of the 
more challenging problems was the need to resolve the logical operations used to identify 
paradoxical belief. When first wading into the subject of myth it quickly becomes apparent that 
the paradoxical conditions relative to myth, and/or belief, are varied and many. Few agree, and 
others focus on disparate areas such as fiction, gods, or deceit. Concepts such as credulousness, 
pretense, belief, faith, unfalsifiability, false belief, and noble lies quickly muddy the waters and 
make it appear that myth, as a discipline, is hopelessly inconsistent, when it is not. In designing 
this model, the idea was to find commonalities that integrated the belief conditions into a 
homogenous and observable process. The logical operations of paradoxical belief, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.6.3.3, solved this problem, and subsequently reinforced the notion that belief and myth 
are inseparable. When integrating these operations into the model an attempt was made to find 
and identify the minimum number of paradoxical operations necessary to accomplish this study, 
stabilize the model, and establish a reliable template for evaluation of paradoxical beliefs within 
a Myth Context. Four logical operations were included in the model and their inclusion was 
determined by their likelihood of frequent occurrence. That is not to say other logical conditions 
are not possible. They most certainly could be. Either as novel operations not included here, or as 
more granular sub-operations of the operations currently included.  
What is notable is not how many operations there are, but rather that there are multiple 
different and satisfiable operations that successfully identify paradoxical belief in a Myth 
Context and permit the correlation of seeming disparate or disconnected aspects of myth. For 
example, if we compare a condition of disbelief in a ground provable to be true—to a condition 
of belief in a ground provable to be false—these two conditions operate in polar opposition to 
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one another, but both still generate paradoxical belief. More interesting however, is the condition 
of disbelief and the way in which disbelief can stealthily produce an obscure Myth Context. 
Someone who disbelieves a narrative may inadvertently or unwittingly be susceptible to myth 
simply and ironically by choosing not to engage with the narrative. For example, if someone is 
presented a story argued to be true yet disbelieves the story because they cannot be sure it is true, 
they may have unwittingly engaged in myth. The perceived “safe bet” is to not believe 
something you cannot personally verify, and we are prone to think that we “believe” in myths, 
not that we “disbelieve” in myths. It shows that variability of myth is not limited to different or 
expansive values but can be a variable with values perceived to be empty or null. A logical 
condition that confirms Barthes (2012) assertion that myth can “start from the very lack of 
meaning” (p. 242). It also demonstrates the importance of Peirce’s notion of “ground” as it 
relates to the semiotic structure. Whether the ground is true, false, a known pretense, or 
unprovable can dramatically alter the logical relationship between it and belief or disbelief. 
Illustrating how a vast array of variable contexts can potentially occur with myth.  
5.2.4 The Relevance of Context and Selection to Generation 
 While the core notion of myth’s dual-contextuality in this model is defined as a 
distinction between a narrative’s Literal Context and Myth Context, it should be noted that any 
narrative could also potentially possess many multiple Myth Contexts also associated with the 
Literal Context. Further, any of these Myth Contexts connected to the narrative are subject to 
being a socially negotiated procedure. That is, because they are behavioral contexts, further 
imposed upon the narrative by humans, they are subject to human negotiation. For example, 
context can be a selection when part of any social negotiation, especially one where context is 
constructed (Fetzer, 2012, p. 110; O'Donnell, 1999, pp. 92-93). To elaborate, using the Dynamic 
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Context model offered by O'Donnell (1999, p. 63), we can show that context is distinguished as 
being dynamic or static (p. 64), and provides for the notion of Projected Context where a 
discourse is capable of projecting alternatives of context throughout the discourse as a strategic 
maneuver aimed at encouraging a desired new or novel situation by way of projected offers or 
propositions (pp. 92-93). Projected context therefore resembles rhetoric, and since Barthes 
(2012) equated myth as a type of speech (pp. 217-219) and a discourse (pp. 245-247), this notion 
of projected context for the purpose of persuasion, engaged within a Dynamic Context model, 
harbors stunningly significant similarities to the rhetoric of myth as posited by Barthes. Further, 
O'Donnell (1999) argues that in the case of projected context, the actors or agents involved in a 
context negotiation are generally unconstrained, that is they can always “choose from the range 
of situation-types which their society, and personal history, provides them” (pp. 92-94). Adding 
that during this negotiation, any offered context can be accepted when desirable, ignored 
altogether, or one context can be outright rejected in favor of another when either is undesirable 
(O'Donnell, 1999, p. 92). In other words, context selection regarding Myth Context is driven by a 
process of selective negotiation affected by the beliefs or ideology of individual, group, or 
generation. This negotiation further propagates the narrative forward and imparts significant 
resilience upon the host narrative. 
5.2.5 The Resilience of Myth 
The resilience of a Myth Context can at times be identifiable in the lifespan stages of a 
Myth Context, such as Conception, Obscurity, Emergence, or Ascendence. In the same way some 
adults gain notoriety and respect in a community with age, so does a myth. The more “elderly” 
and “senior” a myth is, the more venerable and aged it is, the more ascendent and immediately 
obvious the myth will likely be. The classical myth exemplar can demonstrate such resilience. 
                                    174 
For example, the gods of Greek antiquity resiliently survived the advent of Christianity and 
subsequent attempts to extricate such myths from the culture (Graf, 2007, p. 57). Some of these 
classical myths were so resilient at fending off such attempts, because they were so deeply 
integrated within ancient societies, that they were eventually appropriated to serve Christianity 
(p. 57). However, myth’s resilience is not strictly a matter of popularity and is further connected 
to human resilience. For example, human resilience is suggested to be associable with myths that 
promote desirable outcomes (Kaplan, 1999, p. 30), especially myths regarding archetypal heroes 
in particular (p. 30), and human resilience is further noted as an attributable result of myth’s 
ability to promote both identity and purpose (Newman et al., 2018, p. 89). In other words, 
humans are resilient because of myth’s intervention in human lives and myth is resilient because 
of human intervention in myth’s existence. Resilience, of human or myth, is the result of a 
negotiated, or co-dependent relationship, between human and myth.  
5.2.6 The Co-dependence of Myth and Generation 
Another implication observed by this research is that myth and generation are 
fundamentally co-dependent entities. The selective re-appropriation of a narrative, and any 
subsequent propagation of a myth associated with that appropriation, has been shown here to be 
a significantly “generational” activity based upon need. McGee (1980) had asserted that the 
value of an ideograph’s meaning to one generation, is due in large part to its value to preceding 
generations (pp. 10-11) and argued that its usage was as an excuse for belief and behavior 
preferential to the generation invoking the ideograph’s myth (p. 16). In other words, the 
opportunistic usage of an ideograph, is based upon a need for its corresponding historical 
influence by the appropriator. Barthes (2012) had made a similar case, arguing that “myth is 
depoliticized speech” (p. 255), and that people “depoliticize according to their needs” (pp. 257). 
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Hagood (2008) asserted that “a narrative becomes a myth when a given cultural force (which 
either is an imagined community and/or is part of an imagined community) appropriates it to 
articulate its desires or values” (p. 204), and Strauss and Howe (1991) described a generation as 
having “a sense of social community” (p. 65). In other words, a generation as a concept of 
community imagined, will appropriate a myth according to their need for it, its ability to 
reinforce their values, and promote their rhetoric. However, a myth’s mortality is directly tied to 
the unavoidable mortality of the generation that believes the myth. Where a myth can transmit 
from one generation to another it succeeds in avoiding its own mortality, and the generation 
benefits from the transmission of the myth, and the beliefs they contributed to it, being projected 
into the future. Since myth itself is incapable of contemplating its mortality, this dynamic should 
be understood in the context of a metaphor representing one generation in possession of myth 
and a successive generation void of myth. From this perspective, myth and generation therefore 
present as entities that mutually benefit from each other and are uniquely co-dependent.  
5.3 CONCLUSION 
5.3.1 The Propagation of Myth 
This thesis concludes that myth directly influences the propagation of narratives across 
generational boundaries and can be shown to promote behavior in audiences that enables the 
selective appropriation of narratives from one generation to another. It further concludes that 
myth uniquely enables acceptance or rejection of generational and social differences, that might 
be present in source narratives, across generational divides. An action that permits the Literal 
Context to propagate as a result of transformations that produce the Myth Context associated 
with it. This is an assertion that is supported in Angus Nicholls’ research on Hans Blumenberg’s 
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theory of myth. Nicholls (2015) wrote that myth possessed a unique ability to perpetuate by way 
of temporal adaptation, saying that: 
A myth’s capacity for survival and constancy is, however, dependent upon change—upon 
processes of cultural adaptation…The reception of myth arises from this dialectic 
between the familiarity and authority of the ancient stories on the one hand, and their 
acquiring contemporary relevance through variation on the other. That which seems 
relevant and ‘significant’ to an historically situated audience is seen as expressing a kind 
of ancient truth, while also being able to speak to their contemporary human needs. (p. 
21) 
Nicholls’ passage implies several things of importance: (1) the relevance and significance of 
ancient origin is rendered contemporary by way of the modern being an appropriative imitation 
of the ancient, (2) the ancient is selected because of its immediate potential for variable 
adaptation, (3) Nicholls’ interpretation of Blumenberg suggests that myth enables a process of 
cross-generational transmission of narrative that closely resembles the selective and contextual 
appropriation of narrative, as a result of contemporaneous need, as articulated in the Myth 
Context Reception Model, and (4) though the passage seems to assert myth to be situated within 
an exclusivity of ancient story, it also silently implies that myth still exists within a 
contemporary, or modern, social activity of reception, and is still active in the modern day. 
5.3.2 The Ancient and Modern 
This thesis can conclude that myth of the ancient and modern worlds, when viewed 
through the prism of the Myth Context Reception Model, operates in fundamentally similar 
ways. Despite Barthes intense focus on urban myths of French-culture, and an appearance that he 
might have largely avoided the integration of classical myth into his theories, Plato and Barthes 
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were of a stunningly similar mind regarding myth. They both viewed it as a powerful rhetoric 
with very special qualities. Plato enthusiastically employed his knowledge of myth in an attempt 
to mold a society (Murray, 2011, p. 183), while Barthes (2012) lamented this ideological 
exploitation of myth’s powerful rhetorical character by the bourgeoisie (pp. 262-271). The myth 
that this thesis sought to embrace was the myth that both Plato and Barthes clearly recognized. A 
narrative that is expansive, paradoxically believed, enthusiastically appropriated despite any 
incongruence between its literalness and figurativeness, shared by many in the culture, and can 
influence human behavior and ultimately be imitated in thought and action. The results of this 
thesis further challenge the notion that myth is only evident in primitive societies or ancient 
history. In a practical sense, how does the annually enacted ritual of Santa Claus differ from any 
of the tribal rituals Malinowski studied? Lévi-Strauss (2016) made a similar observation 
regarding its similarity to the kachinas myth of Native Americans (p. 9). What has changed is not 
myth, but how we put myth into context. Where we might contextualize myth of the ancients to 
be conceived as a product of societies that lacked the education that might be required to invent 
antibiotics, automobiles, or computers, we alternatively attempt to re-contextualize myth today to 
conceive it not as myth but rather as simple play or pretense. Yet, as shown by the exemplars 
evaluated, both ancient and modern myths are all paradoxical believed, appropriated, and 
imitated by the audience. Behaviors that might be far more common than we are willing to 
admit.  
5.3.3 The Obscurity and Ubiquity of Myth 
 This thesis can conclude that myth is both obscure and ubiquitous. A profound data point 
regarding the exemplar analysis performed in this thesis is the determination of Obscure Myth 
Context in the audience of the Batman narrative. The use of the Comparative Reception Analysis 
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procedure in this model, designed similarly to Barthes (2012) instructions for the deciphering of 
myth (pp. 238-239), proved to be a valuable tool in demonstrating an example of myth’s 
obscurity within modern culture. In a condition where myth was presumed largely nonexistent, it 
was demonstrated to be strong and dominant within the audience of the immensely popular 
Batman narrative. It raises the question; how many other narratives or visuals evoke hidden 
Myth Contexts without our knowledge? In response to that question, I assert that myth is a 
persistent, inalienable, and ubiquitous human experience. Myth permits long vanquished gods an 
expansive license to influence our architecture, fiction, and geography. It permits an ancient, 
obese, and magical elf—with aeronautically endowed reindeer—the opportunity to sit at the 
table of the most beloved Christian celebration. It permits a fiction about a tragic victim of 
senseless crime to be a pop-culture symbol of justice in the form of a vengeful human-sized bat. 
But resilience and obscurity of myth, as articulated here, more aptly alludes to the frequency that 
myth might occur without our being aware of it. The assertion is that myth is everywhere, and it 
may further exist in places we think to be virtually incompatible with myth, such as science. For 
example, even the most rigidly logical scientist will put forth a hypothesis with nothing more 
than a deep personal belief that, with effort and a strict adherence to the scientific method, their 
hypothesis can be proven. The scientist perceives this pursuit as a simple matter of logical 
scientific evaluation. But to an outsider who is observing the scientist’s actions, they will see an 
individual engaged in the paradoxical belief that a literal narrative with an unproven ground is in 
fact true. They will observe that the scientist appropriates data to use within an imitation of the 
hypothesis [a simulation] so that the hypothesis can be acted out, and that the scientist will use 
the imitation as an authoritative representation of something that, in a literal sense, it is not. With 
ritual thoroughness, the scientist will repeat the simulation, evaluating multiple simulated 
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contexts where the values of each context’s variables are scaled or changed. All the while, the 
scientist continues to paradoxically believe in the potential of the hypothesis, despite all attempts 
by other scientists to prove the hypothesis is false. And finally, the observer will also note that 
the scientist will believe in the hope that, whether the hypothesis is proven or not, that the pursuit 
to prove it true will produce something, big or small, that some future scientist, or future 
generation of scientists, might find of value and seek to appropriate.  
5.4 LIMITATIONS 
5.4.1 The Difficulty in Testing for Obscure Myth 
Though this model provides guidance for the discovery of obscure myths, and the 
Batman exemplar illustrates a good example of how to successfully perform such a discovery, it 
should be noted that the discovery of obscure myth requires significant preparation and 
background knowledge regarding both the narrative and its audience to properly prepare a 
comparative reception analysis. The relationship between audience and narrative is often special 
and unique, and some readers within an audience may have invested years, decades or even a 
lifetime contemplating the narrative. The process is generally easier if the mythologist begins 
from a thorough working knowledge of the literal narrative since that is typically a static 
parameter. Then carefully listen to what the audience has to say about the narrative to determine 
if anything they may articulate sounds paradoxical to the literal narrative. Significant effort and 
attention should then be focused upon the opinions and beliefs held within the audience. Many 
times, the audience may consider the beliefs they hold for a narrative to be irrelevant, 
unimportant, or just simply assumed common. Dependent on the age and depth of the narrative, 
and the complexity of the audience, this process can take time. 
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5.4.2 The Lost Context of Expired Generations 
The most obvious limitation when evaluating the reception of a narrative propagated 
across generational boundaries, is that earlier generations may lack members available to provide 
qualitative or quantitative input. At worst, no members from that the generation will be available. 
This limits deep generational research inquiry to only those from past generations that are still 
living, or limits the inquiry to only historically available commentary. While we can ascertain 
from historical records that which was appropriated by one generation from another, the more 
critical questions as to why such appropriation may have been deemed necessary or permissible 
may often be harder to ascertain.  
5.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.5.1 Alternative Applications of the Myth Context Reception Model 
While the Myth Context Reception Model was designed to identify or discover the 
presence of a myth reception associable with a narrative in a generational context, the myth-
centric methods of the model were constructed with the potential and intent that they might 
function independently. The Myth Identification Procedure and its sub-methods are separable, or 
at least modular enough to allow the Myth Context Reception Model to function without 
temporal constraint. In other words, the model is designed in such a way that with minimal 
adjustment it can be leveraged to research the spatial propagation of myth across geography or 
culture. Or it can alternatively be exercised exclusive of any temporal or spatial framing 
operations. In other words, it can be repurposed as a simple Myth Context evaluator for the 
determination of myth in a variety of genres where human behavior relational to myth can be 
measured. Examples might include urban, anthropological, or political myths, etc.  
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This thesis has taken an approach to myth that demonstrates the way that myth can, and 
most often does, eventuate into a shared experience. Even obscure myth can be shown to be a 
shared experience. Given the depth of Ernest Bormann’s (1982) work in shared construction of 
meaning and behavior in communication, as well as his added focus upon fantasy themes, 
Bormann’s work could provide a possible avenue for the expansion of this model. On a similar 
note, Walter Fisher’s (1984) work on narrative paradigm incorporates a view of narrative that is 
simultaneously literal, rhetorical, and contextual (p. 2). Fisher’s (1984) distinction of narrative 
fidelity (p. 8) implies a degree of faith, or belief, to be at work in the behavioral interaction 
between narrative and audience and could potentially provide application in support of this 
model. 
Other areas where the Myth Context Reception Model might also be repurposed could 
include visual myth, linguistics, or even music. Consider for a moment a sports car analogy of 
visual myth where we might appropriate organic shapes and styles, natural signs such as sharks 
or stingrays, to persuade a viewer to paradoxically believe the design to be in motion even when 
the engine is off and the vehicle motionless. Or, from a linguistics perspective the model might 
be useful in testing metaphors for myth. For example, do we deploy metaphors such as 
“herculean effort” or “pandora’s box” as miniature myths? Do they function as mini- narratives 
that we appropriate as imitations of a vast and historical myth past? In other words, are 
metaphors just weak or obscure myths that function in an ever so slightly altered context? And 
the model might also be useful to test for the presence of Myth Context in relation to music. For 
example, Lévi-Strauss (1995) famously sought to illustrate a connection between myth and 
music (p. 44). Even the poets who preceded Plato often delivered their myths in song, and there 
are music scores and lyrics that have survived generational passage for centuries. This model 
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could potentially be used to identify ways in which music, might produce paradoxical beliefs, 
appropriative imitations, or even reverse-mimesis behavior upon its audience. Consider for 
example the attempt to behaviorally imitate a “moonwalk” dance in response to the playing of 
Michael Jackson’s song “Billie Jean”. The “moonwalk” itself ironically a behavioral imitation of 
forward motion paradoxically moving in reverse. Or we could consider Christmas caroling of the 
song “Silent Night”, a behavioral ritual performed by Christians annually for centuries. 
5.5.2 A Myth Context Theory 
In developing the Myth Context Reception Model, every attempt was made to consider 
the broader realization of myth’s essence. This was not an effort to redefine myth. Rather, the 
intent was to find repeated commonalities—such as belief—and be willing to consider other 
possibilities—such as context. While this thesis has relied heavily on a theoretical framework of 
rhetoric that is more European than American, the whole of Semiotics, both Peircean and 
Saussurean was considered, as were the many disciplines that study myth that could also be 
ascertained to be relevant within the Semiotic paradigm. Not only were Semiotics and 
Contextualism found to be compatible, in the end they seem inseparable. However, since this 
was a study about narratives transmitted across time, by way of unique peer groups, it seemed 
prudent to invite the ancient poets, philosophers, and mythographers along for the journey. After 
all, what fun would research on myth be if we ignored the classical tradition? Further, if we 
argue that myth is an agent of transmission, shouldn’t it still be transmitting? Along the way, the 
similarities in Plato’s and Barthes’ thinking began to crystalize. Reduced to its essence it might 
be described as a resilient contradictory belief that influences and promotes acts of imitation in 
thought and behavior. In the process of developing this model, and upon considering the wide 
range of work that was drawn upon to determine if it could support the model, ultimately what is 
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included here is a shadow of what was left out. One remote observation not included here, 
however, did stand out. There are similarities in the patterns of semiotics and contextualism and 
it was noticed that those similarities further resembled patterns in the random quality of quantum 
computing theory. For example, the dual contextuality and variable value potential of a 2nd order 
signification quite closely resembles the dual-state potential of the quantum bit, or qubit, in 
quantum computing theory. The hallmark quality of the qubit is its quantum ability to 
paradoxically hold the values of binary 0 and binary 1 at the same time in a state called 
superposition (McMahon, 2008, p. 12). However, the similarities do not end there. Binary 0 and 
binary 1, in modern computing, are values of “false” and “true” respectively. It prompts the 
question, would such a superposition dual-state of quantum 0&1 equate to something like 
“maybe”? Or even “myth”?  Those questions cannot be answered here, of course. But is such a 
connection between myth and technology a stretch? I think not. Computer technologies will only 
continue to proliferate and continue to influence our communication practices. The vast and 
exponentially growing store of e-communications means there will only be more and more 
sources of narrative available to be appropriated into myth. From a social standpoint modern 
computing will only advance and promote more transmission of myth, rather than temper it. 
Further, the similarity of the qubit to a 2nd order signification is quite stunning and its advent only 
strengthens the semiotic argument. It further suggests that one possible avenue of future research 
potential for the Myth Context Reception Model might be as a baseline toward a Myth Context 
Theory that explores the greater potential and variable intersection of contextualism and 
cascading 2nd order significations applicable to all human communications. 
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A Visit from St. Nick by Clement C. Moore  
A Visit from Saint Nicholas 
'Twas the night before Christmas, when all through the house 
Not a creature was stirring, not even a mouse; 
The stockings were hung by the chimney with care, 
In hopes that St. Nicholas soon would be there; 
The children were nestled all snug in their beds, 
While visions of sugar-plums danced in their heads; 
And mamma in her ’kerchief, and I in my cap, 
Had just settled our brains for a long winter’s nap, 
When out on the lawn there arose such a clatter, 
I sprang from the bed to see what was the matter. 
Away to the window I flew like a flash, 
Tore open the shutters and threw up the sash. 
The moon on the breast of the new-fallen snow 
Gave the lustre of mid-day to objects below, 
When, what to my wondering eyes should appear, 
But a miniature sleigh, and eight tiny reindeer, 
With a little old driver, so lively and quick, 
I knew in a moment it must be St. Nick. 
More rapid than eagles his coursers they came, 
And he whistled, and shouted, and called them by name; 
"Now, Dasher! now, Dancer! now, Prancer and Vixen! 
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Figure 4 Continued 
On, Comet! on, Cupid! on, Donder and Blitzen! 
To the top of the porch! to the top of the wall! 
Now dash away! dash away! dash away all!" 
As dry leaves that before the wild hurricane fly, 
When they meet with an obstacle, mount to the sky; 
So up to the house-top the coursers they flew, 
With the sleigh full of toys, and St. Nicholas too. 
And then, in a twinkling, I heard on the roof 
The prancing and pawing of each little hoof. 
As I drew in my head, and was turning around, 
Down the chimney St. Nicholas came with a bound. 
He was dressed all in fur, from his head to his foot, 
And his clothes were all tarnished with ashes and soot; 
A bundle of toys he had flung on his back, 
And he looked like a peddler just opening his pack. 
His eyes — how they twinkled! his dimples how merry! 
His cheeks were like roses, his nose like a cherry! 
His droll little mouth was drawn up like a bow 
And the beard of his chin was as white as the snow; 
The stump of a pipe he held tight in his teeth, 
And the smoke it encircled his head like a wreath; 
He had a broad face and a little round belly, 
That shook, when he laughed, like a bowlful of jelly. 
He was chubby and plump, a right jolly old elf, 
And I laughed when I saw him, in spite of myself; 
A wink of his eye and a twist of his head, 
Soon gave me to know I had nothing to dread; 
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Figure 4 Continued 
He spoke not a word, but went straight to his work, 
And filled all the stockings; then turned with a jerk, 
And laying his finger aside of his nose, 
And giving a nod, up the chimney he rose; 
He sprang to his sleigh, to his team gave a whistle, 
And away they all flew like the down of a thistle, 
But I heard him exclaim, ere he drove out of sight, 
"Happy Christmas to all, and to all a good-night." 
 
Retrieved from pp. 3-4 of Santa Claus, last of the wild men: The origins and evolution of Saint Nicholas, spanning 
50,000 years. by Siefker, P. (1997). Jefferson, NC: McFarland. 
 
  




Audience Perceptions of the Batman Character 
This is a research survey being performed as a Lifespan Digital Communications graduate 
study at Old Dominion University. The study is seeking to measure audience perceptions of 
superheroes. Your participation in this study is strictly anonymous and any information provided 
will be held as confidential and will not be provided or sold to a third party. You may participate 
only if you are 18 years of age or older. This survey should take 3 minutes or less to complete. The 
study will be complete within several weeks’ time following this data collection. If you have any 
questions regarding the study results after it is complete, contact Joey Ponthieux, Communication 
and Theatre Arts, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, 23529.  Email: odubatmail@gmail.com 
Instructions: You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this survey. Read each 
statement carefully. Circle the number only, or mark the item, that best describes your response to 
the statement. Answer all statements or questions completely. 
I am familiar with the fictional character Batman from one or more of the following 
media: comics, television, film, video games, graphic novels, audio, other:   
Very Strongly Disagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Very Strongly Agree 
 
I engage in the following Batman media: (check all that apply) 
__Comic books     __Television Films     __Video games     __Novels     __Audio 
recordings     __Other 
 
I read or consume Batman comics or graphic novels: 
Never     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Daily 
 
I view or consume Batman films or cartoons: 
Never     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Daily 
 
Batman’s secret identity is: (check only one) 
__ Dick Grayson  
__ Bruce Wayne  
__ Jean-Paul Valley   
__ none of the above 
 
Batman’s origin begins when: (check only one)  
__ Alfred is murdered   
__ Thomas Wayne is abandoned 
__ Joe Chill finds Bruce alone   
__ none of the above 
…continued on other side 
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Batman/Bruce Wayne is psychotic (he has lost touch with reality): 
Very Strongly Disagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Very Strongly Agree 
 
Batman/Bruce Wayne suffers from Dissociative Identity Disorder (multiple 
personality disorder): 
Very Strongly Agree    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Very Strongly Disagree 
 
Batman/Bruce Wayne is severely depressed, but not psychotic, and is still able to 
function as a superhero:  
Very Strongly Disagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Very Strongly Agree 
 
It is inconceivable or implausible that Batman/Bruce Wayne could ever be severely 
depressed: 
Very Strongly Agree    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Very Strongly Disagree 
 
In your opinion, Batman’s/Bruce Wayne’s mental state is: 
Very Stable     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Very Unstable 
 
The dominant identity (ego identity or self-awareness) of the character is:  
Batman     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Bruce Wayne 
 
The identity making all of the decisions is: 
Bruce Wayne     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Batman 
 
In the following questions, try to establish the difference between identity and role. For 
example, John Doe would see himself as the identity, but if John Doe was a fireman, then 
fireman would be a role. 
In your opinion, the Batman persona is best described as:  
Identity     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Role 
 
In your opinion, the Bruce Wayne persona is best described as: 
Identity     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Role 
 
 
Please provide the year you were born _______________ 
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